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Abstract 
Queensland fruit fly (Bactrocera tryoni) (QFly) is one of Australia’s most problematic 
horticultural pests. Key pesticides traditionally used to manage the pest, fenthion and 
dimethoate, have recently been restricted, resulting in area-wide management (AWM) of 
QFly becoming a key recommended practice. AWM involves management of the entire 
pest population by coordinating management strategies across all key pest sources 
throughout a geographical region. If successful, AWM requires fewer pesticides than 
traditional farm-by-farm approaches as it reduces the overall pest pressure in a region. It 
can potentially contribute to supporting market access to QFly-sensitive markets. Success 
depends on achieving and maintaining cooperation between a critical mass of landholders 
with QFly hosts on their land as unmanaged hosts provide breeding places for QFly. The 
increased push for AWM coincides with state governments tending to reduce direct on-
ground support for pest management. It is increasingly up to local industries to take the 
reins of implementing AWM programs. 
A considerable literature about AWM is available, but it focuses mainly on technical and 
economic aspects. This research investigated the social and institutional aspects of industry-
driven AWM programs based on two research questions: (1) What social and institutional 
factors influence the success of industry-driven AWM at the local level and how can 
success be maximised?; and (2) What are the main constraints to an enabling environment 
for industry-driven AWM implementation and how can these be mitigated? 
Three case studies, together with literature about socio-ecological systems, were explored 
to answer question 1. This involved 43 semi-structured interviews, three focus groups and 
a grower survey involving 98 respondents across the cases. Question 2 was answered based 
on 33 semi-structured interviews with people operating in the broader QFly management 
innovation system, representing the technological, institutional, organisational and 
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operational aspects of the QFly domain. These findings together with the grower survey 
results were analysed through the lens of Agricultural Innovation Systems thinking. 
The research found that the feasibility of industry-driven AWM depends on factors at the 
local level and within the broader QFly management innovation system. Locally, a social 
profile favourable to AWM includes a relatively homogenous grower community; high 
levels of social capital; existing opportunities to monitor compliance; and a high ratio 
between those who have an incentive to manage QFly and those who do not. As every 
region is unique, AWM is best approached through adaptive co-management to bolster 
local QFly knowledge and support a common narrative and adaptive capacity. This 
involves ‘learning by doing’ and drawing on different knowledge systems including QFly 
biology and behaviour; market access; community engagement; and different forms of local 
knowledge. Market access requirements are best seen as ‘bolt-on’ components.  
To carry out adaptive co-management, local industries need to be able to readily access the 
needed knowledge, capabilities and resources. The broader QFly management innovation 
system needs to be responsive to meeting these needs. Training for key local stakeholders 
can assist in overcoming limited local capacities. This work found that in the multi-level 
biosecurity world, the local level can easily become disconnected. Knowledge brokers and 
interconnected innovation platforms can ensure strong two-way information flow between 
local programs and other players, such as policy-makers, researchers and market access 
personnel. Other key difficulties to local industries include the reliance on voluntary 
approaches for securing wide-spread support and establishing a sustainable income. 
Complementary policy mechanisms tailored to local conditions to back-up industry-driven 
approaches are recommended. This research makes an important contribution to 
successful future QFly management by complementing prevailing high investment in 
improving QFly management technologies.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction – Situating the problem 
1.1 Introduction 
Pests present a multi-facetted challenge to sustainable food production and they are 
spreading at an increasing rate related to the growing movement of people and goods 
across borders (Maye et al., 2012). Insect pests lower global food production by an 
estimated 14 per cent, despite the application of three million tonnes of pesticides annually 
(Pimentel, 2007). Several pests also cause restrictions to market access or necessitate costly 
preventative phytosanitary measures to avoid pest spread (Dibden et al., 2011; Quinlan, 
2004). Moreover, increased concerns about the negative impacts of pesticides limit the use 
of certain chemicals that food producers previously relied upon to manage pests 
(Mumford, 2000) thereby limiting the control options available to food producers.  
These conditions call for innovation in pest management approaches. This thesis focuses 
on one such approach, namely area-wide management (AWM). AWM involves tackling the 
entire pest population across a region in a coordinated fashion. If successfully done, it 
lowers the need for applying pesticides. However, pests are traditionally approached as a 
purely technical issue that can be solved through technological means. As the success of 
AWM is dependent on sustained collaboration between a range of people, this thesis 
extends this technocratic problem-solving approach by investigating the social and 
institutional aspects of AWM, especially when these ventures are industry-driven. In this 
thesis, institutions are defined in a broad sense as the rules, norms, or strategies that create 
incentives for certain behaviours in repetitive situations (Ostrom, 2005). They are the 
prescriptions that stipulate what actions are required, permitted, or forbidden in particular 
circumstances. In other words, institutions encompass the formal and informal 
mechanisms in play that determine how people do things in particular situations and why 
they do them one way rather than another (Marshall, 2013).  
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This study is timely as in several countries there is an increasing push for many local 
agricultural industries to be less dependent on direct government support and be more self-
reliant (Cheshire and Lawrence, 2005), including for the management of established pests 
(Donaldson, 2013). AWM is, in this context, a highly salient example of the challenges 
inherent in industry-driven approaches to managing pests. This work focuses on a specific 
kind of pest, namely Queensland fruit fly (Bactrocera tryoni) (QFly). Yet, many of the insights 
gained here have broader application to other forms of rural stakeholder cooperation and 
area-wide pest management. 
QFly forms part of the fruit fly family Tephritidae, or true fruit flies, which are the world’s 
most significant commercial horticultural pests. Every major fruit and vegetable growing 
country has programs in place to deal with members of this insect family (Malavasi, 2014). 
Fruit fly presence limits national and international market access, causes production losses 
and imposes costs for pre- and post-harvest treatments (Qin et al., 2015; White and Elson-
Harris, 1992). The total cost across the globe is estimated at US$2 billion every year, 
including impacts on production, harvesting, packing and marketing (Malavasi, 2014). 
The two species that have the most impact on Australian horticultural industries are QFly 
and Mediterranean fruit fly (Ceratitis capitata) (MedFly). Most commodities of Australia’s 
estimated AUS$9 billion horticultural industry (ABS, 2014b) are susceptible to varying 
degrees (Plant Biosecurity CRC, 2015). Between 2003 and 2008, the Australian horticultural 
industry and government invested more than AUS$128 million in the management of fruit 
flies and reducing their impact on trade. This does not include the expenditure of growers 
in fruit fly endemic areas to prevent fruit fly infestation and deliver a marketable product 
(NFFS Implementation Committee, 2009).  
QFly was chosen as the focus of this study as it has become more prevalent and 
problematic in certain parts of south-east Australia in recent years (Dominiak et al., 2015). 
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As this pest is not found anywhere else in the world, other than in certain areas on the 
eastern side of Australia and some South Pacific islands (Clarke et al., 2011), many 
horticulture importing countries impose strict requirements to ensure Australian produce 
from affected areas does not become a source of QFly infestation. Two factors exacerbate 
this challenge to horticulture growers in affected regions.  
First, most state governments in Australia have traditionally been key contributors in 
performing and supporting on-ground operations to control fruit fly or prevent it from 
establishing in certain regions. However, there is increasingly an expectation that industry 
will play the leading role in funding and managing QFly control programs, often after 
increased fruit fly pressure renders sustained investment in on-ground operational activities 
no longer economically viable (e.g. NSW DPI, 2012; Victoria State Government, 2015). 
Second, the use of two key pesticides—fenthion and dimethoate—has recently been 
restricted (APVMA, 2012; Florec et al., 2013). Many growers have traditionally used these 
pesticides to control fruit fly, as they are relatively low-cost, easy-to-apply, single-kill-step 
measures (Dominiak and Ekman, 2013; Clarke et al., 2011). The review of fenthion started 
in 1998 following concerns about the environment, human health, food residues and trade. 
It ended in October 2014, with the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines 
Authority (APVMA) cancelling active approvals and product registrations, with only very 
limited use of the chemical allowed. A phase-out period of products containing fenthion 
was allowed until October 2015 (APVMA, 2014). While the dimethoate review is still in 
progress, the use of this chemical has been restricted since October 2011 after a toxicology 
assessment revealed dietary risks (APVMA, 2016). Industry is now required to identify 
alternative ways to manage fruit fly. AWM is seen as a key alternative approach to manage 
fruit fly without reliance on heavy chemicals (PHA, 2008; Yu, 2006; Lloyd et al., 2010). 
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1.2 Literature review about AWM 
Traditional approaches to pest management usually involve a reactive approach by 
landholders where problems are addressed farm-by-farm or orchard-by-orchard as pests 
arise. In other words, only small portions of the pest population are controlled at a time 
(Hendrichs et al., 2007). The difficulty with mobile pests, such as fruit fly, is that nearby 
untreated areas, such as from backyards, derelict orchards and wild hosts, become sources 
of re-infestation (Vreysen et al., 2007a; Hendrichs et al., 2007; Klassen, 2005). Hence, the 
uncoordinated endeavours by individual landholders are normally sub-optimal for effective 
management. Uniform suppression of the total pest population across a region is more 
effective in achieving lower pest pressures than a higher level of suppression on individual 
farms (Vargas et al., 2008; Yu and Leung, 2006). 
AWM encompasses pest management strategies that are used over a wide geographical 
area, involving synchronised pest control activities across the whole area to reduce a pest 
below economic threat levels or to completely eradicate it (Elliott et al., 2008). In the 
context of fruit flies, this includes commercial horticulture operations and non-commercial 
settings described above (Vreysen et al., 2007c). The underlying principle of AWM is to 
prevent any places becoming refugia or breeding spots for the pest, which can lead to new 
population levels that cause concern (Klassen, 2004).  
The application of an area-wide approach to controlling insects is not a new invention. It 
can be traced back to various historic events, such as dealing with locust plagues over the 
last two millennia in China and human diseases spread by insect vectors, for example 
mosquitos in parts of southern Europe and north America, (Hendrichs et al., 2007; 
Klassen, 2004). Currently AWM programs exist or have been trialled across the world, 
including in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Central America, Israel, Mexico, South 
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Africa, Thailand, Tunisia and the United States. It is used to control a range of pests 
including citrus greening, codling moth, locusts, pink bollworm, ticks and tsetse fly. 
A sizable body of literature exists in relation to AWM (for example, Pimentel, 2007; 
Lindquist, 2000; Klassen, 2005; Elliott et al., 2008; Dyck et al., 2005; Yu, 2006), and fruit fly 
AWM in particular (for example, Lloyd et al., 2010; Florec et al., 2010; Vargas et al., 2010; 
Jang et al., 2006; Prokopy et al., 2003; Orankanok et al., 2007; Dowell et al., 2000; Gonzalez 
and Troncoso, 2007). However, the great majority of the fruit fly AWM literature focuses 
on the technical and economic aspects of AWM, with limited attention given to the social 
and institutional aspects (exceptions include  Mau et al., 2007; Reyes et al., 2007; Pambo et 
al., 2015). This is a significant gap, especially given that these programs comprise various 
social and institutional components which are recognised as having considerable impact on 
the success of AWM (Klassen, 2005; Hendrichs et al., 2007). In particular, to be successful, 
AWM requires the cooperation of a broad range of stakeholders, locally and beyond. The 
key social and institutional requirements for AWM identified in literature are discussed in 
the next sub-section. 
Several benefit-cost analyses have shown that fruit fly AWM can be cost-effective (Kalang 
Consultancy Services, 2008; Ha et al., 2010; Yu, 2006; Mumford, 2004). Proponents of 
AWM argue that it promises great advantages in terms of reducing the need for pesticides 
and therefore having less impact on the environment and human health, including 
preventing insecticide resistance (Hendrichs et al., 2007). In the context of QFly 
management, AWM programs are based on softer control techniques such as protein baits, 
orchard hygiene, inspections and sometimes male annihilation technique (Jessup et al., 
2007). This could be further supplemented by integrated pest management activities 
(Hendrichs et al., 2007). For example, biological control using fruit fly parasitoids, 
treatment of overwintering sites, planting and treating highly attractive hosts on the 
perimeter of commercial crops, removing unmanaged hosts such as derelict orchards or 
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wild hosts, fruit sanitation, and quarantine regulations to restrict movement of host 
produce into the AWM area (Lloyd, 2007).  
AWM also enables the use of technologies that are generally not cost-effective to individual 
growers, such as sterile insect technique (SIT) (Klassen, 2004). SIT involves a type of birth 
control, where large numbers of a target species are reared, exposed to gamma rays to 
cause sexual sterility and then released in the target region. Sterile males mate with wild 
females preventing the females from reproducing (Klassen and Curtis, 2005). SIT is 
typically applied on an area-wide basis complemented by other control technologies 
(Klassen, 2005). Large investments are currently made in Australia to strengthen the use of 
SIT to manage QFly through a research and development consortium called SITplus worth 
almost AUS$22 million (HIA, 2015). 
Regional characteristics influence the cost of AWM. Characteristics that minimise costs 
include being adjacent to naturally occurring barriers (Florec et al., 2010; Sharov, 2004), 
such as hot dry areas, mountain ranges or large bodies of water, or regions with 
unfavourable climates (Gonzalez and Troncoso, 2007). Other factors that impact on the 
cost of AWM in an area include the production value of commercial hosts, the extent of 
non-crop hosts (such as backyard fruit trees, derelict orchards, fruiting trees in the wild) 
and the type of control best suited for the landscape. QFly is known to be abundant in 
many urban areas (Clarke et al., 2011) as temperature and moisture levels are generally 
more favourable to QFly here than nearby rural areas, especially if irrigation is used in 
towns (Dominiak et al., 2006).  
AWM can be applied to achieve different goals, such as pest suppression, or it can be 
included as a formal phytosanitary measure in the trade context such as maintaining pest 
free areas or areas of low pest prevalence. The latter two are formally defined by the 
International Plant Protection Convention as follows:  
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 Pest free areas (PFAs) – Area[s] in which a specific pest does not occur as demonstrated by 
scientific evidence and in which, where appropriate, this condition is being officially maintained 
(IPPC, 2013: , p17).  
 Areas of low pest prevalence (ALPPs) – Area[s], whether all of a country, part of a 
country, or all or parts of several countries, as identified by the competent authorities, in which a 
specific pest occurs at low levels and which is subject to effective surveillance, control or eradication 
measures (IPPC, 2013: p10). 
AWM is also viewed as a good candidate to include in systems approaches for market 
access (Jamieson et al., 2013; Dominiak et al., 2015). Systems approaches are formally 
defined as ‘the integration of different risk management measures, at least two of which act independently, 
and which cumulatively achieve the appropriate level of protection against regulated pests’ (IPPC, 2013: 
p22).  
However, implementing AWM is challenging as fruit fly management exhibits many 
characteristics of a ‘wicked problem’. As will become clear throughout this thesis, the fruit 
fly problem involves many interdependencies; is multi-causal, constantly changing and 
socially complex; does not sit clearly within the responsibility of one stakeholder group; 
and requires behavioural change (Termeer et al., 2013; Australian Public Service 
Commission, 2007). These issues are resistant to policy interventions targeted at a single 
level in, for example, the jurisdictional, spatial or institutional scales or when short-term 
timeframes are involved (Termeer et al., 2013; Cash et al., 2006). Hence the social and 
institutional aspects of wicked problems are a key component of identifying and solving 
such problems. 
1.2.1 Social and institutional dimensions of AWM 
AWM needs effective partnerships, such as multi-institutional strategic collaborations 
(Reyes et al., 2007), involving stakeholders with diverse and interdependent backgrounds 
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that can contribute to different aspects of the program (Mau et al., 2007) and who are 
committed to achieving success (Elliott et al., 2008; Vreysen et al., 2007a). The relationship 
between local program management structures and higher level governance has also 
received some attention. For example, Vreysen et al. (2007a) identified that the 
management structure of successful programs tended to be flexible and independent with 
high financial and political autonomy enabling quick decision-making. Government 
interference through regulation and bureaucratic rules is minimal, but governments are 
sufficiently engaged to assist in emergencies. However, AWM also requires legal support to 
operate, such as regulations that enable access to private property (Klassen, 2005). 
Mumford (2000) identify a lack of public participation as the main problem undermining 
the success of AWM programs. Yet, the cost of public relations is easily overlooked in the 
estimated cost of proposed pest control programs (Yu, 2006). Maintaining enthusiasm and 
interest from growers and other local stakeholders, such as crop consultants, and the 
broader industry, is a key challenge to the sustainability of AWM (Ferguson and Miles, 
2002). Several authors refer to the ‘weakest link’ or ‘weaker links’ phenomena in relation to 
management of pests that are mobile, as the level of pest control is set by those 
contributors who invest the least in pest management (Perrings et al., 2002; Burnett, 2006; 
Florec et al., 2013).  
Social and institutional factors that contribute to grower cooperation include well-
functioning AWM programs, including trust-based extension services (Pambo et al., 2015; 
Ferguson and Miles, 2002). Cooperation from Darling Downs cotton growers in the 
Helicoverpa AWM program was assisted by the use of local experience and locally-gathered 
data; grower-to-grower communication; and managing grower expectations (Ferguson and 
Miles, 2002). Barnes (2007) found that cultural factors can have a significant influence on 
grower cooperation. Areas with different cultures, languages, crop types and diverse 
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outlooks on farming practices may make grower coordination and cooperation more 
challenging (Barnes, 2007; Yu, 2006).  
When town people do not understand the importance of fruit fly control it makes the 
implementation of these programs considerably more difficult (Jessup et al., 2007). AWM 
programs must meet the concerns of the urban populations to prevent adverse reactions 
and to encourage cooperation. People affected by AWM programs and to whom the 
economic impact of the program is not their primary interest are often concerned about 
other perceived possible impacts, such as on the environment or human health (Klassen, 
2005). Community engagement needs to start well before an AWM program commences to 
solicit wide support and prevent backlash from often well-intentioned, but ill-informed 
people. Public relations programs need to be well-resourced throughout the lifetime of an 
AWM program to maintain wide-spread awareness and support. Such programs need to be 
adjusted by taking into consideration the local cultural profile (Vreysen et al., 2007a). There 
is a need to create fora that allow for effective two-way communication with the 
community, and community representatives need to be engaged in the programs’ decision-
making processes (Klassen, 2005). 
Furthermore, economists argue that the attributes of a natural resource influence how users 
and other relevant parties respond to maintaining it, especially in relation to excludability 
and subtractability. Excludability refers to the ability to exclude others from the benefits of 
a resource. Subtractability refers to whether consumption of the resource lowers the 
availability of the resource to others (Ostrom, 2005). Fruit fly management is seen as an 
industry good, as the main benefits of pest control are directly and fully apportioned to 
certain industries or farmers (Abdalla et al., 2012). However, related to the ‘weaker link’ 
public good argument (Perrings et al., 2002), it can be argued that the absence (or low 
prevalence) of QFly in the context of AWM resembles a common-pool resource, i.e. a 
resource with low excludability and high subtractability. Landholders who are not 
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controlling the pest on their properties are reducing resource benefits to farmers who are 
carrying out pest control, as the former provides breeding spots for the pest which harms 
the resource for all users (implying high subtractability). Hence, the social dilemmas of 
free-riding and ‘opting-out’ associated with common-pool resources also apply in the 
context of mobile pest management and must be considered in AWM program design. For 
example, if a critical mass of landholders is following recommended practice, thereby 
lowering QFly prevalence in the region, those who are not following suit cannot be 
excluded from the benefits, i.e. they are free-riding. This may provide an incentive not to 
invest in pest control. Likewise, landholders witnessing others doing little to address QFly 
on their properties may have a perverse incentive to use this observation as an ‘opt out 
clause’ by asking ‘Why should I control the pest if they don’t?’ (Ostrom, 1990; Anderies et 
al., 2004). Several others (e.g. Reid et al., 2009; Davis and Harrison, 1999; Ferguson and 
Miles, 2002) also identified that one stakeholder group’s lack of pest control can discourage 
other landholders from controlling the pest on their properties. 
However, despite being negatively affected by risk contributors who under-invest in pest 
management, those who invest more might still enjoy better crop protection than those 
investing less (Burnett, 2006). This implies that landholders who are economically or 
otherwise negatively affected by QFly still have an incentive to manage the pest on their 
land, regardless of what others do. Landholders who have little incentive to manage QFly 
and who would have to do so for the greater good of the local horticultural industry can be 
expected to be more likely to ‘opt out’ if they witness QFly not being addressed on land 
elsewhere. 
Scholars have found that the biophysical attributes of natural resources also influence the 
ability to achieve a resource management program design that is well supported by 
stakeholders. Two main biophysical attributes that hinder collective action between 
resource users include resource mobility and storage (Agrawal, 2001; Ostrom, 2005; 
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Poteete et al., 2010). Fruit fly has high mobility attributes as it is a mobile pest and it can 
also ‘hitchhike’ with travellers into fruit fly sensitive areas (Dominiak and Coombes, 2009). 
In terms of storage capability, the benefits of having no or low fruit fly prevalence can also 
not be stored, such as water in a lake or holding on to a common herd of cattle. Mobility 
and lack of storage capability increase the transaction costs of finding suitable solutions for 
resource maintenance as these factors reduce the predictability of resource availability 
(Agrawal, 2001; Poteete et al., 2010).  
To summarise, the social and institutional aspects are likely to be more significant when 
AWM is industry-driven. The success of AWM will be influenced by the difficulty of local 
industries to find suitable partners to support them in their endeavours to achieve AWM. 
Cooperation from risk contributors is challenged by the common-pool nature, the mobility 
of fruit fly and the lack of storage capability of no/low fruit fly prevalence. It suggests that 
the institutional context for QFly management needs to be designed specifically to support 
local industries to achieve AWM. 
1.3 This study 
The research presented in this thesis examines the social and institutional aspects of 
industry-driven AWM that impact on the success of these ventures. The empirical context 
is the Australian horticultural sector. This study has two key research questions that have 
been answered across five journal articles (see Box 1): 
1. What social and institutional factors influence the success of industry-driven AWM at 
the local level and how can success be maximised? (Phase 1) 
2. What are the main constraints to an enabling environment for industry-driven AWM 
implementation and how can these be mitigated? (Phase 2) 
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Box 1. Overview of the journal articles produced 
PHASE 1 
Article 1: Designing local institutions for cooperative pest management to underpin market 
access: the case of industry-driven area-wide fruit fly management. (Published in the 
International Journal of the Commons.) In this article Ostrom’s design principles for robust 
common-pool resource institutions (Anderies et al., 2004; Poteete et al., 2010; Cox et al., 2010; 
Ostrom, 1990) are applied to case study findings to demonstrate the important influence of regional 
communities’ social profile on their ability to achieve AWM.  
Article 2: Adaptive co-management for collaborative commercial pest management: the 
case of industry-driven fruit fly area-wide management. (Published in the International Journal 
of Pest Management.) Adaptive co-management provides a pragmatic way for local industries to 
initiate local collective fruit fly management initiatives. Key principles contained in the adaptive co-
management literature are used as a lens through which the case study findings are explored to 
better understand what enables AWM. 
PHASE 2 
Article 3: “Smart regulation” and community collaboration in Australia’s modern 
biosecurity context (under review with the journal Rural Society – the first round of reviewers’ 
feedback has been incorporated). A key challenge to industry-driven AWM is achieving wide-spread 
voluntary cooperation amongst fruit fly risk contributors, including growers, town residents and 
other landholders. Case study findings; theoretical considerations about the role of community in 
biosecurity; and experiences elsewhere contributed to identifying four options for dealing with this 
challenge. 
Article 4: Creating an enabling environment for industry-driven pest suppression: the case 
of suppressing Queensland fruit fly through area-wide management. (Published in the 
Agricultural Systems journal.) In an era of limited on-ground government support institutional 
innovation is required to ensure that the QFly management innovation system is designed such that 
it makes readily available the knowledge, capabilities and resources that local industries need to 
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achieve AWM. Agricultural innovation systems (AIS) thinking is applied to identify how to create 
an enabling institutional environment that will support local industries in their quest to achieve 
QFly suppression through AWM. The main blocking mechanisms in the current support system are 
identified and they guide pinpointing key opportunities for improvement based on a structural-
functional analysis (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011; Bergek et al., 2008; Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012).  
Article 5: Helping local industries help themselves in a multi-level biosecurity world – 
Dealing with the impact of horticultural pests in the trade arena (Published in NJAS 
(Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences).) This paper applies the same approach as article 4, but with 
a key focus on achieving market access using a systems approach involving AWM. 
The first question is explored in Phase 1 of the research, which involves a case study 
approach in three diverse areas in New South Wales and Queensland where AWM for 
QFly has been implemented (or attempted). This comparative analysis is undertaken to 
understand, from a social and institutional perspective, what enables or hinders progress in 
and the success of these endeavours. Findings are considered by drawing on the social-
ecological systems framework (Figure 1) (Ostrom, 2007; McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014) and 
associated rationales.  
The second question is explored in Phase 2, based on interviewing people who work in key 
roles in the broader QFly management innovation system, including representatives from 
three levels of government, peak industry bodies, researchers, consultants and regional 
coordinators. A grower survey also sheds light on both research questions. The research 
methodology and methods are explained in greater detail in Chapter 2. 
The key contribution that this work makes is to deepen understanding about the social and 
institutional aspects of industry-driven fruit fly AWM as this area remains underexplored. 
Other academic contributions are discussed in Chapter 5, such as to socio-ecological 
systems thinking, including the commons and adaptive co-management. There are also 
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contributions to community engagement about pest management and the agricultural 
innovation systems rationale in the context of plant biosecurity. 
1.4 AWM as an action situation 
The conceptual foundation for this study from which the journal articles flow, is that 
AWM is an ‘action situation’ as proposed by Ostrom (1990). This is depicted in the socio-
ecological systems framework illustrated in Figure 1. The regional level involves interaction 
between different components: 
 Actors – that is, the risk contributors (horticulture growers and other rural 
landholders who contribute to QFly risk) and others who can influence the success 
of an AWM program, such as local AWM management groups members, crop 
consultants, researchers, market access experts, community groups and other 
relevant staff in government bodies, grower associations, research and development 
corporations and peak industry bodies. 
 A governance system – that is, the local formal and informal institutions that 
outline how the program and its management operate. 
 The natural resource – that is, no or low QFly prevalence. Key natural factors that 
impact on QFly prevalence include the pest’s natural behaviour, biology and 
ecology. 
Each component can be sub-divided into multiple variables. Several of these could be sub-
divided yet again in different variables, as illustrated by the stacked text boxes. These 
components are also embedded in and impacted by broader systems that can either hinder 
or enable local initiatives. These include broader ecosystem processes, such as climate 
change, and the social, economic and political context that sets conditions for the local 
governance system and the decision-making of actors. For example, the local AWM 
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governance system is embedded amongst others in the broader national and international 
plant biosecurity governance system. 
 
Figure 1. Applying the socio-ecological systems framework as a lens for QFly AWM 
(adapted from McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014) 
Traditionally, improving on-ground pest and disease management—like other agricultural 
on-farm practices—has been conceptualised as in need of transferring expert knowledge, 
such as from relevant scientists, to farmers. Increasingly social scientists call for better 
integration of different knowledge systems, such as scientific expertise, local knowledge 
and other, to achieve on-ground progress (Klerkx et al., 2012b; Enticott and Wilkinson, 
2013; Reed and Curzon, 2015). This is in part to be cognizant of and work with factors that 
influence stakeholder support—including on-ground behaviour change and adoption of 
new practices—and that stretch beyond the transfer of scientific facts. These factors 
include things such as the norms, values, risk perception, attitudes, motivations, goals, 
capabilities, capacities and the resource availability of different stakeholders. In addition, 
modern approaches to achieving on-ground progress in agriculture emphasise systemic 
thinking. Besides technological advances, this also includes a focus on the multitude of 
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interactions between players and the institutional context across levels (Klerkx et al., 2012b; 
Schut et al., 2014). As biosecurity at its core is about risk management, increasingly social 
scientists push for greater acknowledgement of the biophysical, social and institutional 
uncertainties involved in biosecurity management and how it is being approached (Reed 
and Curzon, 2015; Cook et al., 2010). 
The key arguments that this thesis postulates include that the social and institutional 
aspects of industry-driven AWM influence the transaction costs of achieving industry-
driven AWM and therefore have a major bearing of the feasibility of such programs. For 
example, the local social profile influences the effort needed to introduce and maintain 
local institutions for AWM, including achieving cooperation from risk contributors and 
gaining support from other stakeholders. It also relates to the effort and cost required from 
local industries in order to secure the needed support in the form of knowledge, capabilities 
and resources. Such transaction costs are easily overlooked when benefit-cost analysis of 
AWM programs is carried out.  
In reference to Figure 1, this study focuses on the actors, governance system, the action 
situation at the local level, as well as how an enabling institutional environment can be 
created to support industry-driven AWM. These aspects will be explored throughout the 
subsequent chapters as they encapsulate the social and institutional aspects of industry-
driven AWM. The rest of Chapter 1 will provide the context of this work by describing the 
remaining components presented in Figure 1, that is, the current resource system, including 
QFly behaviour, biology and ecology and how these factors impact on QFly pressure. This 
is followed by an overview of the current social, political and economic settings and the 
current broader QFly management governance system. 
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1.4.1 The influence of QFly behaviour, biology & ecology on QFly pressure 
QFly was once considered native to the tropical and subtropical forests and mangroves of 
Queensland and northern New South Wales only (Dominiak and Ekman, 2013; Gilchrist et 
al., 2006). Nowadays it is more widely established throughout parts of eastern Australia and 
has invaded some South Paciﬁc islands (Clarke et al., 2011). Three key factors influence the 
survival and reproduction of QFly in any region, these comprising temperature, moisture 
(Bateman, 1972; Dominiak et al., 2006) and the availability of hosts (Clarke et al., 2011; 
Muthuthantri, 2013). Significant differences in QFly susceptibility exist between hosts 
depending on the season, fruit maturity, the physical characteristics of the host plant (such 
as whether the fruit’s skin and flesh is suitable to support QFly activity), and the nature of 
the host plant foliage for shelter (Lloyd, 2007).  
Throughout the warmer months, the female lays her eggs in maturing and ripe fruit. 
Hatching maggots and other related decay can cause extensive crop losses (Clarke et al., 
2011). Female adults live for several months and each can lay hundreds of eggs in her 
lifetime (O'Loughlin et al., 1984). Hence such conditions can generate five overlapping 
generations or more per year, causing large populations in late summer and autumn 
(Dominiak, 2007). As climate affects the time a generation takes to mature, there are 
significant differences between regions in terms of how growers are affected by the pest, 
such as between temperate and tropical areas (Muthuthantri, 2013). Humidity as a result of 
irrigation can also make a region more favourable to QFly (Ha et al., 2010). 
Extreme high or low temperature can significantly reduce and even temporarily eliminate 
fruit fly populations in a region (Lloyd, 2007). Fruit fly becomes less active during winter 
(Dominiak and Ekman, 2013; Yonow and Sutherst, 1998), and in some areas fruit fly 
pressure in spring is related to whether the region had a cold or mild winter . It is, 
therefore, not uncommon to find significant variation in fruit fly pressures between seasons 
and consecutive years, due to natural conditions (Florec et al., 2013).  
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Recent years involved wet warm seasons in eastern Australia resulting in expanded QFly 
populations in several regions (Dominiak and Ekman, 2013). The vulnerability of 
horticulture industries to QFly in Australia’s southern states is forecasted to increase 
significantly due to the predicted temperature rise resulting from climate change (Sutherst 
et al., 2000).  
The distances across which QFly travels are critical to explaining why AWM is a potentially 
useful tool, but also why the non-farm community’s involvement is essential. Several 
studies show that an individual QFly travels a few hundred metres to a few kilometres in a 
lifetime (Clarke et al., 2011; Meats and Edgerton, 2008; Dominiak and Ekman, 2013). 
Distances as far as 94 km per fly have also been recorded (MacFarlane et al., 1987), but this 
is regarded as highly uncommon (Dominiak et al., 2003). Yet, Clarke et al. (2011) calls for 
finding resolution about QFly’s true flight distance. Even if flight distances are limited to a 
few hundred metres, this is still of considerable concern in regions where orchards are 
adjacent to towns, such as in Mundubbera (Central Burnett, Queensland) and Leeton (the 
Riverina, New South Wales) (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Orchards adjacent to town areas in Mundubbera (left) and Leeton (right) 
1.4.2 The social and political context of plant biosecurity 
Pests have been a challenge to humankind since time immemorial. Globalisation, 
modernisation and a range of concurrent paradigms and discourses have shaped how the 
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issue is framed and dealt with (Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008). This section provides an 
overview of the international and national paradigms and developments that influence the 
way pests, including QFly, are perceived and approached in the agriculture policy space. In 
other words, it uncovers the underlying and often hidden assumptions about social and 
political connections that shape and influence policies, including who is included and who 
might be marginalised or excluded (Keevers et al., 2008). Macro-level discourses involve a 
set of interrelated thoughts, expressions and practices that are embedded in history 
(Foucault, 2002). Discourse shapes how certain issues are discussed or supressed, as well as 
when and by whom. Hence it determines which interventions are promoted or restrained 
and what changes will be introduced (Keevers et al., 2008). For example, the rebranding of 
the centuries-old practice of addressing agricultural pest and disease issues as biosecurity is 
noteworthy as it demonstrates how current societal concerns about globalisation influence 
agriculture in new ways (Waage and Mumford, 2008). Biosecurity brings ‘life’ into society’s 
political realms, including favouring certain forms of life over others (Braun, 2013). 
Paradigms and discourse shape the roles and responsibilities of the state, industry and the 
broader community. Most fundamentally, biosecurity represents a social and institutional 
construct that is historical rather than universal in nature (Braun, 2013). This involves 
multiple ways of safeguarding agricultural space from pests and diseases (Hinchliffe, 2007). 
Outlining the social and political dimensions of biosecurity is not to dismiss current 
biosecurity efforts, but to understand what underpins current approaches and rationales 
(Braun, 2013). 
Neoliberalism and trade liberalisation 
Globalisation brought with it neoliberal thinking, a loose assemblage of ideas that resulted 
in increased market rule approaches in modern societies (Maye et al., 2012). Key themes of 
neoliberalism include a shrinking role for the state in society, an increase of the role of 
markets and consequently deregulation. During the 1980s, Australia became a supporter of 
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international discourses around neoliberalism (Dibden et al., 2011; Halpin and Guilfoyle, 
2004; Gill, 2011; Measham et al., 2012). Australia is a strong advocate of a ‘level playing 
field’ in the international trade arena (The Cairns Group, 2013) underpinned by trade 
liberalisation and the minimisation of domestic agricultural support. This in part results 
from Australia being a highly export-focused country, which seeks to increase its 
competitiveness against international opponents, where farmers are protected and/or 
subsidised (Dibden et al., 2011). Indeed, agricultural policy scholars universally describe 
Australia as deploying a neoliberal policy paradigm (see for example Coleman, 2001; 
Pritchard, 2005; Gray and Lawrence, 2001; Alston, 2004; Higgins et al., 2016).  
Similarly, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC), promote free trade while using a science-based approach in a bid to 
minimise biosecurity risk. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (the ‘SPS Agreement’) provides the principal rules for maintaining animal and 
plant health during international trade (WTO, 1998). Government agencies in member 
countries need to fulfil a range of roles and responsibilities under WTO arrangements, 
including conducting import risk assessments to distinguish genuine biosecurity measures 
from unwarranted justification for trade protection (Alam and Rolfe, 2006; Dibden et al., 
2011). For example, the IPPC develops International Standards for Phytosanitary Measures 
(ISPMs) that allow for assurances that pest risks are addressed. The first systems approach-
related ISPM, ISPM 14, appeared in 2002 followed by ISPM 35 in 2012 specifically for fruit 
flies. Other relevant standards include for areas of low pest prevalence (ALPP) (ISPM 29 
and 30) and for fruit fly pest-free areas (ISPM 26 and 29), both commonly supported by an 
AWM approach. There are also nationally agreed principles and procedures to manage 
surveillance, trapping, outbreaks and eradication from fruit fly pest free areas. 
In other words, these processes attempt to render biosecurity and increased international 
trade as compatible aims (Maye et al., 2012) by harmonising biosecurity practices between 
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countries (Dibden et al., 2011; IPPC, 2006). Hence, agriculture-related policies and 
activities, including in relation to AWM, are increasingly aligned with international market 
logics (Maye et al., 2012; Outhwaite, 2013) and less so on local needs and priorities 
(Wissemann et al., 2003; Outhwaite, 2013).  
Trade liberalisation and biosecurity are contested spaces, as the adequacy of science-based 
and regulatory approaches to manage biosecurity is increasingly critiqued (Maye et al., 2012; 
Dibden et al., 2011; Outhwaite, 2010). Politics influence trade-related decisions and the 
framing of scientific information (Simberloff, 2005; Dibden et al., 2011; Maye et al., 2012; 
Potter, 2013), for example, during import risk assessments (Potter, 2013; Higgins and 
Dibden, 2011). Governments are often torn between trade obligations, domestic 
agricultural industry demands and consumers’ wishes for cheaper food. The long list of 
WTO SPS disputes suggests that governments still use SPS measures as de facto trade 
barriers to protect their own industries (Trampusch, 2014). 
The ‘risk society’ and categorisation 
Biosecurity management presents a prime example of the ‘risk society’, which involves 
modern society increasingly being concerned about assessing and controlling risks to 
personal safety, health and the environment and who is responsible for addressing these 
issues. It means society organises itself around the distribution of ‘bads’ rather than ‘goods’ 
(Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1999). In the context of QFly management this involves greater 
scrutiny of pesticide safety and finding systematic, science-based ways to deal with the risk 
of pest spread through trade. 
Hence, there is a presumption that processes of categorisation, ordering and accompanying 
rules can stem the flow of unwanted organisms from ‘unclean’ infested areas to ‘clean(er)’ 
controlled areas and provide assurances that produce is free of unwanted organisms. In 
particular, control of human behaviour is seen as the key mechanism to achieve desired 
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outcomes (Donaldson and Wood, 2004) in a realm that in practice involves a complex 
interplay between the environment, host plants, humans and the problematic organism, 
here QFly.  
The positivist approach  
A consequence of the WTO’s and IPPC’s activities, the SPS Agreement and the focus on 
science-based evidence is that biosecurity is generally approached as a ‘ technocratic 
discourse’ by governments and agriculture industries (Dibden et al., 2011; Potter, 2013). 
This involves a positivist mode of thinking based on objective and absolute knowledge. 
Schut et al. (2014) conducted a meta-analysis of crop protection literature and concluded 
that the great majority of publications are technology-oriented with the institutional and 
political dimensions of crop protection seldom addressed. Enticott and Wilkinson (2013) 
point out that biosecurity is characterised by the formation of ‘knowledge hierarchies’ 
dominated by a rational, natural science perspective. It follows that biosecurity policy tends 
to assume spatial homogeneity (Larsen, 2009). However, as implied in the earlier 
discussions about fruit fly AWM and QFly management, in reality biosecurity responses 
involve a complex interaction of the geospatial, behavioural and biological sciences 
(Enticott and Wilkinson, 2013). Hence, some argue for a shift in thinking from ‘breach 
points’ based on reductionist thinking towards thinking around ‘tipping points’ caused by 
the interaction of different conditions that together could cause ‘bio-insecurities’ 
(Hinchliffe et al., 2013). 
New Public Management and rural restructuring 
The support for neoliberal approaches is also informed by New Public Management, an 
approach that supposes that market-oriented management of the public sector leads to a 
more efficient government (Hood, 1991; Johnston, 2000). This includes a shift in 
government approaches from public service to service delivery, involving privatisation of 
traditional government services, corporatisation of the way the public service is managed 
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and an increased emphasis on public-private partnerships (Gahan, 2007; Connell et al., 
2009).  
These rationales resulted in an on-going systematic restructuring of rural Australia 
(Cheshire and Lawrence, 2005; Dibden et al., 2009; Martin and Ritchie, 1999), where 
governments took on the role of facilitator of progress and development rather than direct 
actor in agriculture, as with other economic sectors (Rose, 2000; Gill, 2011; Wissemann et 
al., 2003). The rural policy direction of governments in Australia, at both federal and state 
levels, has shifted to service rationalisation to achieve economic efficiency (Gerritsen, 
2000b), involving progressive cut-backs of the extensive farmer support of previous 
decades (Bjørkhaug and Richards, 2008) and employing strategies favouring self-reliance 
(Cheshire and Lawrence, 2005). This approach was supported by farmers’ lobbies, like the 
National Farmers’ Federation, so that Australia and New Zealand were alone among 
OECD nations in reducing agricultural support mechanisms (Gerritsen, 2000a). The 
philosophy is to bring farmers closer to international market signals to deliver efficient 
commodity production where market forces play a key role in shaping rural development 
(Measham et al., 2012; Martin and Ritchie, 1999). Australian farmers are now some of the 
least government-supported farmers in the world (OECD, 2013; Gerritsen, 2000a). 
Ironically, in the context of AWM—which requires collective action—some term it the 
‘individualisation’ of risk, whereby the responsibility for managing the risks of modern life 
has been redistributed from the government and the economy to the individual (Cheshire 
and Lawrence, 2005). 
Shared responsibility and partnerships 
The increased emphasis on public-private partnerships has left its mark on biosecurity 
policy. During 2008 an independent investigation of Australia’s biosecurity system, the 
Beale Review, titled ‘One Biosecurity: a working partnership’ (Beale et al., 2008), was 
released. This followed the Nairn Report, titled ‘Australian quarantine – a shared 
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responsibility’ (Nairn et al., 1996). The concepts of biosecurity as a partnership and a 
shared responsibility between government, industry and the community are now key 
themes in key strategic biosecurity documents of both the Australian Government and the 
state and territory governments. This includes the recent National Fruit Fly Research, 
Development and Extension Plan (Plant Biosecurity CRC, 2015). The shared responsibility 
beyond industry is justified with the notion that the broader Australian community derive 
benefits from sound biosecurity, including better food security and quality, stronger trade 
and greater environmental preservation (Fraser, 2016). 
However, the concept of partnership and the appropriate roles and responsibilities of 
different partners are contested. The nature of the bond between government and citizen 
can be understood differently by each party. Responsibilities attributed by the state to the 
other two parties does not guarantee that they accept and enact these (Gill, 2011). A lack of 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities, transparency and good communication results in 
ambiguity and tension (Higgins et al., 2016). Some question whether the broader 
community is a true partner, as it has limited opportunity to shape the biosecurity agenda 
(Barker, 2010). Donaldson (2013) posits that in this context the community’s biosecurity 
responsibilities become an extension of government and agriculture industries’ biosecurity 
apparatus, often for trade-related aims.  
Enticott and Franklin (2009) argue that government remains the most powerful partner in 
the partnership systems, as it has superior expertise and it is able to give effect to its 
ambitions through a range of mechanisms such as programs, policies, documents and 
procedures. Hence, the state has unique resources and abilities, including legislative powers, 
democratic legitimacy, staff and budgets (Carlsson and Sandström, 2007). 
From industry’s perspective, the biosecurity roles and responsibilities of government 
stemming from international and national institutions make government a QFly 
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management partner with many faces. For example, the ‘faces’ of state governments 
include:  
 regulators that increasingly shape policies to mirror international plant biosecurity 
and market access rules set by the WTO and IPPC  
 implementers of national and international trade rules such as those contained in 
trade protocols, including doing auditing of policies and procedures, issuing 
accreditation certifications, and inspecting fruit destined for certain markets 
 negotiator for market access to other domestic states and territories  
 funder and in-kind contributor to QFly-related activities, including research and 
other support activities  
 local partner in achieving AWM for a range of regions, including advising on how 
to apply in-field QFly control to maximise chances to gain market access and win 
extended support from government.  
The first three roles are similar for the Australian Government in assisting Australian 
growers to gain access to international markets. This illustrates the unique relationship, but 
also the power differential that exists between horticulture industries and government 
agencies at all levels.  
Clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of the different partners is further challenged 
by determining how to best invest scarce resources for biosecurity, as the sources and 
potential impacts of biosecurity risks are multiple (Craik et al., 2016; Donaldson, 2013). 
Agricultural biosecurity is now part of a broader biosecurity agenda that also includes 
addressing environmental biosecurity concerns. More diverse biosecurity threats 
increasingly come to the fore, requiring agricultural biosecurity resources to be increasingly 
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thinly spread (Waage et al., 2005). For example, the increased push for expanded tropical 
horticulture in northern parts of Australia will require more investment in understanding 
Australia’s endemic tropical fruit flies (Plant Biosecurity CRC, 2015). Trade-offs are needed 
between pre-border, border and post-border protection, and between reducing impacts on 
agriculture trade and production, the environment and social amenity (Cook et al., 2011). 
Investment prioritising is further needed between prevention, eradication, containment and 
asset protection (Fraser et al., 2006; Waage and Mumford, 2008). A key principle 
underpinning contemporary biosecurity spending is maximum return on investment (Cook 
et al., 2010; Beale et al., 2008). 
Agriculture’s loss of hegemony 
Agriculture has lost its hegemony in rural areas during the last few decades as new groups 
and interests have gained prominence (Dibden et al., 2009; Bjørkhaug and Richards, 2008). 
Many rural areas have seen a growing diversity amongst rural actors (Groth et al., 2014) 
and hence competition between them. This implies that policy-makers have to deal with 
more social, economic (Enticott and Franklin, 2009) and environmental pressures (Argent, 
2002). Some Australian rural areas have experienced an influx of people involved in 
mining, tourism and agriculture value-adding industries (Wissemann et al., 2003; Miller et 
al., 2012). This means growers can no longer expect that their interests, such as a wishing 
for drastic action to manage QFly, will be prioritised over those of other groups inhabiting 
the rural space. 
1.4.3 The economic context of Australian horticulture 
During the 1980s and 1990s Australia witnessed strong agricultural productivity growth, 
which has been largely attributed to extensive neoliberal microeconomic reform that 
provided greater incentives for innovation and improved performance. The 
microeconomic reform strategies included opening the economy to competition, trade and 
investment and the deregulation of industries and institutions (Nossal and Gooday, 2009). 
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They contributed to significant growth in the production value of Australian horticulture. 
For example, the production value for fruit rose between 1982 and 2012 from AUS$632.1 
million to AUS$3506.2 million and for vegetables from AUS$556.9 million to AUS$3417.5 
million per year (ABARES, 2012).  
However, there is also evidence that hard-line neoliberal approaches have caused 
considerable hardship in rural Australia. Whereas most of Australia’s metropolitan areas 
have benefited from neoliberal approaches over the last few decades, many areas in rural 
Australia have experienced negative trends, such as a loss of farmers, depopulation, 
increased unemployment, ageing population and withdrawal of services and private 
investments (Cheshire and Lawrence, 2005; Dibden et al., 2009; Vanclay, 2003; Alston, 
2004). Many Australian farmers are struggling to maintain viability (Halpin and Guilfoyle, 
2004) or, at least, becoming increasingly vulnerable (Dibden et al., 2009). For example, the 
Productivity Commission (2002), in reference to unpublished ABS data, indicates that in 
1993–1994 there were well over 3,500 citrus establishments in Australia, whereas by June 
2015, this figure was 1,120 (ABS, 2016a). In short, there are many fewer farms than in the 
past, but there has been a shift to larger farms. Most output is delivered by a small 
proportion of farms, involving large commercial operations (Productivity Commission, 
2005). 
The two main industries covered in this work are the citrus and cherry industries. The 
citrus industry, the largest exporter of fresh produce in Australian horticulture, had a local 
value of AUS$411 million during 2014–2015 (ABS, 2016b), an increase from the equivalent 
value in 2000–2001 of AUS$309 million (ABS, 2003). During the 2000s it experienced 
several challenging years involving drought, wet summers and a record high Australian 
dollar. The industry’s fortunes turned around in 2012–2013 with increased export demand 
and stronger prices (Citrus Australia, 2013). The 2014–2015 season brought high export 
demand and a better growing season, resulting in a ten year record citrus export value 
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(Citrus Australia, 2015) estimated in the order of AUS$275 million for the 2015 calendar 
year (Fresh Intelligence Consulting, 2016). These exports involve a total of almost 200,000 
tonnes of citrus, comprising almost 150,000 tonnes of oranges and almost 50,000 tonnes of 
mandarins (ibid.). The Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and 
Transport undertook a review of the citrus industry in 2013. Key challenges identified for 
the Australian citrus industry included high production costs related to high electricity, 
water, regulation and labour costs, while the industry faced direct competition with lower-
cost offshore producers, such as from South Africa, Chile and Peru. Phytosanitary 
concerns, of which QFly is a key one, are a major barrier to expanding exports to protocol 
countries. The export protocols that growers are required to comply with can be onerous, 
expensive, and time-consuming to meet. Growers also face competition from imported 
cheap fruit juice concentrate (SSCRRAT, 2013). 
The cherry industry has also undergone remarkable growth since the early 2000s. The local 
value of the Australian cherry industry was AUS$ 55.5 million in 2001 (ABS, 2003) and 
rose to over AUS$133.7 million during 2014–2015 (ABS, 2016b). The industry reached an 
export record 5,600 tonnes during the favourable 2015–16 season, valued at around 
AUS$77 million (CGA, 2016). Australian cherries are exported to over 30 countries (ibid.). 
There is opportunity to further grow exports as more growers show interest in supplying 
overseas countries and most current export markets show growth in their cherry imports. 
Over the last decade the Australian cherry industry, or parts thereof, was plagued by a 
strong Australian dollar for most of the period from 2008 to 2014. In some cases non-
protocol countries became protocol countries, such as Thailand, which caused a temporary 
loss of this market. Further challenges for market expansion include high production costs; 
growers lacking export ‘readiness’ including a lack of export knowledge, limited pest free 
areas and strong competitors in the southern hemisphere, in particular Chile and New 
Zealand (CGA & HAL, no date). Tasmania and the Riverland in South Australia are 
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recognised internationally as pest free areas (CGA & HAL, no date) and they therefore 
enjoy better export conditions than the other mainland cherry growing regions. 
In terms of future economic conditions, a range of new bi- and multi-lateral agreements 
that were signed during the last three years promise better trade opportunities for 
Australian horticulture. These include the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (HIA, 
2016) and free trade agreements with Korea, Japan and China (Hyde, 2015). It is foreseen 
that the free trade agreements will reduce or eliminate import tariffs on several Australian 
agricultural exports to these countries over the coming 20 years. For example, as part of the 
China FTA, all tariffs on horticulture, including tariffs of up to 30 per cent on citrus, will 
be removed over eight years. As part of the FTA with Japan, the 24 per cent tariff on 
cherries was eliminated when the agreement commenced on 15 January 2015 (ibid.). 
However, QFly as a technical barrier that either prevents market access or requires costly 
phytosanitary measures, remains a key concern to horticultural industry stakeholders 
(Metcalfe, 2015). It must therefore be addressed for the full benefit of these arrangements 
and for increased exports to be realised.  
1.4.4 QFly management governance context 
This section provides an overview of the key regulatory activities and instruments across 
the international, national and state and territory levels. 
Trade requirements 
In the international trade context, the IPPC develops International Standards for 
Phytosanitary Measures (ISPMs) that allows for assurance that imports are not the source 
of pests. According to WTO policies, compliance with ISPMs are consistent with the SPS 
Agreement (WTO, 1998). A number of ISPMs are relevant to fruit fly AWM as AWM 
underpins phytosanitary measures such as PFAs and ALPPs. The most relevant ISPMs are: 
 ISPM 04 – Requirements for the establishment of pest free areas 
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 ISPM 14 – The use of integrated measures in a systems approach for pest risk 
management 
 ISPM 22 – Requirements for the establishment of areas of low pest prevalence 
 ISPM 26 – Establishment of pest free areas for fruit flies (Tephritidae) 
 ISPM 29 – Recognition of pest free areas and areas of low pest prevalence  
 ISPM 30 – Establishment of areas of low pest prevalence for fruit flies (Tephritidae) 
 ISPM 35 – Systems approach for pest risk management of fruit flies (Tephritidae)  
 ISPM 37 – Determination of host status of fruit to fruit flies (Tephritidae) 
Australian horticulture industries wishing to pursue technical international market access, 
such as with strict phytosanitary conditions, need to submit their applications to a specially-
appointed industry panel. The application typically requires the inclusion of rigorous data 
as evidence in support of the proposed market entry; hence such applications are often 
preceded by a thorough research and development process. The panel considers the 
proposals and is responsible for assisting Horticulture Innovation Australia to provide 
advice to the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (DAWR) about the 
prioritisation of horticulture market access applications. DAWR is responsible for 
international market access protocol negotiations. Until mid-2015, this panel was the Office 
of Horticulture Market Access. It has been replaced by the Trade Assessment Panel, which 
is supported by an Industry Advisory Panel (HIA, 2015). Technical international market 
access application processes are often long and arduous and it can take many years before 
access is granted. 
Application for domestic market access follows a different process. The Subcommittee on 
Domestic Quarantine and Market Access oversees the development of domestic market 
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access conditions for horticulture to ensure they are technically justified with minimal 
regulatory burdens on industry; harmonised and coordinated as far as possible; and aligned 
with international import and export market access conditions and policies (SDQMA, 
2016). Increasingly domestic trade is modelled on international trade arrangements as an 
exemplar. Over time successful domestic protocols then strengthen evidence to support 
international market access applications using the same protocol (NFFS Implementation 
Committee, 2009). 
Most pertinent to domestic market access is the interstate certification assurance (ICA) 
scheme, which governs the movement of horticultural produce throughout Australia 
(Jessup et al., 2007). This scheme involves various protocols to provide assurances to 
importing states that certain pest risks have been addressed following verifiable standard 
operating procedures, many relating to QFly.  
Australia’s QFly management Code of Practice is a key guidance document outlining rules 
recognised by domestic and some international markets as the basis for controlling QFly 
and developing international market access opportunities. The current Code (1996) is 
regarded as outdated partly because it does not make allowance for more recent measures 
such as maintaining areas of low pest prevalence. The Code contains detailed prescriptions, 
including the type of QFly monitoring traps required, their spacing specifications in the 
context of pest free areas and thresholds for the number of flies caught per trap before 
corrective action is required (IPHRWG, 1996).  
Other aspects of Australian fruit fly management coordination and regulation 
Australian plant biosecurity involves a multitude of committees, sub-committees, working 
groups, agreements, legislation and regulations, many of which impact to a greater or lesser 
extent on QFly management. However, a full overview of Australia’s plant biosecurity 
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system falls outside the scope of this document and only key components are summarised 
here. 
Australia has a centralised approach to biosecurity governance (Cook et al., 2010). Within 
Australia, plant biosecurity management is controlled through Commonwealth and state 
legislation, administered through a range of government departments across all 
jurisdictions responsible for agricultural and environmental issues (PHA, 2012). The 
Australian Government, in particular DAWR, is mainly responsible for post-border 
(offshore) and border biosecurity issues (Cook et al., 2010; Beale et al., 2008). DAWR plays 
a limited role in establishing and managing regional QFly management initiatives. However, 
it is responsible for fulfilling international phytosanitary obligations, such as certifying 
produce for compliance with international phytosanitary measures. It also plays an 
important role in international trade negotiations (PHA, 2012). Key legislation at the 
national level is contained in the Biosecurity Act 2015 which replaced the Quarantine Act 1908 
on 16 June 2016. 
On the domestic front, state government departments responsible for agriculture oversee 
post-border (onshore) plant biosecurity, in collaboration with plant industries (PHA, 2012). 
Each state and territory has its own plant biosecurity-related legislation and several have 
current biosecurity strategies. They have different approaches to delivering plant 
biosecurity operations due to reasons such as geography, climate, differences in population 
density, ability to fund biosecurity activities, the volume of interstate trade and the 
importance of agriculture to the state’s economy (Cook et al., 2010). Some states, such as 
Victoria, have developed their own fruit fly management plan, i.e. Managing fruit fly in 
Victoria – Action Plan 2015–2020. 
Plant Health Australia (PHA) facilitates the government-industry plant health partnership 
in Australia. It collaborates with representatives from federal and state governments and 
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industry to improve policy, practice and performance of Australia’s plant biosecurity 
system. It is a not-for-profit company funded by Australian government, state and territory 
governments and industry levies (PHA, 2012). It provides secretariat and executive support 
to the National Fruit Fly Council (NFFC) (PHA, 2017). 
The Australian Government, state and territory governments, plant industries and the 
research community collaborated to develop the Draft National Fruit Fly Strategy (NFFS) 
released in March 2008. It contains 20 recommendations and 80 strategies across key 
operational, policy and research areas. This was followed by the National Fruit Fly Strategy 
Implementation Action Plan, released in April 2010, which involves 15 key initiatives and 
projects to implement the key recommendations contained in the draft NFFS. The NFFS 
Implementation Action Plan is designed to, amongst other things, enhance domestic and 
international market access, improve coordination and reduce any overlap of effort and 
duplication of resources and provide support for local industry management of fruit flies. It 
identifies AWM, ALPP and PFAs as ‘critical areas in which investment is required’ (NFFS 
Implementation Committee, 2009: p23). The economic benefit of a national approach to 
control fruit fly (QFly and MedFly) through the implementation of NFFS is estimated 
between $29 and $38 million per year (Abdalla et al., 2012). 
Key funders of fruit fly-related research include Horticulture Innovation Australia Limited 
(HIA), a research and development corporation. HIA administers the industry research and 
development levies, which the Australian Government matches dollar for dollar under the 
Primary Industries Research and Development Act 1989. Other key research bodies include the 
Plant Biosecurity Cooperative Research Centre (PBCRC), universities, Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics and Sciences, and state government departments. A range of 
collaborations exists.  
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A number of significant developments have occurred since the research reported here was 
initiated in 2013: 
 The PBCRC released the National Fruit Fly Research, Development and Extension 
Plan in 2015 (Plant Biosecurity CRC, 2015). This was followed by a consultation 
process involving seven stakeholder workshops across Australia (Metcalfe, 2015).  
 The National Fruit Fly Advisory Committee (NFFAC) was launched in May 2014 
to provide strategic direction to fruit fly policy and RD&E in Australia. The 
NFFAC morphed into the NFFC at the end of 2015, a government and industry 
committee. Its role is to provide national leadership and coordination to manage 
fruit fly in Australia, including implementing the NFFS Implementation Action 
Plan and working with growers and fruit fly management community groups to 
control the pest. The Council also involves a full-time National Manager, based in 
PHA, to progress the Council’s plans. 
 the establishment of a sterile insect technique consortium called SITplus (HIA, 
2015), which besides conducting extensive research involves the development of a 
SIT rearing facility in Port Augusta, South Australia and the appointment of a 
SITplus Program Director and a QFly Area-Wide Management Coordinator. These 
two roles are based in HIA and work closely with the NFFC’s National Manager. 
1.5 Summary 
The discussion above illustrates that AWM of QFly occurs in a complex context resulting 
from an entangled network amongst interacting ‘multiples’ (Poteete, 2012; Hinchliffe et al., 
2013). There are multiple crops, geographical and climatic conditions, types of enterprises 
and on-farm objectives. Commodity groups differ in how well they are organised. Many 
stakeholder groups are involved, including the three levels of government, different groups 
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within government departments, various public and private research providers, consultancy 
services and multiple horticulture industries. Markets are embedded in global institutions 
through the WTO’ s trade rules; domestically there are a myriad of laws, regulations and 
expectations that shape the rules by which AWM programs need to abide.  
It is also a context that has seen considerable change in recent decades. A range of trends 
have reshaped connectedness and scale, including the relationship between markets and 
governance, leading to new forms of interdependencies and geopolitical power. The 
increasing interconnection, such as between markets and producers across the globe, leads 
to greater uncertainty and blurs the benefits and costs of policy options (Young et al., 
2006). Decisions at one place have a significant influence on decision-making and action in 
another place (Folke et al., 2005). More recently, a range of new initiatives, pesticide 
regulations and governing structures in the fruit fly arena are changing how the issue of 
QFly is being approached. Change can also mean that the rules and norms to guide policy 
formulation are not always well-defined. This can cause challenges to and uncertainty over 
the rules and logic of policy-making and the role of expertise in producing new spaces for 
biosecurity issues. It raises questions about who should consider, contribute and implement 
solutions to biosecurity issues and how they should do this (Enticott and Franklin, 2009). 
As for growers, unlike in the decades following World War II, they can now expect less 
direct government support, more demanding markets and pesticide regulations and a loss 
of hegemony in rural spaces. It is therefore imperative that new recommendations such as 
industry-driven AWM are well understood, not only from a technical but also a social and 
institutional point of view in order to design an institutional context that will ‘help local 
industries help themselves’. Only then can these ventures be more widely achievable.  
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Chapter 2. Theoretical foundation and research 
approach 
2.1 Introduction 
This study adopts a mixed-methods approach, involving qualitative and quantitative 
research. This approach was chosen as it bolsters accuracy, delivering a more complete 
picture as the different approaches complement each other’s strengths and weaknesses 
(Denscombe, 2014). As explained in Chapter 1, there are two key research questions, which 
are explored across two research phases: 
1. What social and institutional factors influence the success of industry-driven AWM at 
the local level and how can success be maximised? (Phase 1) 
2. What are the main constraints to an enabling environment for industry-driven AWM 
implementation and how can these be mitigated? (Phase 2) 
This PhD is delivered by publication, involving four manuscripts that have been accepted 
and published by academic journals. The fifth article’s feedback from the journal’s 
reviewers has been incorporated and the revised article has been resubmitted to the journal. 
Box 1 (Chapter 1) provides an overview of the journal articles.  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: In the next two sections the theoretical 
underpinnings of Phase 1 and Phase 2 are briefly introduced. This chapter concludes with a 
discussion about the methods used across both research phases.  
2.2 The theoretical underpinnings of Phase 1 
Phase 1 investigates how the chances of establishing successful fruit fly AWM can be 
maximised at the local level. It involves an inductive-deductive interplay between using and 
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developing theory (McGhee et al., 2007; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) using three case 
studies as empirical evidence and integrating findings from that interplay with relevant 
literature. It applies an interpretivist theoretical perspective (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000) to 
understand the real-life situations of growers and key stakeholders located in the case 
studies. 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) stress that it is important to justify why research questions 
are better addressed by theory-building instead of theory-testing research, that is, by 
showing that there is a lack of plausible existing theory. Knowledge about the social and 
institutional aspects of fruit fly AWM is scant as traditionally issues related to fruit fly and 
AWM are addressed from a predominantly technical point of view (see the discussion on 
the positivist approach on p34). Plant biosecurity issues such as fruit fly also have unique 
aspects that are less common in other reported socio-ecological systems, including the 
linkage to market access, which implies that fruit fly AWM programs are nested in a highly 
regulated and contested broader institutional context. In addition, fruit fly AWM typically 
involves a large range of risk contributors whose support is vital to the success of the 
undertaking, but who may have little direct incentive to participate. A lack of public 
support is one of the biggest challenges of industry-driven AWM (Mumford, 2000). Hence, 
existing theory, such as those dealing with socio-ecological systems, falls short of fully 
encompassing the challenges faced by fruit fly AWM programs. However, the work 
reported here is underpinned by the belief that existing theory can make a significant 
contribution to understanding and strengthening fruit fly AWM programs. It draws on a 
range of complementary theoretical underpinnings, which are described below. 
2.2.1 Socio-ecological systems 
Phase 1 of this research uses the work pioneered by Elinor Ostrom and others about self-
governing socio-ecological systems (SESs) to deepen understanding about how to 
strengthen industry-driven AWM programs. A SES is defined as ‘a structure composed of a 
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common-pool resource [in this case no or low QFly prevalence], its users and an associated governance 
system’ (Janssen and Anderies, 2007: p44).  
In particular, this work uses aspects of the SESs Framework that is often applied to deepen 
understanding about the sustainable management of natural resources. The conceptual 
basis of this thesis is the first tier of the multi-tier SESs Framework, as represented in 
Figure 1 (see Chapter 1). It provides a broad frame for incorporating the interactions 
between the resource system, resource units, local AWM governance system and actors 
situated in a certain social, institutional and economic context, which together deliver 
certain outcomes (Binder et al., 2013; Poteete et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2007).  
The SESs Framework was chosen as it acknowledges that humans make conscious choices, 
both individually and as members of cooperative groups, and that these choices influence 
outcomes (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2014). The social and governance structures influence 
how actors behave and shape outcomes through different interactions and feedback loops 
and with the resource and its related ecology (Binder et al., 2013). The SESs Framework 
also recognises that local natural resource management (NRM) initiatives are nested in 
different hierarchical levels of governance systems and that interactions occur between 
them (Binder et al., 2013; Poteete et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2007; Armitage, 2007; Ostrom, 
2005). This includes the need for higher hierarchical levels of the governance system to be 
responsive to the needs at local levels in order to support them without over-riding local 
autonomy (Ostrom, 2005; Marshall, 2005). 
Translated into the context of fruit fly AWM, this means that local institutions encapsulate 
the strategies and activities employed at the regional level to control fruit fly. They 
incorporate ways to ensure cooperation of a critical mass of risk contributors to lower and 
maintain fruit fly numbers at the desired level. It also includes recommended best practice 
promoted to growers and other host plant owners, such as town residents; the fruit fly 
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control activities undertaken by other stakeholders, such as local councils or other 
government bodies; and stakeholder engagement strategies. The local action situation is 
nested in the wider political and economic setting of national and international trade in 
which fruit fly AWM programs are embedded. This will influence the level of QFly 
management employed and how management activities are executed by different host plant 
owners.  
Some explanations of resource management outcomes require focus on both the micro-
situational level as well as the broader level in order to highlight the relationship between 
the two levels (Poteete et al., 2010; Berkes, 2007). These kinds of issues are conceptualised 
as ‘complex adaptive systems’. This refers to systems involving multiple autonomous 
elements, or variables, which continuously interact and shape each other. The patterns of 
behaviour cannot simply be understood by analysing its individual elements (Marshall, 
2005). 
The literature review findings about how biosecurity is currently constructed (see 1.4.2) 
suggest there is a tension with socio-ecological systems thinking. In the market access 
space, biosecurity institutions of WTO member countries, such as Australia, and their 
associated jurisdictions are by and large shaped by the international trade logics (Maye et 
al., 2012; Outhwaite, 2013) rather than on these regions’ own needs and priorities 
(Outhwaite, 2013). For example, the governments in Australia at both national and 
state/territory levels to a great extent align their biosecurity policies with international rules 
and less so on local needs and priorities (Wissemann et al., 2003; Outhwaite, 2013). Some 
scholars have called for greater adaptive governance including shifts from Australia’s 
prevailing centralised biosecurity governance system towards more polycentric systems. 
This is to better deal with the uncertainty, risk and complexity that is so inherent to 
biosecurity (Cook et al., 2010).  
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Moreover, Marshall (2005) points out that mainstream economics often assumes optimal 
institutional design at the start of collaborative environmental management systems. Yet, 
there is a substantial need for negotiations, renegotiations and coordination throughout the 
life of these management systems (Dentoni et al., 2012), which involve costs. In the 
context of industry-driven AWM, local industries also need to find ways to ensure risk 
contributors continue to comply with QFly management practices. The monitoring and 
enforcement of this compliance tend to be costly (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). These kind 
of costs are known as transaction costs, which can be defined as ‘the costs of the resources used 
to define, establish, maintain, use and change institutions and organisations; and define the problems that 
these institutions and organisations are intended to solve’ (Marshall, 2013: p188). The cost of 
achieving policy choice and design, particularly when non-point pollution is involved, can 
be considerable. However, empirical assessment of NRM policies in this context often do 
not incorporate such costs (McCann et al., 2005).  
Cost benefit analyses of fruit fly AWM in Australia (such as those contained in Ha et al. 
(2010); Florec et al. (2010) and Chambers and Franco-Dixon (2007)) also show limited 
reflection of accounting for such transaction costs. Florec et al. (2010) acknowledge the 
cost involved in education and communication of risk contributors and strategic planning. 
They also point out that AWM is challenged by the ‘weakest link’ phenomena, including 
the issue of individuals’ private actions (or lack thereof) that do not take into account the 
consequences for the social welfare of others. However, there is no acknowledgement that 
addressing this issue will likely require considerable levels of investment, such as in 
deliberation with local groups and governments at local and state levels to find workable 
ways forward. Klassen (2004) points out that considerable cost savings to AWM programs 
can be expected in areas where there are already processes in place for decision-making, 
communication and fee collection. 
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The SESs Framework originates from the political sciences and is based on theories around 
collective action, common-pool resources and NRM. It applies an anthropocentric 
perspective of ecological systems, that is, ecological systems are seen as providers of 
services that support human well-being (Binder et al., 2013). As this framework has most 
commonly been applied to forests, fisheries, water and pastures (ibid.), this research 
presents a novel way of applying this framework to commercial pest management. In 
addition, SESs thinking is seldom applied to issues related to commercial agriculture. 
Hence this work extends the scope of SESs literature. 
Common-pool resource theory 
During the 1950s and 1960s there was much pessimism about the potential self-
management of common-pool resources. The likes of Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968) 
believed that short-term, self-interest of resource users would invariably undermine 
achieving the high level of benefit to all users if they engaged in voluntary cooperative 
behaviour. This work led to the belief that common-pool resource preservation is only 
possible if external authorities impose rules on users (Poteete et al., 2010). Mancur Olson 
(Olson, 1965) put forward a theory of collective action, by identifying conditions in which 
self-organising cooperation could emerge. However, this work still had pessimistic 
undertones, especially in relation to free-riding and the incentive created for users to ‘opt 
out’ when others do not collaborate in following the rules (Schlager, 2004). 
Yet, over time it became clear that many examples exist where people have organised 
themselves to sustainably manage a common-pool resource. Hence, common-pool 
resource theory emerged in the 1980s to emphasise the social, institutional and physical 
factors that influence cooperation between resource users within a region (Agrawal, 2001; 
Poteete et al., 2010; Villamayor-Tomas et al., 2016). At the core of the evolving common-
pool resource theory was Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) design principles for long-term, robust 
local resource management. She identified eight principles by reviewing numerous case 
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studies of both successful and failed common-pool resource management systems. The 
principles were also verified by other scholars (e.g. Cox et al., 2010; Marshall, 2008; 
Weinstein, 1999) and they are associated with the SESs Framework (Ostrom and Cox, 
2010). These principles facilitate the conditions required to sustain the trust and reciprocity 
that are needed to sustain collective action. 
In short, these principles involve the presence of clear resource and social boundaries; 
congruence between rules and local conditions and equivalence between the cost and 
benefits of cooperation. Resource users need to have the opportunity to participate in rule-
setting and other decision-making that impact on resource management. There is a need 
for effective and prudent monitoring and sanctioning, low-cost conflict resolution 
mechanisms and external recognition of the right of resource users to make their own 
rules. Complementary rule-making and multi-level division of labour are required across 
scales (Poteete et al., 2010; Cox et al., 2010; Villamayor-Tomas et al., 2016; Ostrom, 1990). 
These principles were applied to the three case studies and reported in Article 1. The 
application of the principles in a biosecurity context where a lack of cooperation can 
contribute to hindering market access opportunities, is novel.  
The principles are of great relevance to AWM as success depends on achieving and 
maintaining collective action between horticulture growers and other landholders with 
QFly hosts on their land. As Ostrom’s principles relate to resource users effectively self-
organizing and sustainably managing a commons, they seem of particular relevance in the 
Australian context with its push for industry-driven AWM. 
Adaptive co-management 
It is well recognised that biosecurity is a complex and uncertain matter (Barker et al., 2013). 
QFly management is no exception. While protocol documents, such as the QFly 
management Code of Practice, may suggest that QFly management is a matter of simply 
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following a set of specifications, regional QFly management is complicated by the fact that 
each region is unique and knowledge gaps remain in QFly management involving 
insecticide-based approaches (Clarke et al., 2011). Moreover, the management of AWM 
programs is known for being managerial intensive and complex due to the technical, social, 
institutional and financial dimensions involved (Vreysen et al., 2007b). 
Adaptive management is recommended to deal with uncertainty, complexity and surprise in 
SESs (Folke et al., 2005). Fundamentally, this involves a cyclical process of ‘learning by 
doing’, monitoring and reflection, where learning from past and current management 
activities shape the approach applied in the following stages of the resource management 
process (Olsson et al., 2004; Allan and Curtis, 2005; Marshall, 2005; Stankey et al., 2005; 
Röling and Wagemakers, 2000; Stringer et al., 2006; Prager and Vanclay, 2010; Holling, 
1978), including in the context of pest management (Shea et al., 2002). It is seen as a 
complementary approach to more conventional resource management that tends to rely 
heavily on reductionist thinking and one-way transfer of generic information (Allan and 
Curtis, 2005). The adaptive management concept was formally introduced in the late 1970s 
by Crawford Holling (Holling, 1978), followed by Carl Walters who further developed the 
rationale in the mid-1980s (Walters, 1986).  
In addition, the concept of co-management promotes knowledge partnerships involving 
shared power, rights and responsibilities in relation to managing natural resources 
(Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007; Berkes, 2009). It involves bringing together different 
networks and organisations (Olsson et al., 2004), including those of resource users, 
scientists, government managers, and other stakeholders. This enables management 
strategies to engage with various knowledge systems, horizontally at the local level and 
vertically across jurisdictional levels (Armitage et al., 2008b) as a continuous problem-
solving process (Plummer, 2009; Berkes, 2009). Some of the earliest key scholars who 
formally introduced this concept include Fikret Berkes (e.g. Berkes et al., 1991), Evelyn 
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Pinkerton (e.g. Pinkerton, 1994; Pinkerton, 1992) and Robert Pomeroy (e.g. Pomeroy, 
1995; Pomeroy and Pido, 1995). 
An increasing body of literature combines the notions of adaptive management and co-
management as a prudent governance approach for SESs in the form of adaptive co-
management (Armitage et al., 2008a; Plummer and Hashimoto, 2011; Plummer and 
FitzGibbon, 2007; Olsson et al., 2004; Doubleday, 2007; Wollenberg et al., 2000; Cundill 
and Fabricius, 2009). Armitage et al. (2008b: p96) define the concept of adaptive co-
management as ‘a flexible system of resource management, tailored to specific places and situations, 
supported by, and working in conjunction with, various organizations at different scales’. 
Hence, adaptive co-management typically involves collaboration among diverse actors who 
self-organise through voluntary coordination and self-enforcement activities with a strong 
focus on learning (Ruitenbeek and Cartier, 2001; Olsson et al., 2004; Cundill and Fabricius, 
2009). This approach contributes to achieving institutional fit between ecosystems and 
governance; that is, how well institutions themselves fit together and with the biophysical 
and social arenas in which they function (Plummer and Hashimoto, 2011). Key facets 
include social learning, communication, adaptive capacity, shared decision-making and 
shared authority (Plummer and Armitage, 2007). These were used as a lens to investigate 
fruit fly AWM in Article 2. 
However, biosecurity traditionally involves a positivist technocratic mode of thinking (Reed 
and Curzon, 2015) based on objective and absolute knowledge as is evident from the large 
volumes of technical pest-related literature (Schut et al., 2014) (see also section 1.4.2). 
Internationally and within Australia there are also concerted efforts for more 
harmonisation and standardisation of biosecurity practices (Higgins et al., 2016). A key 
example is the IPPC’s ISPMs and Australia’s QFly management Code of Practice. It is not 
uncommon that formalised and generalised knowledge displaces local knowledge in the 
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biosecurity context (Enticott and Wilkinson, 2013). Communication with grower and other 
communities generally rely heavily on top-down, generic information provision (Royce, 
2011). Knowledge hierarchies occur in the biosecurity context that determine whose 
knowledge counts, normally in favour of certain scientific groups (Enticott and Wilkinson, 
2013, Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2004). While not disregarding ‘expert’ knowledge, Enticott 
and Franklin (2009) warn that it should not be privileged at the expense of local knowledge 
and learning processes rooted in the local socio-economic, cultural and political contexts 
(Gonsalves, 2005).  
Local people construct their own understandings of why they should or should not do 
certain biosecurity practices based on their own and their peers’ interpretation of the 
validity of recommended practice. These decisions are further influenced by practical 
considerations and competing sets of priorities across all areas of their lives. In addition, 
people normally know exceptions to the rules. For example, farmers may point to a 
farming operation that contracted a biosecurity issue despite adhering strictly to 
recommended practice and/or others who are not following recommended practice and 
who have not been affected by the relevant biosecurity risk. This can undermine their faith 
in universal biosecurity knowledge (Enticott and Wilkinson, 2013). 
2.2.2 Community collaboration  
There is a need for community collaboration to enable successful AWM, as host plants in 
town backyards, peri-urban areas and on public land can present pest breeding places 
(Vreysen et al., 2007a; Klassen, 2005). Hence pest management activities are also required 
in non-commercial urban settings. Article 3 investigates what policy interventions are best 
suited to secure community collaboration to deal with horticultural pest pressure coming 
from private land beyond affected commercial orchards. 
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The role of the community has received considerable attention in NRM literature, 
including those relating to biosecurity. Broadly, two coexisting theoretical views are 
evident. The first is commonly called public participation, which revolves around capturing 
important information and views from stakeholders that contribute to the success of 
managing SESs. The public participation approach tends to increase the perceived 
legitimacy and satisfaction with decisions and outcomes (Moore and Rockloff, 2006; Lane, 
2005; Stringer et al., 2006; Parkins and Mitchell, 2005; Lockie and Vanclay, 1997; Curtis 
and Sample, 2010; DeCaro and Stokes, 2013; Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Curtis and 
Lockwood, 2000). Public participation is also seen as bolstering stakeholder empowerment 
and local control (Parkins and Mitchell, 2005), while encouraging participants to voluntarily 
implement on-ground activities (Lane et al., 2004). Participatory processes and multi-
stakeholder participation are central themes in both the adaptive management and the co-
management literatures (Stringer et al., 2006; Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Armitage et al., 
2010). 
Public participation rose to prominence in the 1960s and the theoretical background to 
public participation is rather scattered and intertwined with theoretical work from other 
fields (Webler, 1999; Rowe and Frewer, 2005). Listing them all falls outside the scope of 
this study. Key influential works include Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communication, 
including his theory of communicative action (Webler, 1999; Habermas, 1984; Habermas, 
1985) that emphasises quality deliberation processes to ensure effective decision-making 
(Reed, 2008; Dietz and Stern, 2008). The seminal work by Sherry Arnstein (1969) also has 
had a large influence on subsequent work about public participation. She identified 
different forms of participation and the power (or lack thereof) citizens have in influencing 
outcomes. In this work she questions to what extent attempts to involve the public are 
tokenistic, thereby lacking the needed redistribution of power to make these interactions 
meaningful.  
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The second view of the role of the community in NRM is contained in neoliberal thinking. 
Further to the discussion in Chapter 1, the shift towards neoliberal economic management 
in Australia during the last few decades, including the New Public Management approach, 
means that governments are now viewed as facilitators of progress and development rather 
than direct actors in agriculture and other economic sectors (Rose, 2000; Gill, 2011; 
Wissemann et al., 2003). Osborne and Gaebler (1992) famously coined this as 
government’s role shifting from ‘rower’ to ‘steerer’. This is manifested in the state pursuing 
governance, rather than governing, in a bid for industries to be more self-reliant. In other 
words, a shift from a single governing body, such as the state, to the sharing of governing 
activities between the state and non-state participants (Dibden et al., 2011). In particular, 
cross-sector partnerships are seen as a key vehicle to mediate the changed roles and 
responsibilities of society’s three primary institutional sectors, i.e. government, business and 
the civil sector.  
Associated with the neoliberal push towards public-private partnerships is an increased 
emphasis on the community as an active agent and mobilising active citizens (Joseph, 
2013). The concept of ‘community’ has become increasingly popular as a solution to the 
individualistic, market-based approaches of neo-classical thinking (Cheshire and Lawrence, 
2005). Key neoliberal themes such as deregulation and a smaller state led to the term ‘roll-
back’ neoliberalism (Peck, 2010; Maye et al., 2012; Lockie and Higgins, 2007), which results 
in increased reliance on voluntary approaches to address NRM issues (Gunningham, 2009). 
Hence, neoliberal approaches easily lead to a way of thinking that emphasises what the 
community can do to achieve predetermined outcomes.  
Some biosecurity scholars question whether endowing biosecurity responsibilities to 
citizens in general is appropriate, such as the need to undertake voluntary biosecurity-
related activities. In particular, there is concern about the limited input citizens have in 
determining the objectives of these activities (Barker, 2010). Some argue that if people are 
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asked to contribute to achieving certain biosecurity objectives, they should have the 
opportunity to influence the related biosecurity agendas. If not, it could be argued that they 
are taken advantage of for the benefit of other groups in society (Donaldson, 2013). 
Article 3 outlines why both rationales are problematic in the context of community 
collaboration for AWM of QFly. In particular, AWM is used as an example of a situation 
where the main beneficiaries (growers) are concentrated, yet the costs are diffused across 
many risk contributors. It argues that there is a need for ‘smart regulation’. ‘Smart 
regulation’ involves the employment of a range of complementary policy instruments and 
behaviour interventions fit for a specific context (Martin and Gunningham, 2014; 
Australian Public Service Commission, 2009; Kennedy, 2010). It is defined as ‘a form of 
regulatory pluralism that embraces flexible, imaginative and innovative forms of social 
control’ (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2017: , p133). For example, it may combine regulation, 
self-motivation and local empowerment. In other words, given the neoliberal context of 
biosecurity, this article argues for a shift to ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism. That is, the introduction 
of policy adjustments that still support ‘market rule’ (Peck, 2010; Maye et al., 2012), but 
that overcome the shortcomings of relying on voluntary approaches to gain community 
collaboration. 
2.3 The theoretical underpinnings of Phase 2 
This phase takes as its departure point that local industries will require a range of 
knowledge, capabilities and resources in order to achieve industry-driven AWM. As Klerkx 
and Leeuwis (2008) point out, growers are likely to face challenges, such as information 
asymmetries and difficulty in finding providers who can meet their information needs. So 
they may lack certain competencies that will withhold them from initiating AWM 
programs. Hindrances are likely to be present at various points, such as the knowledge and 
skill level of individual growers, the accessibility of information, the nature of the new 
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technologies, the characteristics of the industry and how stakeholders interact with each 
other (Morriss et al., 2006). Innovation is therefore needed, not only to produce new 
technologies, but also to design the institutional context to ensure local industries can 
readily access the needed information and support (Klerkx et al., 2010). 
It is important to make a distinction here between the term ‘systems approach’ as a 
phytosanitary measure and ‘systems approach’ as put forward in innovation systems theory 
literature. In this document ‘systems approach’ refers primarily to the phytosanitary 
measure that the IPPC defines as: ‘The integration of different risk management measures, at least 
two of which act independently, and which cumulatively achieve the appropriate level of protection against 
regulated pests’ (IPPC, 2013: p22). In innovation systems literature the term ‘systems 
approach’ generally refers to the notion that innovations emerge from systems of actors, 
who are embedded in an institutional context that influences how they behave, link and 
interact with other parts of the system (Hounkonnou et al., 2012; Hall et al., 2003; 
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011; Allen et al., 2011). The prevailing institutions, actors and 
interactions in addition to technology development all offer entry points to strengthen 
innovation (Hounkonnou et al., 2012). 
2.3.1 Agricultural Innovation Systems  
An Agricultural Innovation Systems (AIS) approach was chosen as the theoretical 
underpinning for Phase 2 as innovation systems approaches are valuable to assist in 
understanding the macro-level socio-economic and political context (see for example 
Kebebe et al., 2015) (refer to Figure 1, Chapter 1). In particular, AIS offers a way to 
explore how multi-level, multi-actor and multi-dimensional dynamics shape plant 
biosecurity innovation outcomes (Schut et al., 2014). An AIS can be defined as ‘a network of 
organizations, enterprises, and individuals focused on bringing new products, new processes, and new forms 
of organization into economic use, together with the institutions and policies that affect their behaviour and 
performance’ (World Bank, 2006: pvi-vii). Innovation here, therefore, means the process of 
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both technical and institutional change at farm and higher levels that impacts on outcomes 
such as productivity, sustainability, and market access (Röling, 2009). Given the changing 
conditions for QFly management and the need for innovative approaches for both pest 
suppression and market access arrangements, applying AIS thinking is well suited to 
address research question 2 (Phase 2).  
AIS is a corollary of the innovation systems approach, which originated in the mid-1990s in 
Europe in response to what was seen as deficiencies in neoliberal and neo-classical 
economic approaches (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). It became increasingly apparent that 
high levels of research seldom lead to high levels of innovation and societal development, 
especially in the case of ‘wicked problems’. This phenomenon is called the ‘knowledge 
paradox’ (Bouma et al., 2011). 
The innovation systems approach perceives innovation not as the result of science or 
markets, but rather of interaction between actors to collectively pursue progress. Actors are 
heterogeneous with their own interests, perspectives and values. Hence, such collective 
action involves deliberations, negotiations, tensions, agreements between actors and 
engaging in collaborative efforts that determine whether advances are made (Röling, 2009; 
Van Mierlo et al., 2010). Unlike reductionist approaches, the innovation systems concept 
acknowledges that the system’s behaviour cannot be understood by a sole focus on 
analysing different key components. Instead, exchanges and interactions between different 
components are a fundamental element of understanding the functioning of an innovation 
system (Hall and Clark, 2010).  
Innovation systems are, therefore, interconnected institutions where knowledge, skills and 
technologies are created and transferred (Van Latesteijn and Andeweg, 2010). They 
acknowledge that institutions, unlike technologies, cannot be merely designed, tested or 
replicated, but they are embedded in historical contexts (Röling, 2009; Hounkonnou et al., 
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2012). The result is a complex knowledge and economic system involving various feedback 
loops where information and resources flow between its components and across 
boundaries. Learning plays a central role (Hall and Clark, 2010). 
A range of innovation system approaches have emerged, including the ‘national innovation 
systems’ (Lundvall, 1992). The key contribution of this concept is that it provides policy-
makers with a tool to identify systemic weaknesses that obstruct the development and 
performance of the system. This assists with policy interventions (Jacobsson and Bergek, 
2011).  
Subsequently, the AIS concept originated in the 2000s and was developed from the 
‘national innovation systems’ literature (Lundvall, 1992; World Bank, 2006; Hall et al., 
2001). It emerged as a critique to prevailing linear models of agriculture innovation, where 
innovations are developed by scientists and then transferred to farmers. Similar to the other 
innovation sectors, many studies demonstrated that innovations developed by scientists are 
often not adopted by farmers and other agriculture stakeholders (Leeuwis and Aarts, 2011).  
Based on widespread evidence, successful agricultural innovations are now seen as the 
result of multiple interactions between growers, supply chain members, research bodies, 
markets, authorities, policies and other elements (Leeuwis and Aarts, 2011; Klerkx et al., 
2012b; Bouma et al., 2011). The different actors engage in a process of co-learning and 
negotiation to shape the innovation (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008). Here, organisational 
arrangements, such as agreements, rules and perceptions, are seen as part of the innovation 
system, rather than external conditions (Leeuwis and Aarts, 2011).  
AIS comprises a co-evolutionary process involving concomitant technological, institutional, 
social and economic change. It is not a neutral process, but is driven by values, norms and 
worldviews that bring about winners and losers (Klerkx et al., 2012b). Successful 
innovation therefore depends on changed narratives, discourses that come about between 
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the interacting agents (Leeuwis and Aarts, 2011). Klerkx et al. (2010) posit, in reference to 
Giddens’ structuration theory (Giddens, 1984), that as individual actors lack power and 
resources to pursue innovation on their own, they need the support and cooperation of 
others. Actors are therefore conditioned by their network, while also actively shaping it to 
achieve their own and collective goals (ibid.). 
A key component of AIS is its emphasis on the importance of intermediaries or knowledge 
brokers who act throughout different parts of the innovation system’s multi-actor networks 
(Kilelu et al., 2013). Their key bridging functions include demand articulation, knowledge 
translation, network formation and coordination and innovation management functions 
(Kilelu et al., 2013; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008). These are further described in Article 4 
below. The importance for knowledge brokering between disparate groups related to a 
biosecurity issue is also increasingly highlighted (Reed and Curzon, 2015; Thompson et al., 
2009; Proctor et al., 2011). For example, Proctor et al. (2011) show how professionals 
advising farmers—in their case vets—not only transfer scientific knowledge to them, but 
also ‘translate’ different kinds of knowledge, while developing new knowledge ‘by doing’. 
Where multiple stakeholders are involved there is also a need for innovation platforms, that 
is, spaces that are deliberately created to facilitate linkages between heterogeneous 
stakeholders that enable information-sharing, knowledge-development and implementation 
activities to solve a common problem (Cullen et al., 2014; Kilelu et al., 2013). For issues 
that require addressing across levels, such as across local, state/territory and national levels, 
there may be a need for interconnected innovation platforms (Nederlof et al., 2011). This is 
further discussed in Article 5. 
This resonates with suggestions made by several biosecurity scholars who call for more 
‘alternative spaces of negotiation’ that allows for more negotiation and flexibility (Higgins 
et al., 2016; Enticott, 2008). Cook et al. (2010) suggest the formation of local ‘grower 
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cooperatives’ as part of a more adaptive governance approach to biosecurity. The purpose 
of these groups is to act as local governance hubs. They are then linked to inter-connected 
hubs across levels. A key aim is to ensure information flows not only ‘top-down’ but also 
‘bottom-up’ and horizontally between ‘grower cooperatives’. In this process scientific 
findings can be integrated with local and other forms of knowledge. 
Schut et al. (2014) investigated to what extent innovation systems thinking are found in the 
crop protection literature. They concluded that the potential of AIS to deepen 
understanding about how to address complex crop protection challenges is left mainly 
unexplored. This work contributes to filling this gap. 
AIS thinking is also complementary to adaptive co-management thinking because both AIS 
and adaptive co-management embrace the need for social interaction in the way of open, 
pluralistic and democratic processes that are underpinned by social learning to engage with 
complexity. Both rationales promote close integration between science and social choice 
(e.g. policy-making), as the application of knowledge is seen as value-laden (Norton, 2005). 
Key overlapping themes between adaptive co-management and AIS are listed in Table 1.  
Table 1. Overlapping themes between adaptive co-management and innovation systems 
(including AIS).  
Common themes and focal 
points 
Adaptive co-management Innovation systems/AIS 
thinking 
Institutional interplay Armitage et al. (2008b); Berkes 
et al. (2007) 
Leeuwis and Aarts (2011); 
Klerkx et al. (2010) 
Networks, including cross-
scale/multi-level linkages 
Armitage et al. (2008b); 
Carlsson and Sandström 
(2007); Cash et al. (2006); 
Berkes et al. (2007); Bodin et 
Leeuwis and Aarts (2011); 
Klerkx et al. (2012b); Klerkx 
and Nettle (2013); Klerkx and 
Leeuwis (2008); 
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Common themes and focal 
points 
Adaptive co-management Innovation systems/AIS 
thinking 
al. (2006); Folke (2007) 
Learning (including social 
learning) 
Armitage et al. (2008b); Cash et 
al. (2006); Berkes et al. (2007); 
Allen et al. (2011) 
Hall and Clark (2010); Klerkx 
and Leeuwis (2008); Klerkx 
and Nettle (2013); Knickel et 
al. (2009) 
Complex systems thinking to 
overcome reductionist 
approaches and deal with 
complexity and uncertainty 
Armitage et al. (2008b); Cash et 
al. (2006); Berkes et al. (2007); 
Allen et al. (2011); Folke (2007) 
Hall and Clark (2010); Knickel 
et al. (2009); Klerkx and 
Leeuwis (2008) 
Knowledge brokers/ 
Intermediaries/Bridging 
organisations 
Cash et al. (2006); Bodin et al. 
(2006); Allen et al. (2011); 
Berkes (2009) 
Klerkx and Nettle (2013); 
Klerkx et al. (2012a); Kilelu et 
al. (2013) 
 
2.3.2 The functional-structural analysis approach 
While the concept of AIS is now well established, different approaches are applied to 
analyse them (Klerkx et al., 2012b; Turner et al., 2016). The Phase 2 research applies a 
process-oriented, functionalist view of AIS (Klerkx et al., 2012b) as proposed by Hekkert 
et al. (2007) to understand how particular weaknesses hinder the fulfilment of certain 
functions. The functional-structural approach of innovation systems was further developed 
by Wieczorek and Hekkert (2012) by adding the structural components of innovation 
systems. These components include the presence of actors, their interactions, institutions 
and infrastructure (Nelson, 1993; Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012; Turner et al., 2016; 
Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). Whereas the functions of innovation systems represent the 
68 
 
processes that support healthy innovation systems, the quality of the structural components 
make it possible for the innovation system to function (Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012; 
Kebebe et al., 2015). This work argues that a well-functioning innovation system will 
support entrepreneurs, here local industries, in their endeavours to capitalise on new 
opportunities (Hekkert et al., 2007), here AWM. The structural components offer target 
areas for policy recommendations to strengthen the innovation functions (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2011; Kebebe et al., 2015).  
Like other studies (such as Lamprinopoulou et al., 2014; Turner et al., 2016; Kebebe et al., 
2015), Phase 2 involves a combined functional-structural analysis of the current QFly 
innovation, in particular how it interacts with and supports industry-driven AWM 
programs. The seven functions proposed by Hekkert et al. (2007) is used as a lens in order 
to identify systemic weaknesses that could provide opportunities for improvement. This is 
done both in the context of growers securing support to achieve AWM for pest 
suppression (Article 4) and to include AWM as part of a systems approach to achieve 
access to QFly-sensitive markets (Article 5). The weaknesses are then listed against the 
different structural components to assist in identifying policy intervention 
recommendations.  
The seven functions are interpreted as follows:  
F1. Entrepreneurial activities – actors exploit opportunities by arranging new knowledge and 
networks into initiatives. This represents conducting experiments, including taking risks 
with uncertain markets, technologies and institutions (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011; Negro 
et al., 2007). These activities are indicators of the system's performance as they produce 
knowledge about the innovation system’s functioning in various settings. Well-functioning 
innovation systems will assist entrepreneurial activities to thrive (Hekkert et al., 2007).  
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F2. Knowledge development – this is normally a strong function in innovation systems 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). The most important mechanism here is learning, which can 
come from ‘learning by searching’ (e.g. formal research, engaging expertise from elsewhere) 
or ‘learning by doing’ (Hekkert et al., 2007; Negro et al., 2007). 
F3. Knowledge diffusion – this involves multi-directional information flow that encourages 
learning by interacting with others and by applying certain technologies or approaches 
(Hekkert et al., 2007). This involves not only the latest research findings and policy 
decisions reaching growers or other target audiences, but for different players in the 
innovation network to influence the agendas of others. For example, on-ground challenges 
and opportunities also need to reach and shape the agendas of policy-makers and 
technology developers (Negro et al., 2007). Sound communication is fundamental here as 
the meaning of knowledge is actively constructed between people and these meanings are 
influenced by context and prior knowledge. Failed communication is likely to contribute to 
misunderstandings and other problems and tensions (Leeuwis and Aarts, 2011). 
F4. Guidance of the search – this encompasses stakeholders' vision that gives direction to the 
innovation process. The use of limited resources is optimised if learning processes across 
levels are directed based on external influence and continuous internal interactions and 
reflections (Hekkert et al., 2007). This includes making the needs and expectations of 
entrepreneurs and technology users visible (Negro et al., 2007). 
F5. Market formation – this refers to investing effort and resources into creating markets for 
products produced in new ways as they face competition from what users are accustomed 
to (Hekkert et al., 2007; Negro et al., 2007).  
F6. Mobilisation of resources – this comprises the human and financial capital that are needed 
for all activities in the innovation process (Hekkert et al., 2007; Negro et al., 2007). Hence, 
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this function includes influencing actors in how and where to invest resources (Jacobsson 
and Bergek, 2011). 
F7. Creation of legitimacy – resistance to new technologies and approaches needs to be 
surmounted (Hekkert et al., 2007). Innovations need to become part of the current regime 
or even replace existing systems or technologies (Negro et al., 2007). Legitimacy is also vital 
for other functions to perform, such as resource mobilisation, market formation and 
guiding the direction of the search. It cannot be taken for granted and often requires a 
concerted effort to overcome the uncertainty associated with newness (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2011).  
AIS thinking is seen as complementary to the SESs Framework as it also conceptualises 
innovations such as AWM as a nested set of systems within other systems (Hekkert et al., 
2007). Moreover, several innovation systems studies use as their departure point the 
structural components of innovation systems, that represent some overlap with those 
presented in Figure 1 (Chapter 1), including the actors, their interactions, the governance 
system or institutions (Ostrom, 2009; Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012). Both the SESs 
Framework and the AIS approach recognise that the social and governance structures and 
accompanying institutions influence the behaviour of actors, while actors might also be 
part of the governance system and shape the prevailing institutions (Binder et al., 2013; 
Klerkx et al., 2010). 
Little evidence was found that a functional-structural analysis of a biosecurity-related 
system has been done before. However, several parts of the biosecurity literature refer to 
similar principles as those contained in the innovation functions. For example, AIS 
literature points out that in most innovation systems knowledge production tends to be the 
strongest function, in particular scientific knowledge production (function 2) (Jacobsson 
and Bergek, 2011). This is likely even more so for biosecurity in Australia given the related 
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neoliberal technocratic discourses that construct biosecurity challenges as technical issues 
in need of technical solutions. In addition, the push for harmonisation and standardised 
practices (Higgins et al., 2016) could give the impression that the only need for knowledge 
diffusion (function 3) is to communicate prescribed activities to farmers (Enticott, 2008). 
However, as suggested above as part of the discussion aboutAdaptive co-management under 
2.2.1, social scientists focusing on biosecurity increasingly call for broader kinds of tacit and 
non-tacit knowledge to be integrated when solutions are constructed and tailored to 
circumstances. Biosecurity knowledge diffusion is required not only ‘top-down’, but also 
multi-directional including ‘bottom-up’ and horizontally between actors to increase the co-
production of integrated knowledge (Kruger et al., 2009; Falk et al., 2009; Enticott and 
Wilkinson, 2013; Pautasso et al., 2012).  
There is considerable evidence of guidance of the search (function 4) in the both Australian 
biosecurity and fruit fly management at national level. This is evident from strategic 
documents that have been develop through wide stakeholder consultation such as the 
National fruit fly strategy and its related Implementation plan (NFFS Implementation 
Committee, 2009) and the National fruit fly research, development and extension plan 
(Plant Biosecurity CRC, 2015). 
In terms of resource mobilisation (function 6) much attention has been given in biosecurity 
literature to the costs and benefits related to fruit fly AWM and the need for cost sharing 
between government and industry (e.g. Florec et al., 2013; Kalang Consultancy Services, 
2008; Chambers and Franco-Dixon, 2007; Ha et al., 2010; Harvey et al., 2010; Mumford, 
2000; Florec et al., 2010). A key argument for industry contribution is that industry is the 
main beneficiary. For example, Abdalla et al. (2012) argue that fruit fly management 
constitutes an industry rather than a public good as it is specific industry members that 
benefit from fruit fly management through reduced production losses and strengthened 
trade opportunities. Arguments for public sector investment include the difficult challenge 
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of dealing with ‘free-riding’ that is outside the control of farmers, and the public benefits 
that are derived from reduced pesticide use (Hendrichs et al., 2007). 
2.4 Methods 
This section outlines the methods used throughout the research reported in this thesis. At 
the start of research project a literature review was carried out. It covered the key 
paradigms and discourses that influence how fruit fly management is framed and 
approached (see Chapter 1) and the social and institutional aspects of AWM of pests and 
SESs. Later literature about community engagement, AIS, and agricultural extension was 
also explored. 
2.4.1 Phase 1 – Case study research 
After the initial literature review, qualitative research based on a case study approach was 
applied in Phase 1 to gain an in-depth understanding of the processes occurring at the local 
level (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).  
Rationale for case study research 
Several reasons exist for the choice of a case study approach. It is a popular approach for 
studying collective action in NRM, as it provides rich, in-depth knowledge about a certain 
combination of events and circumstances (Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; Meinzen-Dick et al., 
2004; Poteete et al., 2010). As a complex adaptive system, the socio-institutional aspects of 
AWM cannot be understood by studying separate elements (Marshall, 2005). Case studies 
enable investigating a phenomenon as a ‘whole’, including understanding the complex 
relations and teasing apart closely interwoven variables to create a detailed understanding 
of the phenomenon studied (Poteete et al., 2010). In particular, it enables understanding 
how local people socially construct their realities through their own interpretations and by 
interacting with others (Blumer, 2007). Case studies offer a valuable way to investigate 
areas where knowledge is shallow, fragmented, incomplete or non-existent (Punch, 2005). 
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Poteete et al. (2010) identify a case study approach as the only option for empirical field-
based research when cross-case data is limited. The use of multiple cases provides a 
stronger base for theory building than a single case, as propositions and theoretical 
constructs are more deeply grounded in empirical evidence from a broader exploration of 
research questions. Each case study in effect presents a trial, here of fruit fly AWM, under 
different conditions and together they contribute to the emerging theory (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). Comparative analysis between case studies strengthens the validity of 
each individual case’s findings through data triangulation. This benefit is maximised when 
the cases are subjected to a single research design, as opposed to case study comparisons 
between different projects (Marshall, 2005). Hence this study involves three case studies. 
Case study selection 
Case studies were selected using theoretical sampling. In other words, cases were chosen to 
maximise gaining insight (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2006) about the social 
and institutional aspects of fruit fly AWM programs as opposed to random sampling. They 
were also chosen to achieve maximum variation of social and institutional profiles 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). The selection criteria for the cases were that they all had to involve 
existing, or coordinated, attempts to achieve industry-driven fruit fly AWM programs in 
Australian horticultural industries. In addition they had to have different social and 
institutional profiles. An overview of the case studies is provided in Chapter 3. It is 
noteworthy that despite the fact that fruit fly AWM programs are increasingly in the 
spotlight as a strategy to address fruit fly issues, incidences of industry-driven AWM 
programs in Australia are still limited.  
Case study fieldwork 
Fieldwork occurred between September 2013 and March 2014. This involved face-to-face, 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with key informants. One focus group was also carried 
out for each case study, predominantly with the management group members.  
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Purposive sampling was used to select interviewees by identifying suitable people based on 
their knowledge, position or characteristics (Morse et al., 2002), such as how well they 
know how growers and/or the broader community respond to the AWM program. This 
provided an opportunity to focus on a small, but information-rich sample to address the 
research questions. A range of interviewees were chosen to ensure a diverse range of 
perspectives (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Key informants typically included local 
program coordinators, key growers, on-farm consultants, as well as representatives of the 
programs’ management groups, packhouses, local shire councils and local industry bodies 
and associations. The great majority of interviews were carried out face-to-face with only a 
few completed over the phone when, for example, a state government representative was 
not living in the region visited. The interviews were audio-recorded.  
Entering a study relating to a SES warrants a broad perspective as SESs literature, including 
the SESs Framework, presents an analytical challenge with its large number concepts, 
variables and possible interactions, (Armitage, 2007). Interview and focus group questions 
were broad and open-ended in order to obtain an authentic representation of how 
respondents view the local AWM program ‘from the inside’ (Punch, 2005). The interview 
questions were aimed at understanding research question 1, i.e. how the prospects of 
successful industry-driven AWM can be increased at the local level from a social and 
institutional perspective. To do this the interview questions were framed around the SESs 
Framework tier 1 components (see Figure 1, Chapter 1). The key questions were based on 
the themes listed below (the SESs Framework components are at the end of each theme in 
brackets). For more detail about the questions asked during the Phase 1 interviews, see 
Appendix 1.  
 How does the AWM program operate – including progress to date, how it is 
currently being managed, how rules are being set and if consequences exist for lack 
of QFly management (Action situation, AWM governance system and outcomes) 
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 Who are the main players in the AWM program and how do they contribute? Who 
should be contributing more? (Actors) 
 What communication processes are used with and between different stakeholders 
about QFly and the AWM program? (Interaction and feedback between 
governance system and actors) 
Focus groups were used to develop a timeline of key QFly-related events in each region 
and to explore: 
 What does success look like?  
 What has worked well about the QFly management so far?  
 What are the main challenges to achieve or maintain AWM? 
Data analysis 
Soon after each field trip, the audio recordings of the interviews and focus group 
discussions were transcribed verbatim. This was to ensure that the data used involved 
accounts that are as true as possible to the original source thereby minimising the risk of 
data loss or misinterpretation (Green and Thorogood, 2013). Data was analysed by using 
the qualitative research analysis tool NVivo, as such software assists in achieving a high 
level of consistency as well as reliable coding, categorisation and comparison of data 
(Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). For all three case studies, coding revolved around broad 
categories relating to the AMW program and the key players. These nodes were: 
 ‘Local AWM program’, including sub-nodes on things such as ‘background’, ‘rules’ 
(of operation), ‘challenges and positives’ 
 ‘QFly management in the region’, including sub-nodes such as ‘history’, 
‘perceptions of QFly’ and ‘management techniques’ 
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 Key players nodes included the ‘Australian Government’; ‘state government’; ‘local 
government’; ‘industry bodies’; ‘landholders’; ‘towns’; and ‘management group’. Sub 
nodes typically included things such as ‘communication’ (to and from), ‘rules’ and 
‘learning’ associated with each group 
 Markets 
 Other contextual issues 
Having a data set for each case study assisted in easier data interrogation for each case 
study. As they all had the same broad coding structure it allowed for easy comparison 
between cases. There were variations in nodes and sub-nodes to better match the data to 
each case study. For example, Central Burnett had an additional node for on-farm ‘crop 
consultants’, as these players were a key part of this AWM program. Structuring the data in 
this format provided a sound starting point for the analyses needed for the first three 
journal articles. 
For example, journal article 1 (see section 4.1) applied Ostrom’s design principles for 
robust common-pool resource institutions. Different sets of nodes and sub-nodes related 
to each principle and this facilitated finding the relevant information. For example, 
Principle 1 ‘Clearly define boundaries’, drew on sub-nodes such as ‘AWM 
program’/’background’; ‘AWM program’/’rules’; ‘landholders’/’supportive’; 
‘landholders’/’not supportive’; and ‘towns’. Principle 2 ‘Congruence between appropriation 
and provision rules and local conditions’ drew predominantly on ‘AWM 
Program’/’background’; and ‘AWM program’/’rules’. 
Journal article 2 (see section 4.2) applied the key components of adaptive co-management 
(Plummer and Armitage, 2007) to the case studies. Again, certain nodes and sub-nodes 
related to each component. For example, the first two components discussed involved 
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social learning and communication. As sub-nodes around ‘learning’ and ‘communication’ 
were created for most key players (which formed parent nodes), they provided key areas 
for locating relevant data. For the components of adaptive capacity, shared decision-
making and shared authority the parent nodes about the ‘local AWM program’ and the 
related sub-nodes assisted with finding the relevant information. For the component 
shared authority the nodes around the three levels of government and markets were also 
key areas to locate the needed data. 
Journal article 3 focuses on the challenge of gaining community collaboration (see section 
4.3). The nodes relating to ‘towns’, ‘local government’ and ‘landholders’/’not supportive’ 
were key points for information, in addition to data from the grower survey. 
Validation 
Member checking of interview responses (Punch, 2005) was adopted for all three case 
studies. Participants were provided with a summary of the findings developed from NVivo 
using the parent nodes for the structure of these documents. It allowed them to identify 
gaps or provide alternative views to the points listed. Key representatives of each case 
study were also provided with draft copies of the journal articles to allow them the 
opportunity to comment and be informed about what had been produced from the 
research findings. 
In addition, in order to bolster the robustness, thickness and richness of the evidence base, 
methodological triangulation was used, that is, converging lines of inquiry based on 
multiple methods and sources of evidence (Denzin, 1973; Punch, 2005; Denscombe, 2014). 
Data from the semi-structured interviews and focus groups were supplemented with data, 
where available, from relevant meeting minutes, media releases, journal articles and other 
documents about the local initiatives. 
78 
 
Case study research limitations 
A key limitation of the case study research is that it is based on three case studies across 
two states only. Even though the case selection deployed in this thesis captured 
theoretically important variation, it is likely that more lessons can be drawn from studying 
cases in other regions across Australia.  
Another limitation is that significant developments occurred in the two New South Wales 
case study regions after the fieldwork was carried out, that is, the instigation of systems 
approach trials. This work does not report on these events and the related stakeholder 
experiences. 
2.4.2 Phase 2 – Semi-structured interviews about the institutional context 
The key research question for Phase 2 was how can an enabling broader institutional 
environment for industry-driven fruit fly AWM be created? Phase 2 started with the 
development of a list of the key knowledge, capabilities and resources that local industries 
need to achieve fruit fly AWM for market access. The draft list was based on the case study 
research and then galvanised through consultation with seven key informants, including 
case study representatives, and research and government officials involved in either the 
technical or market access aspects of AWM.  
Subsequently, between April and September 2015, semi-structured interviews were carried 
out with key informants who work in the broader institutional and support network of fruit 
fly management. Semi-structured interviews are a common approach for studies that apply 
Hekkert’s seven functions and/or a combined functional-structural investigation (see for 
example Negro et al., 2007). As for Phase 1, purposive sampling was used to select 
interviewees, i.e. people were chosen based on their knowledge, position or characteristics 
(Morse et al., 2002), such as being appointed in a fruit fly-related role, and having extended 
involvement in fruit fly management, research or policy-making and/or engagement with 
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growers and others about the pest. This was complemented with ‘snow-balling’, that is, 
requesting key people to suggest others to be interviewed (Noy, 2008; Denscombe, 2014). 
This enabled an information-rich sample, here involving 33 interviews with 36 participants 
(some interviews involved more than one person). A range of interviewees were chosen to 
ensure diverse range of perspectives (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The types of 
individuals interviewed are listed in Table 2.  
As the case studies are located in New South Wales and Queensland, Phase 2 interviewees 
were predominantly located in these two states. Due to the scattered location of the 
interviewees the project budget did not allow for travel to all interviewees. Thirteen 
interviews were conducted face-to-face, nineteen by phone and one respondent preferred 
to respond in writing. Audio recordings were made of all interviews, which were 
transcribed verbatim afterwards. Due to time constraints, the great majority of audio 
recordings were transcribed by a professional transcriber.   
Table 2. The representation and number of Phase 2 interviewees  
Organisation represented No. of interviewees 
State government – QFly researcher 7 
State government – Policy 6 
State government – Industry support  4 
State government – Operational 
management 
1 
Australian Government – Policy 3 
University sector 2 
Industry body  7 
Local industry  2 
Local government 1 
Consultant 3 
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Interview questions were designed to assist in understanding the current institutional 
context and answering how a more enabling broader institutional environment for fruit fly 
AWM could be created. Hence, interview questions explored: 
 the role of the interviewees and/or the organisation represented in advancing QFly 
on-ground management and/or market access 
 the main barriers faced in supporting local industries with on-ground QFly 
management and/or achieving market access to QFly-sensitive markets 
 from their perspective, the key knowledge and capabilities that local industries need 
to achieve AWM for suppression and/or market access (they were also asked to 
comment on the draft list of key knowledge and capabilities required developed 
earlier) 
 the potential for AWM as part of a systems approach to underpin market access 
(only for interviewees involved in market access) 
 how local industries can secure the support they need to achieve AWM 
 how support for local industries can be improved. 
Feedback from interviewees was used to refine the list of key knowledge, capabilities and 
resources that local industries need to achieve fruit fly AWM for market access. The final 
list is contained in Appendix 2.  
Data was also obtained by reviewing fruit fly governance publications. These include: 
 Draft National Fruit Fly Strategy (PHA, 2008) 
 National Fruit Fly Strategy – Draft Implementation Action Plan (NFFS 
Implementation Committee, 2009)  
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 National Fruit Fly Research, Development and Extension Plan (Plant Biosecurity 
CRC, 2015) 
 Regional prioritisation of the National Fruit Fly Research, Development & 
Extension Plan (Metcalfe, 2015) 
Data analysis 
As mentioned earlier, an inductive-deductive interplay between using and developing 
theory was applied (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). In other words, when data coding 
started there was no commitment to a particular theory yet. However, the researcher kept 
exploring literature while the interviews were on-going, in particular literature relating to 
agricultural research, development and extension; and AWM. When the data collection and 
analysis were well under way, it became clear that several key themes emerging from the 
data resonated well with AIS thinking. These included that high emphasis on formal 
knowledge and technology creation is often accompanied by the assumption that these will 
be adopted by industry (linear model). The data showed that various other factors also 
slowed progress at the on-ground level, such as that local industries are often weakly linked 
to other key QFly management innovation system actors. As AIS thinking suggests a 
holistic approach to solving the agricultural problems by improving the related innovation 
system, it offered a suitable approach to understand how to create an enabling environment 
for industry-driven AWM.  
The functional-structural analysis approach proposed by Bergek et al. (2008) and 
Wieczorek and Hekkert (2012) seemed particular relevant as the functions represent 
processes that would make entrepreneurial activities flourish (Negro et al., 2007; Hekkert et 
al., 2007). In other words, finding ways to achieve/support all functions is likely to create 
an enabling environment for local industries pursuing AWM. Applying the functional-
structural analysis was selected during the data analysis phase. 
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Data coding from the interview transcripts involved an iterative process of constant 
checking and refining codes as new data came in. As the author conducted the interviews 
and made notes during and shortly after the interviews, it assisted with familiarity with the 
data (Denscombe, 2014; Punch, 2005). Coding (‘open coding’) started around key 
stakeholder groups, i.e. Australian Government, state governments, local government, 
community, and industry bodies. As themes across, or not related to, specific stakeholder 
groups became apparent, additional parent nodes were added. As the connections between 
the open codes started to emerge, it enabled axial coding (Punch, 2005). 
Hence, continuous refining of codes happened during the data analysis, including refining 
code names and categorising and re-categorising of codes as needed. Sometimes a parent 
node became a child node. For example, one such parent node was ‘CoP out of date’ (QFly 
management Code of Practice is out of date), which was an early open code. Over time 
more issues related to the Code of Practice appeared that went beyond the document being 
seen as out of date, such as prescriptions for the use of certain traps that were hard to 
come by. The name of the parent node was changed to ‘CoP’, with child nodes ‘CoP out of 
date’ and ‘Other challenges’.  
Sometimes a parent node became a child node of another parent node. For example, there 
used to be two parent nodes titled ‘need inter-scale approach’ and ‘industry and 
government interaction important’. Later the latter became a child node of the former. 
From time to time previously coded transcripts were revisited to ensure coding remained 
consistent. 
Later the seven functions and structural components were added as nodes. Many of the 
existing nodes were allocated to these. However, to ensure nothing was overlooked, all 
transcripts were reviewed again.  
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Validation 
All interviewees received a copy of their interview transcript to provide them with the 
opportunity to correct or add anything if needed. This led to a few small corrections. A 
respected industry representative who has had a long involvement with QFly management 
in Australia was engaged to critically review drafts of the last two articles (chapters 4.4 and 
4.5) and interpretation of the data to ‘ground truth’ the findings.  
Limitations 
The limitations of Phase 2 include that it has an ex-post character. That is, in the current 
fast-moving arena of fruit fly management, conditions have changed since the interviews 
took place and interviewees’ information might not have been current (Lamprinopoulou et 
al., 2014). This research also represents a snapshot of a difficult transitioning period in 
Australia’s QFly management. It occurred after an era when growers had access to the low-
cost, easy-to-apply pesticides of dimethoate and fenthion and several areas had more on-
ground state government support. Yet the research was also conducted during the time 
when new initiatives, such as the National Fruit Fly Council, the SITplus program, the 
AWM Coordinator and the National Fruit Fly Research, Development and Extension Plan 
(Plant Biosecurity CRC, 2015) came about. As not enough time has passed for them to 
show real impact, this may have impacted interviewees’ responses. The social and 
institutional aspects of AWM uptake as part of the SITplus program is being explored by 
the SITplus program partners. 
2.4.3 Phases 1 and 2 – Grower survey 
A grower survey was instigated to complement the qualitative data obtained through both 
Phases 1 and 2. It represents methodological triangulation and increases the findings’ 
richness (Denscombe, 2014). The survey was conducted in all three case study regions 
between September and November 2015. The survey was designed based on themes that 
came from the qualitative research in Phase 1 and informal discussions with QFly key 
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informants. It covered aspects of on-ground QFly management and how growers related to 
the broader QFly system, such as the levels of trust that various stakeholder groups would 
deliver the needed support and cooperation. The survey is included in Appendix 3. In 
short, the survey asked respondents about: 
 how they were impacted by QFly 
 if they used crop consultants 
 their management of QFly on non-commercial land, such as host plants around the 
farm house and sheds 
 their opinions about different control mechanisms, including their cost-
effectiveness and ease of application 
 their levels of trust in different stakeholder groups to provide cooperation or 
support relating to both QFly suppression and market access to QFly-sensitive 
markets. For QFly suppression these included full-time growers, part-time growers, 
town residents, the management group, the local government and the state 
government. For market access these were the local management group, state 
government and federal government. 
 their understanding of some market access concepts 
 their views about who should be responsible for QFly management, i.e. 
government, industry or both. 
The survey questions were designed and refined in consultation with a few key growers, 
crop consultants and management group members across all three case studies. This was to 
ensure that the questions asked were appropriate for the growers targeted, both in context 
and the way they were worded. Questions related to market access were asked only of 
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growers who are interested in supplying to QFly-sensitive markets. Many questions 
requested respondents to rate to what extent they agreed or disagreed with a statement, 
with the options being ‘strongly disagree’, ‘somewhat disagree’, ‘somewhat agree’, ‘strongly 
agree’ and ‘I don’t know’. The survey was hosted on the online service SurveyGizmo.  
Grower contact lists were provided by either the local management group or the local 
industry association, which, to the best of their knowledge, included all growers in the 
region representing the industry driving coordinated QFly management. All lists needed 
data cleaning, as some entries were either out of business or the phone numbers did not 
function. The response rate has been calculated based only on the entries that were 
contactable and operating (see Table 3).  
In order to encourage responses, several suggestions put forward in the survey guidelines 
by Dillman et al. (2014) were applied: 
 the surveys were promoted before they were launched. The sponsorship of peak 
and/or local industry bodies as legitimate organisations was employed. They 
assisted with promoting the survey by emailing growers to encourage their support. 
Media releases through the local media were also published where possible shortly 
before the survey was introduced to further raise the profile of the survey. 
 communication with growers was on an adult-to-adult basis, pointing out that other 
growers in the region also participated and emphasising the benefits of 
participating. The benefits were that the survey findings would strengthen the 
‘grower voice’ in the policy arena and academic circles by showing what AWM 
looks like from an on-ground perspective. All growers were contacted by phone to 
request their participation.  
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 growers were offered multiple ways to complete the survey. It was emphasised that 
online completion through SurveyGizmo was the quickest and easiest. If they 
agreed they were emailed an invitation letter, an information sheet outlining what 
would happen to their data and a link to the survey. They were also offered a hard 
copy with a paid return envelope if they preferred not to use a computer. 
Alternatively, they were able to choose to complete the survey over the phone.  
 they received several well-spaced reminders in different formats. Respondents were 
given around six weeks to complete the survey. SurveyGizmo’s functionality 
allowed for sending an electronic reminder after a week. Those who still had not 
responded after 10 to 21 days received another reminder phone call. After another 
approximately 10 days those who had not responded received a final reminder 
phone call and/or email.  
The response rate was calculated based on the ‘clean’ data list; that is, the growers who 
were contactable and operating, including those who from the onset declined and those 
who initially agreed but failed to complete the survey. The lower response rate from the 
Riverina is in part due to lower levels of computer usage in this region. Here there were 
many more requests for hard copies and this region had a lower return rate than did the 
electronic survey. This was probably because hard copies are more cumbersome to return.  
In Young-Harden two cherry growers indicated that they were not affected by QFly and 
were therefore not doing anything to manage the pest. Like for the other local industries 
not affected by QFly, these growers were not included in the sample group. The survey 
response rates are outlined in Table 3.  
There were a number of limitations to the conduct of the survey:  
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 The initial intention was to survey all horticulture growers in each region. However, 
survey responses from wine grape growers in Young-Harden, the first area where 
the survey was launched, quickly showed that responses from horticulture growers 
not impacted by QFly resulted in a high level of ‘I don’t know’ responses. 
Consequently, it was decided to continue surveying only growers who were part of 
the industries that are driving coordinated QFly management.  
Table 3. Grower survey response rates 
 Central 
Burnett 
(QLD) 
Young-
Harden 
(NSW) 
Leeton & 
Carrathool 
(Riverina, NSW) 
No. of growers requested to 
participate (‘clean’ list) 
40 28 98 
No. of respondents  
28  
 
20  
 
50  
Response rate 70 % 63% 51% 
No. of respondents interested in 
QFly-sensitive markets1 
 
26 
 
12 
 
22 
1 Only these growers answered questions related to accessing QFly-sensitive markets. 
 In Young-Harden there are a number of cherry growers with a non-English 
speaking background who are known to seldom participate in local industry 
activities. For example, the local industry association has not been able to include 
them in their grower list. Various attempts were made to contact them and request 
their participation, but to no avail.  
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 The large size of the Riverina, project resourcing and time constraints prevented 
surveying all citrus growers in the region. As a matter of courtesy, the Riverina 
QFly campaign coordinator was asked to liaise with Riverina Biosecurity 
Incorporated (the management group) to identify a sample region. This resulted in 
the local government areas of Leeton and Carrathool becoming the participating 
areas. According to the qualitative research findings, some respondents see these as 
the more progressive regions in the Riverina, including having a better chance to 
achieve cooperation between growers. 
 Due to the small population sizes, the findings presented in the articles are limited 
to percentages of respondents only. It was not possible to do statistical analysis 
beyond descriptive in nature. 
2.5 Ethics  
A core element of good research is ethical research. Identifying what constitutes ethical 
human research has been a long on-going point of enquiry among scholars. Most notable 
in the last century were the Nuremberg trials and a number of other human research 
related scandals, such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. In response certain principles 
now stand central to many countries’ research ethics guidelines (MacFarlane, 2010; 
Lindorff, 2010), including Australia’s National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human 
Research (NHMRC et al., 2007). As the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee base 
their requirements for ethical clearance on the Australia’s National Statement on Ethical 
Conduct in Human Research, the principles contained in the Statement underpin this 
research. They are:  
 Justice – this implies the research will not exploit participants, for example, by 
overburdening them in terms of time, energy, discomfort and disclosure; or 
because they are for whatever reason vulnerable. Research outcomes and findings 
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need to not reinforce or strengthen injustices or inequalities (Lindorff, 2010; 
NHMRC et al., 2007)  
 Beneficence – acting for the benefit of others (MacFarlane, 2010), therefore research 
needs to be designed to minimise risks of harm and maximise potential advantages 
to participants, their families and related communities (Lindorff, 2010; NHMRC et 
al., 2007) 
 Respect – to treat others as oneself would like to be treated (MacFarlane, 2010), 
including to have due regard for participants’ autonomy, such as for their beliefs, 
perceptions and cultural backgrounds, as well as their privacy and confidentiality 
(Lindorff, 2010; NHMRC et al., 2007) 
 Research merit and integrity – including research that is justifiable based on the 
potential benefit it offers; designed such that the methods and resources are 
appropriate for achieving its objectives; supervised by experienced people; and is 
peer reviewed (NHMRC et al., 2007).   
With these principles in mind, the research proposals associated with each phase were 
developed and subsequently submitted and approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee. The research activities included the case study fieldwork, the semi-structured 
interviews with key informants active in the broader QFly network and the survey.  
As part of the ethics applications, plain language program information sheets were 
developed for each activity. The program sheets provided information about what the 
project was about; what was required from participants; the time their involvement would 
take; the option of withdrawal at any time; confidentiality; how their data would be used 
and stored; and the benefits, if any, they could expect from the study.  
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Consent forms were produced to obtain participants’ formal consent to participate in either 
a focus group or interview and for the conversation to be audio-recorded. The consent 
form for focus groups also included a statement that the participant agreed to keep the 
comments of others in the group confidential. All participants agreed to have interviews 
and focus groups audio-recorded, although some requested the recorder to be turned off 
during some parts of the interview. As growers self-opted to participate in the survey, their 
participation was regarded as giving consent.  
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Chapter 3. The case studies 
This chapter describes key features of the case study regions, why they were chosen and the 
key findings. As mentioned in Chapter 2, case studies were selected to achieve maximum 
variation of social and institutional profiles (Flyvbjerg, 2006). As successful industry-driven 
AWM programs in Australia were still scarce, both existing, and coordinated attempts to 
achieve industry-driven AWM programs were considered. The case studies are Central 
Burnett in Queensland, which has attained AWM, plus Riverina and Young-Harden are 
both in New South Wales and are working towards AWM. Figure 3 provides an overview 
of the case studies’ locations. 
Note that systems approach trials were initiated in 2015 in both the Riverina and Young-
Harden with the support of the NSW Department of Primary Industries (NSW DPI). As 
these developments occurred after the fieldwork they are not covered here.
 
Figure 3. An overview of the case study locations 
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3.1 Central Burnett (Queensland) 
Central Burnett was chosen as it is seen as a model case of successful industry-driven 
AWM (Davidson and Davidson, 2012; PHA, 2008; Hargreaves and Nimmo, 2012; Fay et 
al., 2011). Once a significant endemic pest that sometimes devastated crops, QFly is now a 
minor pest. Past trap catches revealed up to 240 flies/trap/day, but this reduced drastically 
to 1 fly/trap/day by 2010 under the AWM program (Fay et al., 2011) 
Preliminary investigation before the project commenced suggested that Central Burnett has 
had certain social factors that contributed to its success, which could be easily overlooked 
when the focus is only on the technical aspects of the program. These included the strong 
involvement of local crop consultants in the AWM program. Town communities were also 
dependent on the local citrus industry for the region’s economic well-being and residents 
were thus sensitive to the industry’s needs (Lloyd et al., 2010).  
Central Burnett presented a form of critical case as it involved social circumstances in 
which the success of the phenomena under investigation was most likely (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
Fieldwork here was carried out in October 2013, involving thirteen semi-structured 
interviews and a focus group. 
3.1.1 Regional and grower community profile 
The area under AWM is located in the local government area (LGA) of North Burnett 
Region and it surrounds the towns of Gayndah and Mundubbera as indicated in Figure 4. 
The area had an estimated 2000 hectares of citrus (mainly mandarins) and 50 hectares of 
mangoes in 2007 (Fay et al., 2011). AWM strategies are applied in the citrus growing area 
on either side of the Burnett River. Most commercial orchards are located along the 
Burnett, Boyne and Auburn Rivers and their tributaries. This region is about 70 km long 
and 12 km wide (Lloyd et al., 2010). Gayndah and Mundubbera are the only town areas 
included in the AWM program (Lloyd, 2007).  
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No official record of the number of citrus growers in the region could be found. At the 
time of the fieldwork, some respondents estimated that there were around 60 commercial 
citrus growers. However, once the survey contact list was cleaned of non-operating 
numbers, 40 entries were left. In some cases several farms had the same owner. There were 
also small numbers of table grape and mango growers. Citrus growers were fairly 
homogenous in their on-farm goals relating to QFly. For example, 93 per cent of survey 
respondents were interested in supplying to QFly-sensitive markets. 
 
Figure 4. The Central Burnett district 
From a biophysical point of view, the area is surrounded by dry sclerophyll forests and 
grazing land (Lloyd et al., 2010) that have a protective affect as a natural barrier to QFly 
infestation from outside the region. QFly activity is low in the period when citrus is 
maturing and harvested, that is, between March and August. However, QFly prevalence 
surges in spring, with temperature increases from late August and early September (Lloyd 
et al., 2010). 
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3.1.2 History 
The AWM program builds on a successful integrated pest management (IPM) program 
implemented and refined by on-farm consultants, which had significantly reduced QFly 
pressure prior to AWM (Lloyd et al., 2010). These activities include trapping, regular 
protein baiting and occasional insecticide cover sprays at times of high QFly pressure. The 
then Queensland Department of Primary Industries (QDPI) had carried out a number of 
QFly-related research activities in the region since the 1990s. Many growers participated in 
experimental trials with the on-going support of the crop consultants. Hence, fruit fly 
activity in the area was well understood and provided important baseline data when AWM 
started as a pilot program. AWM was introduced largely in response to the imminent 
restricted use of dimethoate, to further improve QFly control and strengthen market access 
(Lloyd, 2007).  
3.1.3 Local organisation 
The past Central Burnett Horticulture Committee had been active in the region for many 
years, as a local research and development body funded by local grower levies. It co-funded 
a variety of local research projects in the years leading up to AWM, including on IPM, 
market access, plant breeding, production and fruit quality.  
Three local crop consultants had serviced around 90 per cent of growers for twenty years 
or more (Lloyd, 2007). The survey confirmed reports during the interviews that this figure 
had reduced somewhat in recent years, mostly due to harsher economic conditions, with 79 
per cent of respondents then employing a crop consultant. This is still much higher than 
the other two case studies (see below). Overall high pest pressure in this region has been 
proposed as one of the key reasons why so many Central Burnett growers employ 
consultants. Together the crop consultants form a trusted and credible communication 
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‘infrastructure’ with growers that allows for ample opportunity for two-way 
communication and continued support with QFly management. 
The Central Burnett AWM Committee was formed in 2003, when the program started as a 
trial (Lloyd et al., 2010). Until today the committee comprises the three crop consultants, 
citrus and non-citrus grower representatives from both Gayndah and Mundubbera grower 
groups, staff from the state government department responsible for agriculture, a local 
shire council representative and a few other stakeholders.  
3.1.4 Securing local cooperation 
There was common agreement during the interviews that a high level of QFly control 
exists on-farms because several growers had witnessed crops being devastated by QFly 
some decades ago. The towns of Gayndah and Mundubbera are relatively small (1789 and 
1042 residents, respectively in 2011 (ABS, 2014a)), making it feasible for growers to fund 
urban backyard QFly treatments with voluntary contributions. Earlier QDPI research had 
ascertained that towns present considerable ‘breeding hot spots’ (Lloyd et al., 2010), which 
provided clear evidence for the need to apply town treatments. 
The key requirement of town residents at the time of the fieldwork was to permit a 
contractor to enter their backyards to perform control activities. Engagement processes 
with town residents commenced before the program started, including public meetings, 
advertising, and media releases (Lloyd, 2007). QFly displays are also presented at public 
events in the region. 
The number of growers making voluntary contributions to the town treatments has 
reduced considerably over time. This has forced less intense town treatments, although the 
effectiveness of the revised procedures are being closely monitored. The management 
committee has been experimenting with approaches to expose those growers who are not 
contributing in the hope that it will motivate them to contribute again. For example, non-
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contributors are made known in an indirect way by publicly thanking contributors in the 
local newspaper, including listing their names. Contributors are also provided with gate 
signs. 
The most frequently mentioned reason why growers opt out from contributing to town 
treatments is because others do not contribute, yet still enjoy the same benefits. The survey 
revealed that 89 per cent of respondents believe that QFly pressure from towns posed a 
serious risk if left unmanaged. However, 59 per cent indicated that they would contribute 
to the town treatments only if all other growers contributed as well. The second most 
mentioned reason is the failure to achieve international market access to lucrative markets 
without the need for cold sterilisation (see below). 
3.1.5 Market access 
QFly management through the IPM program has resulted in successful outcomes. This 
enabled the establishment of a systems approach-based protocol (ICA-28) for Central 
Burnett citrus founded on pre-harvest baiting and post-harvest inspection for the period 
from March to late August. In 1999, ICA-28 enabled Central Burnett to secure market 
access to Victoria without the need for post-harvest treatments (Lloyd, 2007). In 2007, 
based on this protocol, domestic market access was expanded to South Australia and New 
South Wales. While there is no requirement for AWM in ICA-28, the project team 
interpreted this success as increased confidence in the AWM program that complemented 
the protocol (Fay et al., 2011). 
However, access to international markets without the need for post-harvest treatments has 
not yet been obtained despite the success of the Central Burnett AWM program. Instead, 
growers are required to invest in cold sterilisation to provide assurances to QFly-sensitive 
markets that the risk of produce being a source QFly infestation has been adequately 
addressed. 
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3.2 The Riverina (New South Wales) 
Preliminary scoping revealed that the Riverina could be a challenging case study as the 
region is large, including the five LGAs of Carrathool, Griffith, Leeton, Murrumbidgee and 
Narrandera. The region includes many horticulture industries, including citrus, wine grapes, 
prunes, stonefruit, cherries, figs, apple, walnut and avocado (Davidson and Davidson, 
2012). The population is culturally diverse and there was evidence that the town 
communities lacked knowledge about QFly management in their backyards (Clarke et al., 
2012). 
The key drivers for QFly management in this extensive area are to control pest numbers, 
prevent post-harvest treatments and to minimise impacts on market access opportunities. 
A business plan for a grower-driven fruit fly control campaign was released in July 2012. 
This included calls for attitudinal and behavioural change amongst Riverina horticulture 
growers in how they approached QFly management (Davidson and Davidson, 2012). The 
fieldwork occurred in March 2014, comprising twenty semi-structured interviews and a 
focus group. Limited fieldwork resources meant that only two of the five LGAs in the 
Riverina could be surveyed in 2015. The local management group opted for Leeton and 
Carrathool. The fieldwork findings suggested that these two LGAs are more progressive 
than the other regions. 
3.2.1 Regional and grower community profile 
According to feedback from respondents in March 2014 there are around 420 citrus, 370 
wine grape and 55 prune growers, with several growers being multi-commodity producers. 
Several towns are also present, including the large rural centre of Griffith, as well as the 
smaller towns of Leeton, Narrandera and Hillston.  
Biophysically, the Riverina’s climate is predominantly dry and semi-arid with hot summers 
and cool winters (RDA, 2014). The Riverina is situated on the ecological limit of the range 
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for QFly and the area offers marginal conditions for the pest (Yonow and Sutherst, 1998). 
However, the region encompasses the Murrumbidgee and Coleambally Irrigation Areas 
(RDA, 2014), and this irrigation makes conditions more suitable for QFly (Yonow and 
Sutherst, 1998). Dominiak et al. (2006) found that towns over the size 10,000 residents are 
likely to create micro-climates, i.e. ‘urban heat islands’, which make them more suitable for 
QFly than surrounding rural areas. This applies to Griffith, which in 2011 had a population 
of 17,616 residents (ABS, 2013).  
 
Figure 5. The Riverina area 
Several major roads lead through the Riverina, which increases the risk of travellers 
carrying fresh produce unwittingly introducing QFly to the region as indicated in Figure 5. 
99 
 
These include the four federal highways of the Hume Highway (north to south), the Sturt 
Highway (east to west), the Mid-Western Highway (south to north-east), and the Cobb 
Highway (north to south). The Newell Highway is a principal freight and tourist route 
connecting Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. The Sturt Highway is part of the 
main route between Sydney and Adelaide. Other major highways in this region include the 
Burley Griffin Way and the Kidman Way (RDA, 2014).  
3.2.2 History 
The Riverina has a long history of AWM for QFly with strong support from the state 
government. Yet at the time of case study selection in early 2013, the state government was 
in the process of handing over QFly on-ground control activities to local horticulture 
industries. The Riverina used to be part of the Fruit Fly Exclusion Zone (FFEZ), an 
official trade zone across the adjoining high value horticulture regions in New South Wales, 
Victoria and South Australia. The official zone was instigated in 1994 to maximise its 
export market access by eradicating fruit flies from the zone and nearby areas. The zone 
involved a collaboration between state government and the Australian Government 
departments responsible for agriculture and several related industries (Voullaire and 
Dominiak, 2003; Dominiak et al., 2006).  
NSW DPI withdrew its management and financial support for the on-ground operations of 
QFly control in July 2013 and handed these over to industry (NSW DPI, 2012). This 
followed record numbers of QFly found in the region’s trapping grid during the seasons of 
2010/11 and 2011/12 (Davidson and Davidson, 2012). Hence NSW DPI deemed the 
NSW FFEZ economically unsustainable.  
One of the key differences in on-ground support is that NSW DPI is now monitoring a 
hugely reduced number of QFly traps in the area. The trapping grid involved a network of 
traps across the region that was regularly checked by NSW DPI staff to obtain data about 
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the number of QFly in the region. This served as hard evidence of the region’s QFly status 
during trade negotiations with overseas countries. There used to be more than 300 traps in 
the region, which number has been reduced to around 40 traps.  
In addition, a local industry body, Riverina Citrus, ceased to exist in March 2012 following 
local tension about its management. It used to be a key player in QFly-related activities, for 
example, by working closely with NSW DPI and local shire councils to undertake QFly 
treatments in towns.  
3.2.3 Local organisation 
Riverina Biosecurity Incorporated (RBI) was instigated in September 2012 by the now-
defunct Riverina Citrus and Citrus Australia as a body to oversee biosecurity issues across 
horticulture industries, using QFly as a starting point (Davidson and Davidson, 2012). A 
part-time Riverina Fruit Fly Campaign Coordinator was employed in early 2014 to support 
the activities of RBI. This was funded by the then Horticulture Australia Limited. 
At the time of the fieldwork, the RBI Executive Committee comprised representatives 
from Citrus Australia, the then Horticulture Australia Limited, Local Land Services, NSW 
DPI, Leeton Citrus Grower Association, Griffith Citrus Grower Association and Riverina 
Citrus growers. Representatives of the grower associations are growers themselves. RBI is 
resourced with residual funding from the now-defunct Riverina Citrus and that originated 
from citrus grower levies.  
The grower survey revealed that a very limited number of growers, involving 30 per cent of 
respondents, employ a crop consultant. As Leeton and Carrathool are seen as the more 
progressive regions in the Riverina, this figure is expected to be higher here than elsewhere 
in the Riverina. Some respondents ascribed the lower level of crop consultant employment 
to the overall lower pest pressure in the region and the low-input nature of many 
operations. 
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3.2.4 Securing local cooperation 
RBI attempts to increase grower support for the program by requesting supply chain 
members, such as packhouses, to insist on proof of QFly control from their grower 
suppliers. Supportive packhouses typically require growers to provide evidence through 
spray diaries and receipts for input purchases for QFly management. RBI’s fruit fly 
campaign encourages town residents to manage QFly on their properties. It includes QFly 
management workshops, publishing articles in local media and promoting QFly 
management via the radio and TV.  
Despite the Riverina being traditionally not endemic to QFly, achieving widespread 
cooperation faces several social challenges. These include a highly fragmented grower 
population and diverse on-farm objectives. Many of the non-citrus horticulture industries 
are not economically affected by QFly and were reluctant to support RBI’s efforts. Many 
citrus growers are part-time operators who run low-input production systems focused on 
the juice market, while a smaller proportion of growers supply to export markets. Tension 
within the citrus industry also resulted from the demise of Riverina Citrus in 2012. 
Communication with target groups is challenged by a cultural divide between people from 
different ethnic backgrounds, as well as from different sub-regions in the Riverina.  
Several respondents perceive QFly pressure from the towns as beyond the control of 
growers, while others said town communities are used to government or others taking care 
of the QFly problem. There are several abandoned orchards in the area which are believed 
to provide breeding hotspots for QFly. 
At the time of the fieldwork legislation required Riverina residents to maintain QFly host 
plants. According to the Plant Diseases (Treatment and Eradication of Queensland Fruit 
Fly, Riverina) Order No. 45, 2011 under the Plant Diseases Act 1924, owners and 
occupiers of land or premises in the Riverina area are required to treat citrus and prune 
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plants for QFly by using specified bait sprays and maintaining a treatment record. Many 
interviewees expressed frustration that the state government did not enforce this 
legislation, some ascribing it to a lack of state government resources. A state government 
representative pointed to a moral constraint upon fining ordinary citizens for not 
maintaining fruit trees if they lacked resources or were not able-bodied (such as some 
retirees). 
3.2.5 Market access 
Most horticulture growers have experienced limited impact from fruit fly on their ability to 
market their produce, except for export-oriented citrus growers. Forty four percent of 
survey respondents indicated that they are interested in supplying to QFly-sensitive 
markets. As noted above, this figure is probably lower in parts of the Riverina other than in 
the Leeton and Carrathool LGAs. As the trapping grid density no longer meets the 
requirements for underpinning export market access, lucrative export markets, such as the 
US, China and Japan, can now only be supplied if produce undergoes costly cold 
sterilisation. 
Most of the citrus supply chains require QFly-free produce; but the prerequisites for 
supplying growers differ. At the time of the fieldwork juice companies carried out fruit 
inspections for signs of QFly maggots when produce arrived at the plant. For export-
oriented growers to achieve access to lucrative overseas markets without applying cold 
sterilisation, they must be able to provide evidence that QFly is under control. In the past 
this was achieved through the extensive trapping grid monitored by NSW DPI when the 
region was part of the FFEZ. There is little benefit for the juice market growers to invest in 
such an elaborate and expensive undertaking as area-wide trapping. 
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3.3 Young-Harden (New South Wales) 
The cherry industry is driving the quest for coordinated QFly control in the region due to 
market access concerns. A key characteristic of this case study is the strong support it 
enjoys from the regions’ local governments. The fieldwork here was carried out in 
September 2013 and involved nine semi-structured interviews and a focus group. 
Several developments, in addition to the system approach trials, have occurred in this 
region since the fieldwork was carried out. The impacts of these are not covered by this 
research. They include the introduction of a SIT initiative in the Young township 
implemented by the Young local government in collaboration with NSW DPI. In 2016 the 
councils of Harden, Young and Boorowa merged to form the Hilltops Council. 
3.3.1 Regional and grower community profile 
This case study includes the then two shires of Young and Harden (Figure 6). Marte (2007) 
reports that the region involves an estimated 200 growers producing cherries, sugar plums, 
prunes, apples, wine grapes and other stonefruit. However, local respondents in 2013 
reported a large drop in grower numbers in recent years, and, while no official figures could 
be obtained, locals believe there are in the order of 40 cherry growers. This seems a 
reasonable estimate, given that for the survey in 2015 the local cherry grower association 
list of growers revealed 28 active cherry growers (a few others were listed but reported that 
they went out of business). There are also a number of growers from non-English speaking 
backgrounds who prefer not to be part of the association. Respondents in 2013 also 
referred to 20 wine grape growers, which were confirmed by the grower list from the local 
winegrape grower association. Local industry representatives estimate the region includes 
650 to 700 ha of cherries and up to 1,000 ha of wine grapes.  
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Growers reported being challenged by impractical export protocols and low profitability 
over recent years as a result of export market loss, oversupply on the domestic market and 
a strong Australian dollar. 
 
Figure 6. The Young-Harden region 
The region’s cold winter temperatures and QFly pressure during the cherry harvest season 
were key reasons why this region has previously been identified as suitable for establishing 
an AWM program (Marte, 2007; Jorgensen, 2002). QFly trapping activity during 2003 and 
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2006 showed that the towns had considerably higher QFly prevalence than the surrounding 
commercial orchards (Marte, 2007). 
3.3.2 History 
Young-Harden has had the least intense history with QFly control in the region although 
various QFly activities have been carried out by the state government and the local councils 
(Marte, 2007). Cherry growers lost market access to Taiwan in the early 2000s and to 
Thailand in 2011, due to QFly-related concerns with the latter being described as a 
‘particularly big blow’ to cherry growers.  
3.3.3 Local organisation 
Cherry growers and the local councils of the Young and Harden shires instigated the Fruit 
Fly Action Group in September 2012. This group aims to coordinate QFly activities in the 
region. The Action Group includes representatives from the two councils, an on-farm 
consultant from a chemical company and a NSW DPI representative. Most growers’ 
representatives are well connected both with other growers in the region and/or with the 
cherry industry networks. For example, several grower members are also members of the 
Cherry Grower Association Board, Australian Cherry Export Working Group, NSW 
Cherries Association and the then Horticulture Australia Limited advisory committees. 
One member has been involved in QFly management activities in the past and his local 
knowledge is highly valued. Some of these growers are collaborating formally and 
informally with a NSW DPI researcher on QFly-related research activities on their 
properties.  
Anecdotally, persistent ‘nagging’ from one grower who had been particularly hit hard by 
QFly pressure from towns, played a key role in getting the local government on board. In 
addition to fulfilling various administrative responsibilities related to the QFly initiative, the 
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local government applies bait sprays on public land during two periods per year when QFly 
numbers spike.  
A key theme was frustration with the lack of support from the Australian Government to 
progress market access. Establishing the needed networks was identified as one of the 
biggest challenges. The Fruit Fly Action Group tries to build rapport with key government 
officials, such as the State Minister for Agriculture. The group intends to win the 
cooperation of other horticulture industries in the wider region to have more influence 
when dealing with politicians about QFly.  
3.3.4 Securing cooperation 
There were reports that growers find the transition from using fenthion and dimethoate to 
softer technologies, such as bait spraying, challenging as the latter needs to be applied more 
regularly and is more costly. Following resource-intensive recommended procedures, such 
as picking up fallen fruit, is also challenged when profitability is low. For example, picking 
up fallen fruit after a hail storm is not economically justifiable when a big part of the crop 
has been destroyed. Thirty percent of respondents in the grower survey indicated that they 
employ the services of a crop consultant. 
Respondents reported that fruit fly breeding in town backyards is a major concern. The 
community has been approached through articles in local newspapers and newsletters, 
letterbox drops, occasional reports on the radio and two community meetings. Some 
mentioned an increase in derelict orchards, lifestyle blocks and absentee landholders on 
land that used to be commercial orchards. Some exiting growers sold their land as a 
number of lifestyle blocks to maximise their capital gain.  
In the past some town residents complained when local council staff applied chemicals in 
their backyards to control QFly. The fear that the NSW Environmental Protection 
Authority might issue considerable fines to the local council in response to public 
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complaints, contributed to the council ceasing backyard treatments. Several respondents 
pointed out that, despite the strong support from local government, there is a lack of local 
power to compel risk contributors to follow recommended best practice. Examples include 
several town residents, lifestyle block owners and absentee landholders.  
3.3.5 Market access 
Despite negligible QFly damage to cherries exported, the pest hampers market access and 
necessitates cold sterilisation to access several markets. Not only does this add considerable 
cost, cold sterilisation can cause quality deterioration in cherries and undermine the 
growers’ competitiveness. Sixty per cent of respondents in the grower survey indicated that 
they are interested in supplying to QFly-sensitive markets. 
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Chapter 4. Publications 
 
4.1 Article 1. Designing local institutions for cooperative pest management to 
underpin market access: the case of industry-driven fruit fly area-wide 
management  
 
In this article Ostrom’s design principles for robust common-pool resource institutions 
(Anderies et al., 2004, Poteete et al., 2010, Cox et al., 2010, Ostrom, 1990) are applied to 
case study findings to demonstrate the important influence of regional communities’ social 
profile on their ability to achieve AWM. 
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Abstract: Area-wide management of mobile pests offers advantages over 
uncoordinated farm-by-farm efforts through increased effectiveness of pest 
control and by reducing the need for pesticides. The literature about area-wide pest 
management focuses predominantly on the technical aspects of these programs, 
but tends to neglect the importance of social and institutional aspects. In this 
article the eight design principles for robust common-pool resource institutions 
are applied to industry-driven area-wide pest management. Three case studies  
are compared to gain insight about the social and institutional aspects that affect 
the success of these undertakings. These cases are focused on Queensland Fruit 
Fly control to underpin market access. Growers face a particular challenge to 
gain support from town residents, as backyard fruit trees can be pest breeding 
spots. The paper illustrates that social aspects – such as heterogeneous incentives, 
social capital and the ratio between town residents and main beneficiary growers 
– influence the ease of which the design principles can be applied. Market access 
opportunities impact the ratio of cost and benefits to different participants. The 
paper concludes that disconnecting the technical aspects of successful programs 
from the social and institutional aspects in which they are embedded can create 
unrealistic expectations in socially different regions that intend to replicate these 
programs. 
 
Keywords: Biosecurity, market access, pest management, social ecological 
systems, sustainable agriculture 
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4.2 Article 2. Adaptive co-management for collaborative commercial pest 
management: the case of industry-driven fruit fly area-wide management 
 
Adaptive co-management provides a pragmatic way for local industries to initiate local 
collective fruit fly management initiatives. Key principles contained in the adaptive co-
management literature are used as a lens through which the case study findings are 
explored to better understand what enables AWM.
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4.3 Article 3. ‘Smart regulation’ and community collaboration in Australia’s 
modern biosecurity context  
 
A key challenge to industry-driven AWM is achieving wide-spread voluntary cooperation amongst 
fruit fly risk contributors, including growers, town residents and other landholders. Case study 
findings; theoretical considerations about the role of the community in biosecurity; and experiences 
elsewhere contributed to identifying four options for dealing with this challenge. This manuscript is 
under review with the journal Rural Society – the first round of reviewers’ feedback has been 
incorporated. 
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“SMART REGULATION” AND COMMUNITY COLLABORATION IN 
AUSTRALIA’S MODERN BIOSECURITY CONTEXT 
Increasingly resource-constrained governments encourage greater industry and 
community self-reliance. This research investigates the potential use of “smart 
regulation”, that is, complementary policy instruments in a context where 
reliance on voluntary approaches to achieve local cooperation is problematic. It 
explores the case of industry-driven area-wide management (AWM) of fruit fly, a 
potentially devastating mobile pest. AWM involves synchronized pest 
management across a geographical area. As host plants beyond commercial 
farms, e.g. in nearby town backyards and peri-urban areas, create fruit fly 
breeding places, pest management activities are also needed here. In Australia, 
most local horticulture industries are expected to drive these initiatives to 
minimise damage to their crops and market opportunities. AWM offers an 
example of where the beneficiaries are concentrated, but the risk contributors are 
diffused. Mixed-methods research was applied involving three Australian case 
studies. Considerations for four policy instruments that could be included in a 
“smart regulation” approach are explored. The research shows that applying 
“smart regulation” promises a prudent way forward when governments expect 
industry self-reliance, but where industry has limited influence over diffused risk 
contributors.  
Keywords: area-wide management; biosecurity; community engagement; fruit 
fly; partnerships; shared responsibility 
Introduction  
In many countries “top-down” government approaches have made way for alternative 
policies often featuring partnerships and shared or devolved responsibilities with 
industry and the community (Morrison and Lane, 2006; Lockie and Higgins, 2007; 
Berkes, 2010). In rural Australia, this often leads to reliance on voluntary approaches to 
encourage farming and town communities to contribute to accomplishing certain 
outcomes (Gunningham, 2009; Curtis, 2000; Curtis et al., 2014). However, these 
approaches are challenged when the main beneficiaries are concentrated, yet the costs 
are diffused across many risk contributors. Here such an example is explored from the 
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plant biosecurity world. Australian biosecurity is a prime example of where the state 
increasingly devolves responsibility to other societal sectors (Higgins et al., 2016).  
Queensland fruit fly is a mobile pest that can devastate horticulture crops and it can 
hinder market access even without production impacts (PHA, 2008). It poses a serious 
threat to Australia’s fruit and vegetable industry worth almost AUS$8 billion in 2014-
2015 (ABS, 2016b). QFly management has recently become more challenging in 
Australia with the restriction of key pesticides, fenthion and dimethoate, traditionally 
used to control the pest (APVMA, 2012). Area-wide management (AWM) is promoted 
as a key control strategy (NFFC, 2016) as, if successfully implemented, it lessens 
dependence on pesticides (PHA, 2008). It refers to coordinated pest management 
activities implemented over an extended area. As host plants in town backyards, peri-
urban and public land present pest breeding places, pest management activities are also 
required here (Hendrichs et al., 2007). Hence, the AWM success depends inter alia on 
community collaboration.  
A lack of public support is a greater contributor to AWM program failure than poor 
technology (Dyck et al., 2005). Community engagement is needed to both encourage 
support and address community concerns (Hendrichs et al., 2007). This work focuses on 
gaining community support to prevent QFly infestation from their land. 
This article explores how suitable is “smart regulation” as an option for managing 
pest pressure from land beyond affected commercial orchards. “Smart regulation” 
involves complementary policy instruments in a context where reliance on voluntary 
approaches to achieve local cooperation is problematic (Martin and Gunningham, 2014; 
Australian Public Service Commission, 2009; Kennedy, 2010). It starts by canvassing 
the changing roles of the state, industry and the community, including in the Australian 
biosecurity context; and how regional pest issues are addressed elsewhere. Data is 
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derived from mixed methods including three case studies. Four policy instruments that 
could potential be included in “smart regulation” are explored. This article contributes 
to the broader discussion about making the modern biosecurity project workable, 
including gaining community support. 
Literature review 
The changing roles of the state, industry and community in NRM  
Recent decades have witnessed an increase in approaches that emphasise community 
involvement in natural resource management (NRM) (Curtis et al., 2014). Broadly 
speaking, by the 1980s traditional “top-down” government approaches were criticised 
for being inefficient and inflexible (Berkes, 2010; Morrison and Lane, 2006). These 
critiques coincided with increasing neoliberal rationales favouring market-driven 
approaches, deregulation (Maye et al., 2012) and greater industry and community self-
reliance (Lockie and Higgins, 2007). This included an increased reliance on voluntary 
approaches to address NRM issues (Gunningham, 2009; Curtis, 2000). The emphasis on 
key neoliberal themes such as deregulation and a smaller state contributed to the term 
“roll-back” neoliberalism (Lockie and Higgins, 2007; Peck, 2010; Maye et al., 2012).  
However, from around the mid-1990s, the limitations of simplistic deregulation 
became clear, including with voluntary schemes (Gunningham, 2009), contributing to 
“roll-out” neoliberalism (Maye et al., 2012; Peck, 2010). That is, the introduction of 
various innovative regulations and policy adjustments that reinforce “market rule” to 
address challenges associated with neoliberal governing (Maye et al., 2012; Peck, 
2010), while ensuring programs are workable and legitimate (Lockie and Higgins, 
2007).  
“Smart regulation” forms part of such innovative approaches. It is defined as “a form 
of regulatory pluralism that embraces flexible, imaginative and innovative forms of 
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social control” (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2017: p133) Using a combination of 
instruments assists in overcoming the weaknesses of individual instruments, while 
capitalising on their strengths (Australian Public Service Commission, 2009). For 
example, by combining approaches that draw on people’s intrinsic motivation to “do the 
right thing” with enforceable, legal instruments (Kennedy, 2010). It often involves a 
combination of either regulation with self-motivation and/or local empowerment, 
including forms of self-regulation or co-regulation (Gunningham and Sinclair, 2017). 
Community engagement  
The shifting roles of society’s three main sectors have triggered a proliferation of 
community engagement literature. Much are based on the public participation rationale, 
which broadly involves giving communities greater self-determining powers by 
engaging community members in setting agendas, making decisions and other forms of 
policy-making (Rowe and Frewer, 2005). Proclaimed benefits include better 
understanding of issues, strengthened trust, communication and learning between 
citizens and government; and hence improved decision-making that enjoys higher 
legitimacy amongst participants (Creighton, 2005).  
Several authors are concerned that in the context of neoliberal thinking citizens can 
be seen as mere “implementation agents” with a shared responsibility that need to be 
mobilised to contribute to achieving certain outcomes (Curtis et al., 2014; Gill, 2011). 
Hence, this easily leads to a way of thinking that focuses on what the community needs 
to do to achieve predetermined outcomes. The danger here is that such thinking could 
result in over-optimism about what could be achieved through voluntary community 
contributions (Curtis et al., 2014). People in rural areas may hold a different 
interpretation than the state of what their responsibilities are (Higgins et al., 2016). 
Some point out that responsibility endowed does not necessarily mean responsibility 
accepted (Gill, 2011).  
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Curtis et al. (2014), a group of social scientists with extensive experience in NRM, 
have identified key lessons about best-practice engagement based on voluntary 
community-based NRM in Australia and New Zealand over the last 25 years. It is a 
response to their concern that communities are increasingly seen as “implementation 
agents” rather than being truly enabled to address NRM issues. Lessons include the 
need for voluntary collaboration to tap into the community’s intrinsic motivations. 
Governance responsibilities and rights are best devolved to the “lowest” level possible 
where they can be implemented effectively. Adoption requires a multi-pronged 
approach addressing all key barriers to behavioural change, but education has become 
the main focus as it is seen as a low-cost solution. Voluntary cooperation requires 
investment in strengthening local self-help, including capacity building. They point out 
that voluntary cooperation is not appropriate in all contexts.  
The role of the community in the Australian biosecurity context  
The modern biosecurity paradigm in Australia emphasises partnerships and shared 
responsibility, including a greater role for the community (Nairn et al., 1996; Beale et 
al., 2008). It has brought with it reduced public investment for domestic biosecurity and 
the devolution of responsibility (Higgins et al., 2016). However, tension exists around 
the community’s role. On the one hand it seems fair that all Australians have 
responsibility to preserve biosecurity as they benefit from better food security and 
quality, stronger trade and greater environmental preservation (Fraser, 2016). On the 
other hand, some question whether the community is a true biosecurity partner, as it has 
limited opportunity to shape the agenda (Barker, 2010). Plant biosecurity challenges 
seldom become key election issues and society at large is generally ignorant about plant 
pests (Brasier, 2008). Donaldson (2013) posits that in these contexts the community’s 
biosecurity responsibilities may become an extension of government and agriculture 
industries’ biosecurity apparatus, often for trade-related aims. Higgins et al. (2016) 
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found that while governments might be driven by a logic of biosecurity partnerships and 
shared responsibility, this is likely to be challenged by alternative institutional logics at 
the local level.  
The community and area-wide management  
Currently, in most Australian horticultural regions state governments require local 
industries to take the lead in securing the voluntary support from local landholders with 
QFly host plants on their properties. Australia’s National Fruit Fly Council (NFFC) 
states that, “local grower groups are encouraged to work with their local councils to 
help educate residential communities about how to manage their gardens against fruit 
fly” (NFFC, 2016). There are some instances of innovative policy mechanisms to deal 
with QFly. For example, in the Great Sunraysia region in Victoria, a grower levy has 
been legislated (Agriculture Victoria, 2015) to enable a funding stream for industry to 
deal with, amongst other, pest pressure from towns.  
Australian noxious weed management traditionally rest on legislation enforcing 
landholders to manage key weeds on their land. However, there are increasingly calls 
for more innovative approaches involving collective action between landholders across 
an area (Marshall et al., 2016). Sindel et al. (2013) investigated how to improve regional 
weed management adoption by exploring serrated tussock (Nassella trichotoma) 
control. They favour a community-based approach based on cooperation and trust, but 
concluded, “A community-based program to engage the community in weed control (a 
“carrot”) must ... be accompanied by sufficiently strong legislative requirements to 
control weeds, both on private and public land (a “stick”)” (Sindel et al., 2013: xviii). 
“Smart regulation” is also evident in some overseas examples of achieving 
community collaboration for horticulture-related pest management. For example, in the 
US states of Washington and Oregon the state provides certain powers to local groups 
called horticulture pest and disease boards. These grower-run groups are formed once 
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25 growers within a region file a petition to their local government to express their 
concern about pest pressure from other landholders’ land (including towns). Local 
government has the power to approve such boards under the 2011 Washington Code 
(Title 15 Agriculture and Marketing, 15.09 Horticultural Pest and Disease Board). The 
boards, which typically also run community education campaigns, have powers such as 
the ability to enter private property, inspect land and order landholders to control pests.  
In Canada’s British Columbia province, The Sterile Insect Release (SIR) program for 
Codling Moth control, is underpinned by provincial legislation. Programs involving 
sterile insect technique are typically based on AWM. The Municipal and Validating Act 
(1989) makes provisions for bylaws that allow for the establishment of Codling Moth 
SIR programs overseen by autonomous boards in five districts. Three out of the eight 
board members are local growers. Program staff have powers to enter private property, 
inspect land and order landholders to control pests. These activities are complementary 
to community education efforts (Anon., 2011). 
Like Greater Sunraysia, some overseas programs have legislated funding 
mechanisms. In parts of South Africa, if the owners of 70 per cent of the area under 
production within a region are supportive of fruit fly sterile insect technique (SIT), the 
government launches an economic study to investigate if all growers are able to 
contribute to it. If so, contributing to and participating in the SIT program becomes 
compulsory. Part of this funding, which is matched by government funding, is used to 
resource regional coordinators as well as fruit fly control and community education 
activities in towns (personal communication, Nando Baard, FruitFly Africa, December 
2014). The Canadian SIR Program for Codling Moth is primarily funded by a parcel tax 
for horticulture growers (charged per acre under horticultural production) plus a 
property tax on rural and urban properties in the region. This funding enables, inter alia, 
pest management activities in towns (Anon., 2011). 
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Research methods  
The mixed-method research presented here explores how suitable a “smart regulation” 
approach is for managing pest pressure from land beyond affected commercial orchards. 
It does this by exploring four prominent policy instruments that are typically used in 
similar contexts. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of different instruments 
assists in understanding if there is a need for using complementary instruments. 
Empirical research 
The qualitative research involved fieldwork conducted in three case study regions 
that each involve attempts to stem QFly pressure from local towns. An interpretivist 
approach (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000) based on case studies were chosen to tease apart 
the interwoven variables and complex relations involved (Punch, 2005). In particular, 
this research explored the challenges and opportunities that local grower groups face in 
pursuing AWM, including engaging their local communities to manage QFly. These 
cases (see Table 1) were selected using theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007) to achieve maximum social and institutional variation. None of them envisage 
QFly eradication; rather the medium-term focus is achieving/maintaining an on-going 
collective approach to QFly management. Community refers to all residents who are not 
part of the main local industry group driving the AWM initiative.  
Primary data were obtained from face-to-face, in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
with key informants. They were selected using purposive sampling, i.e. people were 
chosen based on their knowledge, position or characteristics (Punch, 2005) and to 
ensure variety of perspectives (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Interviewees were 
chosen based on occupying key roles in the AWM attempt and on their understanding 
of how key stakeholders, such as growers and/or the local community, respond to the 
QFly challenge. They included program coordinators, growers, crop consultants, and 
representatives from local and state governments and packhouses. Focus groups with 
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the local management group members overseeing the AWM initiative were also carried 
out. All participants provided written informed consent to participate. The questions 
asked were broad and open-ended to obtain honest views (Punch, 2005) about the status 
quo of the AWM program. For example, respondents were asked what they thought of 
the support they received from town residents, other landholders and government 
bodies. Other data sources included observing management group meetings, and 
drawing on existing reports, previous management group meeting minutes and media 
releases, where available. 
 
Table 1. Overview of the case studies and data collection 
Case study Central Burnett, 
Queensland 
Riverina, NSW Young-Harden, 
NSW 
Industry 
driving AWM 
Citrus (mainly 
mandarins) 
Citrus (mainly oranges) Cherries 
Why chosen Success story of 
industry-driven 
AWM. The town 
community is 
regarded as supportive 
(Lloyd et al., 2010). 
Large, diversified region 
which had much past 
government support. Since 
July 2013 coordinated QFly 
management attempts are 
industry-driven (Davidson 
and Davidson, 2012). 
Since 2012, growers 
initiated a group to 
coordinate regional 
QFly management. 
Local government 
plays a key role. 
Qualitative 
data  
Thirteen interviews 
One focus group  
October 2013 
Twenty interviews  
One focus group  
March 2014 
Nine interviews  
One focus group  
September 2013 
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Case study Central Burnett, 
Queensland 
Riverina, NSW Young-Harden, 
NSW 
Survey 
response rate 
(No. of 
respondents / 
Total grower 
population) 
 
70% 
(28/40) 
 
51% 
(50/98) 
 
63% 
(20/28) 
 
Interviews proceeded on average for an hour, were audio-recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. Data was coded by one researcher using NVivo 10. Coding involved an 
iterative process of continuing checking and refining codes and emerging themes as data 
came in. Initially coding was based around stakeholder groups, such as local 
government, state government, growers, other landholders, town community; as well as 
program background, institutions and other. As key themes became apparent sub-nodes 
were added (Denscombe, 2014). For example, “communication” was a common sub-
theme under each group. “Supportive” and “non-supportive” became sub-themes under 
growers, other landholders, town community, which were later considered together to 
understand enablers and hindrances for AWM support. Member checking was used to 
verify findings (Punch, 2005) by sending a summary of each case study’s findings to the 
related interviewees for comment. 
The quantitative research involved a grower survey conducted in the same regions 
between September and November 2015. As local grower groups are responsible for 
driving community engagement initiatives, the survey explored how growers perceive 
QFly risk from towns and how it is dealt with. The survey implementation process was 
based on the guidance provided by Dillman et al. (2014). Contact details were obtained 
from either the local management group or industry associations. Most responses were 
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received electronically through SurveyGizmo, while some growers submitted 
hardcopies or completed it over the phone with a researcher. The response rates are 
contained in Table 1. Due to limited fieldwork resources only two out of the five local 
government areas in the Riverina were surveyed, that is, Leeton and Carrathool. This 
was based on the preference of the local management group, Riverina Biosecurity 
Incorporated. Small grower population sizes meant that analysis of responses was 
limited to calculating percentages per respondent population for each case study. 
The development of the questions was informed by the preceding qualitative research 
findings. Central Burnett growers were asked different questions than the growers in 
Riverina and Young-Harden, as Central Burnett relies on voluntary grower 
contributions to fund town treatments, whereas the other two case studies rely on 
awareness-raising and education. All growers were requested to indicate to what extent 
they agree or disagree with a statement. For Central Burnett the statements were: 
 Towns can be a serious risk to QFly pressure in our region if left unmanaged 
 All horticulture growers contribute the recommended amount for their property 
to manage QFly in towns 
 I will only contribute to town treatments if all other growers contribute too 
 I contribute the full recommended amount to the town treatments 
In the Riverina and Young-Harden the statements were: 
 QFly breeding in towns increases QFly pressure for horticulture farms in our 
region 
 All town residents understand the QFly issues faced in our region 
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 Town residents will sufficiently manage QFly in their yards when there are 
regular education and awareness-raising activities 
 QFly treatments on public land are an effective way of reducing QFly pressure 
in our region (such as baiting, trap monitoring and MAT blocks along town 
streets) 
The survey findings were considered together with the qualitative data that dealt with 
community support and the role and support of different stakeholder groups. This was 
compared with a literature review about NRM community engagement as well as how 
overseas AWM case studies deal with the issue of pest pressure coming from land 
beyond commercial farms. The Australian National University Human Research Ethics 
Committee approved the research proposals for the qualitative and quantitative research. 
Identification of the policy instruments 
The policy instruments that are explored in the Discussion section were identified from 
the case studies, literature review and overseas cases (Table 2).  
Table 2. Reasons for the choice of policy instruments to be explored 
Policy instrument Reason why chosen 
Voluntary approaches  Commonly promoted in Australia 
Broad-based state regulation Can easily be seen as “quick fix” 
Devolved power Some forms used in overseas cases and other “public 
participation” forms are promoted in community 
engagement literature 
Legislated cost recovery-
structures 
Present in overseas AWM programs and since recently 
in Greater Sunraysia, Victoria 
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Findings  
This section gives an overview of each case study’s narrative as identified through 
the semi-structured interviews, focus groups and related documentation. It is followed 
by a summary of the survey findings.   
Central Burnett, Queensland 
Once a significant endemic pest that sometimes devastated crops, QFly is now a minor 
pest. AWM started in 2003 as a trial led by state government and local private crop 
consultants, and included the appointment of the Central Burnett Fruit Fly AWM 
Management Group. Local government was instrumental in community engagement 
activities early on and continues to provide some support. 
The towns of Gayndah and Mundubbera are relatively small (1,789 and 1,042 
residents, respectively in 2011 (ABS, 2013)), making it feasible for growers to fund 
backyard QFly treatments with voluntary contributions. Since AWM started, town 
residents were asked to permit a contractor to enter their backyards to perform regular 
QFly management activities. Several respondents spoke about positive feedback from 
the community as they can now enjoy maggot-free backyard produce. Engagement with 
town residents commenced before the program started, including public meetings, 
advertising, and media releases.  
However, grower contributions for town treatments are dwindling, due to both 
witnessing others not contributing while enjoying the same benefit and not achieving 
the anticipated strengthened market access directly attributable to AWM. After years of 
good outcomes, many growers are uncertain whether town treatments still lessens on-
farm QFly pressure. Town treatments have recently been changed to save cost. Results 
are closely monitored. 
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Riverina, New South Wales  
The Riverina faces the most challenges of the case studies. This extensive area includes 
five local government areas, i.e. Carrathool, Griffith, Leeton, Murrumbidgee and 
Narrandera. Since July 2013, the citrus industry has driven an attempt for coordinated 
QFly control, as the pest hampers market access, especially for export navel oranges. 
Grower uptake is challenged by heterogeneous on-farm objectives. For example, several 
respondents referred to numerous Riverina landholders living on 30 acre blocks with 
old citrus orchards that are not their main livelihood. Removing orchards is expensive 
and work commitments elsewhere prevent rigorous QFly management. In years of good 
citrus prices, these orchards can still provide income by selling fruit for juice. 
Moreover, many of the region’s other horticulture producers experience little economic 
impact from QFly, despite these commodities being declared hosts. Frustration with 
those failing to control QFly and their ignorance of its impact was common. 
The area includes Griffith, a large rural centre, and the towns of Leeton and Hillston 
(17,616; 8,414 and 1,430 residents respectively (ABS, 2013)). Town suburbs are 
adjacent to some commercial orchards. There is a long history of strong state 
government-supported QFly control. The New South Wales Department of Primary 
Industries (NSW DPI) used to work with the then Riverina Citrus, a local industry 
association, and local shire councils to manage QFly populations in towns. In July 2013, 
the NSW DPI handed QFly control over to industry after unprecedented QFly 
detections left the prevailing management approach economically unsustainable (NSW 
DPI, 2012). NSW DPI sees its current roles relating to the broader community as 
providing technical information and producing information hand-outs and websites. 
Local government’s involvement ceased when NSW DPI reduced their on-ground 
activities. 
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Riverina Biosecurity Incorporated started in September 2012 as a management group 
to oversee horticultural biosecurity issues, starting with QFly. It organises QFly control 
workshops for growers and town residents to encourage application of baiting, trapping, 
crop sanitation and netting, although attendance can be challenging. RBI appointed a 
Riverina Fruit Fly Campaign Coordinator in December 2013, funded by the then 
Horticulture Australia Limited, to strengthen community and grower support for QFly 
management.  
At the time of the fieldwork, The Plant Diseases (Treatment and Eradication of 
Queensland Fruit Fly, Riverina) Order No. 45, 2011 under the Plant Diseases Act 1924, 
required Riverina landholders and residents to treat citrus and prune plants for QFly. 
However, this regulation was not strongly enforced, which frustrated many respondents. 
Apart from the state government lacking enforcement resources there was a moral 
dilemma, as the quote below illustrates:  
If you have a man of 75, living on his five acre block, he is retired or semi-retired, 
he has contributed to society …should we legislate him out of what he has chosen 
to do for his retirement when he is a self-funded retiree? ... And should we then say 
we demand you do something and he is broke? ... There is no easy way out of this. 
And we get into the very sticky area of where the industry believes something 
should happen ...and are they going to ask government to force an industry view 
onto another sector of society?    (NSW DPI representative) 
 
At the time of writing this legislation was no longer in place. Respondents lamented 
the lack of local power to deal with landholders (both urban and orchardists) not 
controlling QFly.  
Young-Harden, New South Wales  
Between 2003 and 2006, the NSW DPI carried out QFly-related research in Young-
Harden and identified the potential for AWM. QFly trap counts were far greater in 
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towns than in commercial orchards (Marte, 2007). Some commercial orchards are 
adjacent to Young suburbs, whereas Harden is removed from orchards. They have 
10,039 and 1,877 residents, respectively (ABS, 2013).  
In October 2012, the Young and Harden shire councils and local growers instigated 
the Fruit Fly Action Group to coordinate QFly management in the region. The cherry 
industry drives QFly control, as the pest hampers markets access opportunities. Local 
governments play a key role in the Fruit Fly Action Group’s activities, including 
external networking and applying limited QFly control on public land in towns during 
peak QFly periods.  
A strong theme was the lack of local power to compel those with little incentive to 
control QFly. The group recently started engaging the community including through 
media releases, radio talks, letterbox drops and community meetings to promote and 
provide options for QFly management, including baiting, trapping and fruit sanitation. 
Achieving strong community meeting attendance is challenging. Some people spoke 
about derelict orchards and absentee landholders, where owners are not in a position to 
manage QFly effectively. Grower frustration with unmanaged hosts abounds, for 
example: 
I had a neighbour who split his block in four, now I have four neighbours where 
the owners do not live on the land. To get them to spend money to maintain their 
orchards is almost impossible…I speak to people and they say “Yes, yes, yes” but a 
month later they still have not done anything.   (Young-Harden grower) 
 
In the focus group growers expressed frustration to a NSW DPI representative over 
the lack of QFly control enforcement, such as on derelict orchards. He explained that 
the issue goes beyond NSW DPI to magistrates who are far removed from the QFly 
issue: 
164 
 
Here is another inequity. We, as the prosecutors, have to prove to a magistrate say 
in the Land and Environment Court that this orchard is unmanaged. This guy has 
to put in just one day of work a year and say “I try to maintain it”, and we are 
made toothless.       (NSW DPI representative) 
 
Survey results  
The survey results are summarised in Figure 1. The majority of growers see QFly 
pressure from towns as a significant risk, with at least 89 percent agreeing in ll case 
studies. At the time of the survey the Riverina Fruit Fly Campaign Coordinator had 
been leading an education campaign for over a year, including media releases, radio 
talks, a regularly updated Facebook page, newsletters and QFly management 
workshops. Only 42 per cent of Leeton-Carrathool growers surveyed agreed that the 
community understood local QFly-related issues. In Young-Harden there had been 
limited community engagement activities in the period leading up to the survey. In both 
Leeton-Carrathool and Young-Harden, only 42 per cent and 40 per cent of surveyed 
growers, respectively, believed that regular education activities would ensure that town 
residents would adequately manage QFly on their properties. Growers believed that 
QFly treatments on public land are an effective way of reducing QFly pressure affecting 
90 and 80 per cent of Leeton-Carrathool and Young-Harden respondents, respectively. 
The Central Burnett data reveal some distrust amongst growers about others 
contributing the recommended amount, with 45 per cent agreeing that others contribute 
the recommended amount. This influences the decision to contribute of 59 per cent of 
respondents, who said that they would only contribute if others contributed too. About 
the same number indicated that they were contributing the recommended amount. 
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Figure 1. Growers’ views about QFly risk from towns across the case studies 
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Figure 1 (b) 
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Discussion  
The promotion of pest management on a collective basis across a region is a sound 
policy (Marshall et al., 2016; Sindel et al., 2013; Hendrichs et al., 2007), but the case 
studies show that relying on voluntary approaches alone in challenging. This section 
explores the four policy instruments identified in Table 3 that could be used to support 
AWM as part of a “smart regulation” approach. 
Voluntary approaches 
Fortunately, most rural towns involve people who value their backyard produce. 
Arevalo-Vigne et al. (2015) found that 57 percent out of a sample of 606 people in 
Western Australia are doing something to address MedFly on their land. Education 
about prudent QFly management practices is likely to tap into their intrinsic motivations 
to protect their produce and it empowers them to apply effective pest management.  
However, the grower survey in the Riverina and Young-Harden shows growers have 
limited faith in awareness-raising and education, suggesting they might be unlikely to 
voluntarily invest in them if applied in isolation. Requests to the community to invest 
time and money—such as on baiting, trapping, netting and/or fruit sanitation—require 
more skilled negotiations and continued information sharing with them, as opposed to 
requests that demand little (Larson and Brake, 2011). Reliance on QFly control 
technologies that are cheap with low maintenance requirements would be more suitable 
here, such as distributing long-lasting QFly control blocks and traps.  
Moreover, a lack of awareness is not the only reason preventing people from 
diligently managing the pest, as shown by the time-poor 30 acre block owners in the 
Riverina and absentee landholders in Young-Harden. Some interviewees remarked that 
messages to backyarders to diligently manage QFly are undermined when a lack of 
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QFly management close by is evident, such as on derelict orchards. Grower 
interviewees who personally requested neighbours to manage QFly had limited success. 
In short, reflecting lessons learned elsewhere (Curtis et al., 2014; Sindel et al., 2013), 
it is unlikely that education and awareness-raising alone will elicit on-going strong 
community support. 
Central Burnett demonstrates that depending on grower voluntary contributions to 
implement town treatments is likely to be thwarted by free-riding and unmet 
expectations such as when the AWM program does not deliver the sought-after market 
access. 
Broad-based state regulation 
Some AWM experts recommend an enforceable regulatory framework to overcome the 
issue of risk contributors failing to understand the importance of cooperation (Hendrichs 
et al., 2007). However, the Riverina’s Plant Diseases Order illustrates that issuing 
broad-based, “top-down” state legislation requiring all landholders with QFly hosts to 
manage the pest, is problematic. Enforcement is expensive for resource-constrained 
state departments; there is a moral dilemma in applying injudicious, blanket 
enforcement to less-abled community members, and magistrate courts fail to understand 
the level of QFly control required and so reject prosecuted cases. For serrated tussock 
management, Sindel et al. (2013) concluded that the use of legislation in isolation 
deliver sub-optimal results to encourage landholder adoption of recommended practice. 
Devolved power 
The lack of power at the local level to address QFly pressure from private land was a 
key concern, especially in the Riverina and Young-Harden. Two ways of devolving 
power are evident from this research. First, the state can grant powers that traditionally 
rest with them to local groups. For example, the HPDBs in Oregon and Washington and 
the SIR Program Boards in British Columbia have authority to enter private land or to 
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enforce pest control on problematic land. However, the prospects of such approaches in 
parts of Australia seem limited. For example, the Management of fruit flies in New 
South Wales - Policy (issued 22 August 2014) states, “legislation should not be viewed 
as a management tool to force another individual or organisation to comply with 
community or producer priorities such as the removal of feral trees or the treatment of 
unmanaged urban fruit trees” (NSW Trade and Investment, 2014: p2).  
Secondly, power can be devolved to enable greater self-determination powers, 
including clearly defined rights and responsibilities, thereby reflecting values from the 
public participation rationale (Curtis et al., 2014). The community then resembles a 
“truer” partner in the context of partnerships and shared responsibility (Barker, 2010). 
However, there are at least two barriers. The first barrier is that in Australia, legislative 
and political ownership of NRM is mainly retained within state government (Larson and 
Brake, 2011). In NSW this is evident from both the Local Land Services (LLS) Act 
2013 No. 51, a key mechanism through which shared responsibility for natural resource 
management is performed, and the Biosecurity Act 2015. In addition, state government 
legislation also determines local governments’ roles and responsibilities and so renders 
them dependent on state government (Pini et al., 2007). In the case studies, local 
governments have no special powers to deal with the QFly, including not being 
permitted to enter private property for QFly management without the landowner’s 
permission.  
The second barrier is that executing self-determining powers is challenging. 
Adversarial effects encountered in other NRM situations include conflict, reinforcing 
prevailing political inequalities, or power grabs by elite groups (Berkes, 2010). Existing 
grower fragmentation in the Riverina is likely to present a key challenge should self-
determining powers be granted to this region. Dyck et al. (2005) found that involving 
the broader community can open a door for uninformed people to influence the program 
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that can require considerable program resources to deal with. Implementing sound local 
engagement processes requires significant skill, adequate resourcing and support 
(Berkes, 2010; Ribot, 2002). Hence, the devolution of power requires considerable 
simultaneous investment in networking, capacity building (Morrison and Lane, 2006; 
Larson and Brake, 2011) and building complementary institutions across scales 
(Ostrom, 2005).  
Specifically, the solution is not simply giving more power to local governments. 
Since the early 1990s local governments have seen a drastic increase in their roles and 
responsibilities (Pini et al., 2007) without a commensurate increase in revenues 
(Morrison and Lane, 2006). All six local government representatives interviewed had 
reservations about their involvement in QFly management. Reasons included financial, 
staff capacity and capability constraints; fear of setting a precedent for other issues; and 
concerns about community hostility to spraying activities. Some spoke about the 
difficulty of securing cooperation between adjacent councils and the lack of formal 
directive from higher government levels.  
Legislated cost recovery-structures 
A legislated income-stream can facilitate industry and other appropriate local 
stakeholders to implement on-going pest treatments in QFly risk areas. This approach 
applies in combination with community awareness activities in both the fruit fly SIT 
program in parts of South Africa and the Canadian SIR program. Funding can be 
supplemented by government contributions, such as in South Africa. Grower-funded 
QFly management in Central Burnett towns resulted in positive community feedback. 
However, relying on voluntary contributions is problematic. Grower contributions in 
Central Burnett are dwindling due to issues with free riders and disappointment that the 
AWM program has not delivered the anticipated market access. Several Riverina 
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interviewees talked about the need for a local mandatory levy-like system. Dyck et al. 
(2005) reviewed various AWM programs involving SIT and found that financial and in-
kind contributions from growers benefiting most needed to be compulsory, otherwise if 
industry profitability was low, growers would be reluctant to contribute. Contributions 
from growers alone, such as in Central Burnett, are only feasible if the ratio between the 
sizes of the contributing grower population and town population allows it. Such 
arrangements would be difficult if small local industries or large rural centres are 
involved. In these circumstances there is a strong case to legislate for rural town 
residents to contribute too, especially as those valuing their backyard produce will also 
benefit from such program. This is the case in the Canadian SIR program.  
Conclusion  
This article investigated how suitable is “smart regulation” as an option for managing 
QFly pressure from land beyond commercial horticulture orchards. In many horticulture 
regions local industries are dependent on achieving and maintaining wide-spread 
community support for collective QFly management based on voluntary approaches and 
it is proving to be difficult. The strengths and weaknesses of four policy mechanisms 
that could potentially be included in a “smart regulation” approach were explored. The 
case studies showed that the local social and cultural context for QFly control varies 
between regions, suggesting there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to managing QFly-
risk beyond commercial horticulture operations. While this work explored a limited 
number of policy instruments, it is clear that “smart regulation” offers a prudent way 
forward. This is due to its ability to give legitimacy to the AWM program, overcome the 
weaknesses of individual policy instruments and its flexibility to tailor approaches to 
regional circumstances. 
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More broadly this work shows that “smart regulation” can be an important tool in 
partnership and shared responsibility contexts where government encourages industry 
self-reliance, but where industry has limited sway over diffused risk contributors. 
Complementary policy instruments can make it more feasible for local industries to 
carry the main implementation burden and considerable cost of local programs by 
overcoming challenges of voluntary schemes such as apathy and free-riding. Greater 
devolution of power can increase the array of policy instruments available to Australian 
local horticulture industries. However, further research is needed to understand the 
opportunities and constraints around devolving power for issues that are driven 
primarily by concentrated, private beneficiaries, while risk contributors are diffused. 
This includes understanding the appropriate role for local governments. 
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4.4 Article 4. Creating an enabling environment for industry-driven pest 
suppression: the case of suppressing Queensland Fruit Fly through area-wide 
management  
 
In an era of limited on-ground government support institutional innovation is required to 
ensure that the QFly management innovation system is designed such that it makes readily 
available the knowledge, capabilities and resources that local industries need to achieve 
AWM. AIS thinking is applied to identify how to create an enabling institutional 
environment that will support local industries in their quest to achieve QFly suppression 
through AWM. The main blocking mechanisms in the current support system are identified 
and they guide pinpointing key opportunities for improvement based on a structural-
functional analysis (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011; Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012; Bergek et 
al., 2008). 
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4.5 Article 5. Helping local industries help themselves in a multi-level 
biosecurity world - Dealing with the impact of horticultural pests in the trade 
arena  
 
This paper applies the same approach as article 4, but with a key focus on achieving market 
access using a systems approach involving AWM. Article 4 and 5 are companion 
documents. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion  
5.1 Introduction 
This work explored the social and institutional aspects of industry-driven fruit fly AWM 
that impact on the success of these ventures. QFly is a particularly problematic pest as it 
has a wide host range with most fruit and vegetables susceptible to varying degrees. The 
pest is also of considerable concern to many of Australia’s horticulture trading partners. 
Many domestic and international markets place costly restrictions on produce from QFly-
affected areas to reduce the risk of produce being a source of pest infestation in their 
jurisdictions. 
The challenge has recently intensified as the two key chemicals traditionally used to manage 
the pest have been restricted. This coincides with reduced direct on-ground government 
support for dealing with the issue of QFly in many regions, with cuts in terms of pest 
management, pest monitoring activities and extension services. In these regions it is now 
up to local industries to achieve the needed collaboration between various stakeholder 
groups and risk contributors in order to instigate and maintain regional QFly management 
programs. 
AWM is increasingly in the spotlight as a key alternative QFly management option (PHA, 
2008; White et al., 2011; Fay et al., 2011). It promises a reduced need for pesticides and 
AWM is acknowledged in international trade rules as an acceptable measure to manage 
pests, such as fruit fly. Some successful cases of industry-driven AWM exist in Australia, 
most notably in Central Burnett (Lloyd et al., 2010). However, the literature about AWM 
focuses predominantly on the technical aspects of these undertakings, while there is 
acknowledgement that it is often the social and institutional aspects that contribute to 
program failure (Klassen, 2005; Hendrichs et al., 2007), such as a lack of public 
participation (Mumford, 2000). 
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This study applied a mixed-methods approach across two phases to understand how 
industry-driven AWM for QFly can be strengthened. The key research questions explored 
were: 
1. What social and institutional factors influence the success of industry-driven AWM at 
the local level and how can success be maximised? (Phase 1) 
2. What are the main constraints to an enabling environment for industry-driven AWM 
implementation and how can these be mitigated? (Phase 2) 
5.2 A summary of the research’s contribution to AWM literature 
Given the lack of literature about the social and institutional aspects of AWM, this 
research’s key findings present a new critical way of thinking about industry-driven AWM 
and how to maximise the chances of success for such programs.  
Broadly speaking, this work illustrates that achieving desired outcomes from dealing with 
QFly through industry-driven AWM is first and foremost a matter of learning to deal with 
the relational character of both the QFly problem and AWM programs. Each region is 
unique based on the social profile of the local people involved as well as the local ecology 
and climate that influence how QFly behaves in the region. Different stakeholders across 
levels are focusing on different aspects of the QFly problem; applying diverse logics; and 
therefore construing biosecurity differently. This reflects the point that Hinchliffe et al. 
(2013) made about biosecurity more broadly. Currently biosecurity is approached as an 
issue of segregation based on ‘borderlines’, that is, where ‘clean’ areas are distinguished and 
protected from ‘unclean’ areas. They argue that biosecurity rather involves a case of 
‘borderlands’ in which various stakeholders, institutions, incentives, logics, practices, 
technologies and environmental conditions interact, including the intensity and 
characteristics of these interactions.  
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Figure 7 represents the convergence of the key findings of this work and will form the 
basis of the rest of the discussion in this sub-section. It represents key lessons from the 
application of rationales contained in the SES and AIS literatures together with the study’s 
empirical evidence across Phases 1 and 2.  
This research used as its conceptual basis the first tier of the SESs Framework (McGinnis 
and Ostrom, 2014) as outlined in Chapter 1 (Figure 1). Here, AWM is an action situation 
that is situated within the natural world, i.e. the resource system (QFly behaviour, biology 
and ecology) and resource units (QFly pressure). AWM also involves interactions between 
a governance system and a range of actors.  
By building on Figure 1, Figure 7 shows that AWM programs comprise three key 
components (listed below) and are nested across levels. The two-way arrows in Figure 7 
emphasise the importance of multi-directional information flows throughout this multi-
level system and between the three components. This is to ensure that the different 
components and levels are responsive to each other in order to achieve a holistic approach 
that will make industry-driven AWM workable. The components are:  
 Social – there are people and groups at the local, state, national and international 
levels whose actions, interactions and decisions (or lack thereof) can either facilitate 
or hinder AWM initiatives 
 Institutions – there are formal and informal rules that apply at the local, state, 
national and international levels that influence the design and implementation of 
AWM programs 
 Technology – the technologies and information that are available at the local level for 
QFly management flow predominantly from the broader fruit fly management 
innovation system that stretches across state, national and international levels. 
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Figure 7. The ideal industry-driven AWM situation 
 
An example of the importance of feedback loops between components includes the need 
to develop fruit fly management technologies (technology component) that will be 
accepted by national and international trading partners (institutional component). The need 
for feedback loops across levels within a component can be illustrated with the importance 
of state level institutions being designed to enable local institutions that will make industry-
driven AWM workable at the local level (institutional component), such as ‘smart 
regulation’. This will also require feedback loops with and between stakeholders across 
local and state levels (social component).  
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This research focused primarily on the social and institutional aspects of AWM. A key 
argument of this research is that the social and institutional aspects of industry-driven 
AWM influence the transaction costs of achieving industry-driven AWM and therefore 
have a major bearing on the feasibility of such programs. These costs are easily overlooked 
in cost benefit analysis of AWM programs. On the one hand there is a need to invest in 
transaction costs, such as by establishing/strengthening linkages and maintaining 
communication across regional, state and national levels. On the other hand, much 
transaction cost can be saved when appropriate institutions are developed as a result of 
deliberations across levels and between components. For example, it is more likely that 
such linkages will result in trade protocols that are accepted by trading partners and that are 
practical and cost-effective at the local level. The transaction cost involved for growers to 
indefinitely keep risk contributors motivated to manage QFly (such as town residents and 
other landholders with QFly hosts on their land) based on voluntary approaches alone, can 
render AWM program unfeasible. 
Within the context of Figure 7, there are five principles that are important to understand in 
order to effectively progress industry-driven AWM. It is with these principles, which 
sometimes overlap with each other, that the core findings of this research across the five 
articles are pulled together. These principles are discussed below and are as follows: 
 Principle 1. The local social profile influences the prospects of successful AWM. 
 Principle 2. AWM needs to be based on adaptive co-management. 
 Principle 3. Local industries need help to help themselves. 
 Principle 4. AWM programs need strong two-way connectivity with the broader 
QFly management innovation system. 
 Principle 5. Industry-driven AWM programs need institutional adjustment.  
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5.2.1 Principle 1. The local social profile influences the prospects of successful 
AWM 
With the international and national drive for harmonised phytosanitary measures (IPPC 
2006; NFFS Implementation Committee 2009) it can be easy to underestimate the impact 
that the uniqueness of different local regions has on their ability to achieve AWM. The 
AWM literature recognises that the geographical and ecological profile of a region 
influences the suitability of a region for AWM. As explained in Chapter 1, naturally 
occurring barriers (Florec et al., 2010; Sharov, 2004), such as mountains, deserts, or large 
lakes, or adjacent areas with unfavourable climates (Gonzalez and Troncoso, 2007), are 
recognised as helpful in establishing AWM. Likewise a limited extent of QFly hosts beyond 
commercial orchards is also known for easing the implementation of AWM. However, it is 
seldom recognised that the social profile of local actors (Figure 1), such as the growers and 
adjacent town communities, also influence the prospects of a successful AWM program. 
Regions with unfavourable social profiles will probably require greater resources to achieve 
and maintain AWM than regions with favourable profiles. 
The application of Ostrom’s eight design principles for robust common-pool resource 
institutions (Cox et al., 2010; Marshall, 2008; Poteete et al., 2010) to the case study findings 
highlight how certain social variables enable or hinder AWM (see Article 1). In particular, 
the local social profile will determine how hard or easy it will be to develop a set of local 
institutions for the AWM program that are widely seen as fair and supported by risk 
contributors. In other words, the local social profile impacts on the transaction costs 
needed to achieve and maintain AWM. Four such key social variables have been identified 
from the case study findings. These social variables are briefly discussed below.  
First, areas with high heterogeneity of QFly risk contributors are likely to find it more 
difficult to set clearly defined boundaries (Ostrom’s first principle) than will more 
homogenous grower communities. This includes identifying who needs to implement QFly 
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management activities, what is required from them and how to win their commitment. 
Heterogeneous groups of growers generally have different on-farm objectives and different 
market requirements for the level of proof needed for QFly management. This makes it 
harder and therefore more costly to identify a common objective for AWM. For example, 
in the Riverina, a relatively small proportion of citrus growers are interested in exporting to 
premium QFly-sensitive overseas markets. A large proportion of the citrus growers are 
part-time growers supplying to the domestic juice market while earning other sources of 
income. As they are not fully dependent on their horticulture operations to sustain their 
livelihoods, it likely lessens their incentive to participate in AWM, whereas exporters would 
like to see QFly management implemented to the highest level in the region. 
Heterogeneity also makes it more demanding to achieve congruence between appropriation 
and provision rules (Ostrom’s second principle). When participants’ investments are not 
proportionate to the distribution of eventual beneﬁts, local people might view rules as 
unfair, which would discourage them from fully cooperating. This challenges decision-
making (Valentinov, 2007) and adds to the transaction costs of achieving consensus 
(Ostrom, 2010; Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013). Identifying who is gaining most from 
biosecurity measures, and therefore who ought to contribute most, is not always evident 
(Donaldson, 2013). For example, it cannot be taken for granted that international markets 
will accept AWM as part of a systems approach and render post-harvest treatments, such as 
cold sterilisation, obsolete. This situation is less challenging if there is greater homogeneity 
amongst growers. Moreover, heterogeneity can challenge collective choice arrangements 
(Ostrom’s third principle), as it requires the management group to have strong 
communication channels and trust relationships with more groups. This can challenge the 
management group’s legitimacy and credibility across the region.  
Second, the presence of high levels of social capital between all key participants may ease 
the establishment of AWM. This includes established trust and communication networks, 
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champions and leadership. In Central Burnett, relationships between growers, crop 
consultants and the state government department research team have been fostered over 
many years by previous collaborations. The crop consultants were strong champions for 
AWM, both amongst growers and the town community. The research team was also in 
close contact with their colleagues who are responsible for negotiating domestic trade 
protocols, which eventually resulted in ICA-28. The fact that most growers employ one of 
the local crop consultants with whom they communicate on a regular basis, means that 
growers have the ear of key decision-makers, as all crop consultants are management group 
members. Established trust and communication networks therefore assist in achieving 
collective choice arrangements (Ostrom’s principle 3). In addition, strong social capital 
could signal a high level of social norms that translate into informal institutions (Marshall, 
2005) contributing to ‘enforcement’ through informal contracts (Putnam, 2001). This 
facilitates the achievement of Ostrom’s principles 4 and 5 that refer to the need for 
monitoring of compliance and graduated sanctions in case of violation. However, it is 
important that social capital is not located in just some participating groups, as some 
associations could hinder progress and sustainability by maintaining cliques and/or it could 
protect those who seek their own self-interest (Pretty, 2003). 
Third, the presence of existing social mechanisms that provide opportunities for 
monitoring on-farm QFly management activities is likely to facilitate collective action and 
lower transaction costs. For example, in Central Burnett a high proportion of growers 
employ crop consultants or scouts for pest management. This enables low-cost monitoring 
during field visits of whether growers are effectively managing the pest. In the Riverina, 
packhouses also offer the opportunity to implement relatively low-cost monitoring systems, 
if they are willing to insist on their grower suppliers providing proof of QFly control. 
However, this could be thwarted in times when there is a shortage of produce and supply 
chains ease their grower requirements in order to secure supply.  
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Fourth, the ratio between the number of growers keen to pursue AWM and risk 
contributors who have little incentive to manage the pest affects the cost and effort needed 
to establish AWM. In Central Burnett small town sizes make it possible for growers to 
fund town treatments. In areas with large rural towns, such as Griffith in the Riverina, this 
is less feasible. This renders those in favour of AWM dependent on awareness-raising 
activities to encourage town residents and others to manage the pest themselves.  
Policy implications 
In the biosecurity and trade arena there is a push for harmonisation and standarisation. The 
varying profiles of the case studies illustrate that it is unlikely an ‘one-size-fits-all’ set of 
local institutions will be ideal for all AWM programs. The rules relating to how the AWM 
program is run, what the program involves and what it sets out to achieve are best 
negotiated locally with their design tailored to local circumstances. The AWM action 
situation (Figure 7) therefore needs to represent Enticott’s (2008) ‘spaces of negotiation’. 
This means there is a need for deliberation, negotiation and conflict resolution (Klerkx et 
al., 2010)—or what Mau et al. (2007) called ‘frank discussions’ in relation to the successful 
Hawaii AWM program—in order to find ways forward that enjoy support and 
commitment from a wide range of stakeholders. 
5.2.2 Principle 2. AWM needs to be based on adaptive co-management 
Looking at the formal international and national requirements for fruit fly management, 
AWM and systems approaches (such as contained in the ISPMs and the QFly management 
Code of Practice), one could believe that AWM constitutes more or less standardised 
‘spaces of prescription’ (Enticott, 2008), where successful AWM would predominantly rely 
on the introduction of materialities by applying QFly control technologies. Moreover, an 
entrenched view of agriculture innovation perceives growers as situated at the end of a 
technology development line. In this model technologies are typically invented and 
developed by scientists. These inventions are then in need of being transferred to growers 
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for their adoption. Many studies have shown that outcomes under this model can be 
disappointing, as limited uptake by farmers and other agriculture stakeholders is not 
uncommon (Leeuwis and Aarts, 2011). This technocratic view of development tends to be 
based on reductionist thinking. That is, reasoning that is predominantly based on objective 
and absolute knowledge is regarded as universal truth. However, local situations often 
involve high levels of complexity and uncertainty, due to a range of local and higher level 
factors that relate to both the issue at hand as well as broader contextual factors. Enticott 
and Franklin (2009) therefore point out that ‘expert’ knowledge should not be privileged at 
the expense of local knowledge and learning processes rooted in local socio-economic, 
cultural and political contexts. There is a need for a more constructivist and inclusive 
approach that is based on integrating different knowledge systems (Boxelaar et al., 2006) to 
develop control strategies appropriate for the local context. 
Aspects of AWM that add to complexity and uncertainty include its collaborative nature, 
various on-farm objectives and that not all risk contributors may have incentives to 
continually manage QFly. As discussed in Chapter 4 (Article 1) and principle 1 above, a 
range of issues can impact on the ease of finding suitable local institutions that will enjoy 
wide support. In addition, the design of the AWM program requires a good understanding 
of the regional QFly situation, including QFly behaviour in and amongst crops and other 
local hosts and this might vary across years with different weather conditions (Clarke et al., 
2011). Figure 7 illustrates that there is a need for an AWM management group to 
continually monitor QFly pressure and adjust local QFly management strategies 
accordingly. 
Another key source of uncertainty revolves around market access. Central Burnett 
demonstrates that the anticipated market access based on certain conditions, such as access 
to certain protocol countries without the need for post-harvest treatments, does not 
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necessarily eventuate despite a successful AWM program. ALPP as part of systems 
approaches are not well accepted yet in the international trade arena. 
Complexity and uncertainty can be best surmounted through adaptive co-management; 
that is, a flexible process of ‘learning by doing’ and by drawing on different knowledge 
systems (Olsson et al., 2004; Charles, 2007). This enables the design of an AWM program 
to be tailored to local conditions. These different knowledge systems include local 
ecological conditions and the distribution of QFly hosts; QFly biology and behaviour; 
market access requirements; applicable policies, regulations and other rules; risk 
contributors’ motivations and attitudes; and community engagement.  
The case studies illustrate that typically this co-production of knowledge based on different 
knowledge systems occurs within the local management group. Participating stakeholders 
can come from the local level offering different forms of local knowledge. Stakeholders 
from higher levels can offer knowledge on issues such as trade and QFly biology and 
behaviour. However, it can be challenging to have all knowledge systems represented and 
actively involved over time.  
Local management groups therefore represent innovation platforms. Here participants 
engage in social learning, learning from each other and the activities implemented, to 
continually refine QFly-related management activities. From an adaptive co-management 
perspective, outcomes are closely monitored when changes are introduced to the AWM 
program to ensure that the system does not loose functionality. The knowledge that 
stakeholders build over time strengthens their adaptive capacity, as they learn what works 
and what does not in particular circumstances. Social learning requires solid 
communication processes that are well-facilitated, both horizontally between local players 
and vertically across levels. Evidence of adaptive co-management can be seen throughout 
the lead up to and the current management of the AWM in the Central Burnett region (see 
Box 2). 
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Box 2. Central Burnett – An example of adaptive co-management for fruit fly AWM  
The successful Central Burnett AWM program represents many aspects of adaptive co-
management. Local crop consultants, researchers from the then QDPI and citrus growers 
closely worked together on various regional projects from the 1990s, resulting in trust-
based amicable relationships between them. Jointly they decided on research priorities and 
QFly-related activities for the region, and discussed findings, which subsequently shaped 
in-field activities. Research occurred in the region, including in growers’ orchards. Growers 
participated in some of the research activities, such as when male annihilation technique 
(MAT) was introduced on their properties. When AWM was launched in 2003, the local 
government was already involved to assist with community engagement about QFly to 
minimise pest pressure from towns. Other local horticulture industries in the region were 
also engaged in the AWM effort. Over the years, the QDPI research team regularly 
consulted with the state and federal market access staff, respectively. To this day if changes 
are introduced, such as less intense town treatments, the results are closely monitored to 
allow for rapid response in case of unfavourable results. 
 
Adaptive co-management does not offer a ‘quick fix’, and the investment (transaction cost) 
to engage with different players and learning processes can be considerable, especially early 
on. However, it offers several important benefits over time: 
 local knowledge of QFly issues in the local context increases  
 management activities are suited to the local context and continually improve  
 as a result of the above, local adaptive capacity strengthens, as learning occurs 
about what works and does not in the local context and under which circumstances  
 a common narrative develops between key stakeholders, which is fundamental to 
developing the much-needed shared vision for AWM 
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 a more sustainable, fit-for-context and locally-owned initiative is eventually 
established. 
Policy implications 
At the local level, the implementation of adaptive co-management requires a mind-shift 
from a key focus on implementing QFly management measures only—such as when the 
fenthion and dimethoate was still available—towards implementing measures with the 
intention to continually learn and adjust. This is captured in Figure 7 by the two-way 
arrows (feedback loops) between the AWM action situation, the local QFly management 
strategies and QFly pressure. 
Integrating information from different knowledge systems means growers interested in 
instigating AWM need to actively build networks with others, including other growers (or 
representatives of different grower groups), experts in QFly behaviour and market access 
and community representatives, such as local government. Several of these may involve 
actors in the broader AIS (Figure 7). 
A key contributing factor to well-functioning management groups is appointing members 
whose selection is based on positive personality traits, such as an aptitude for consensus-
building, two-way communication skills, flexibility and the ability to sustain trust (Mau et 
al., 2007).  
AWM programs need to achieve a balance between ‘top-down’ elements and ‘bottom-up’ 
components. Several aspects of market access represent ‘top-down’ elements where 
growers have little control, such as in the politics of market access negotiations as well as 
some prescriptions in trade protocols and the QFly management Code of Practice. It is 
therefore important that AWM programs first and foremost focus on achieving QFly 
suppression and see any market access requirements that have not been met yet as ‘bolt-on’ 
components. 
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For government and industry bodies, policy implications include making available the 
necessary experts to engage regularly with local management groups. The benefits of social 
learning can be maximised if staff turnover is minimised. Other ways in which local 
industries can be supported in achieving and maintaining AWM are discussed below. 
5.2.3 Principle 3. Local industries need help to help themselves 
A considerable range of knowledge and capabilities is needed to achieve and maintain 
AWM. An ‘ideal type’ of this knowledge and capabilities was developed based on the Phase 
1 case study research and in consultation with six AWM experts from national and state 
governments and regional QFly management groups. It was further refined after the input 
received during the Phase 2 interviews. The ‘ideal type’ of the knowledge and capabilities 
needed for AWM is summarised here for space considerations, while the full list is 
contained in Appendix 2: 
 AWM program administration and management - Effective program cycle 
implementation, including planning, implementation and monitoring; securing 
funding, sound financial management, understanding broader institutional 
requirements, organising and facilitating meetings, and record-keeping. 
 Conducting stakeholder interaction – including achieving a shared local vision, 
maximising uptake across all risk contributors, networking, advocating the program 
to key stakeholders, conflict management and supporting growers in their 
implementation of recommended practices.  
 Understanding QFly behaviour and on-ground control – including knowledge of 
general QFly biology; QFly behaviour within the target region all year round; 
current on-ground control options and consistently implementing QFly control 
strategies across the district. 
 Understanding market access requirements, including: 
- phytosanitary measure options – including the benefits and limitations of each 
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- formal market access standards – the relevant ISPMs, QFly management Code 
of Practice and existing trade protocols; and related concepts such as probit 9 
levels, appropriate level of protection and risk management 
- informal aspects and requirements – including market expectations of the target 
country and the political aspects of trade negotiations 
- the market access application and approval process, including gathering rigorous 
data and the inclusion of suitable verification steps in the protocol 
- consistent implementation of market access requirements, including rigorous 
monitoring and documentation maintenance and implementing corrective 
actions when needed. 
In Phase 1 interviewees pointed out that it can be difficult to establish the needed networks 
to access the knowledge and capabilities that they need to achieve AWM. A key theme was 
that many growers felt unsupported in their QFly management and market access 
endeavours. This is how a Riverina grower expressed it: 
‘I'd rather see the government be the support worker...because the policeman situation is 
just making things a lot more difficult...Government has pulled out all the support staff, 
but they kept the regulatory staff.’ 
The case studies also demonstrated that knowledge and capabilities differ significantly 
between regions. In Phase 2 some interviewees pointed out that stakeholders at higher 
levels easily assume that growers have certain levels of knowledge or capabilities (such as 
how to achieve collective action), but in reality this varies considerably. Knowledge and 
capabilities at the local level depend on a wide range of factors, such as how long the 
region had to deal with QFly (in some regions QFly only recently became an issue); the 
availability of trusted local experts such as crop consultants well versed in QFly 
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management; the grower group’s access to the relevant networks and previous experience 
in working together.  
In addition, interviewees across Phases 1 and 2 also spoke about a range of issues that 
added to the cost and effort to achieve AWM and that could potentially be made easier. 
For example, these included the difficulties with tapping into relevant networks that deal 
with QFly management and QFly-affected market access. Several interviewees spoke about 
the negative impacts of the high level of staff turnover and restructuring in government 
departments. It means that growers struggle to maintain relationships with government 
staff that are built on a mutual understanding of their local QFly situation, a shared vision 
and possible ways forward. Interviewees also spoke about the difficulty of obtaining past 
trapping data from state governments in some areas that could assist with future planning 
of QFly management. Moving forward sometimes depends on joint decision-making 
between key stakeholders from different organisations and it can be difficult for industry to 
‘get them in one room’ to discuss the issue and agree on a resolution. 
Policy implications 
Given the considerable numerical decline in public extension officers (Hunt et al., 2014) 
training could be offered to those who are likely to fill this gap, such as private crop 
consultants, key growers and other interested local people. This can assist in strengthening 
local knowledge and capacity on issues such as trade; QFly biology, behaviour and 
management; and community engagement. However, training without strengthened 
intermediation between local level actors and the rest of the QFly management innovation 
system will do little to move beyond technology-transfer approaches. Apart from mere 
local capacity building, training can also be seen as a tool that will support innovation 
platforms and other collaborations by more quickly facilitating in-depth conversations 
between growers and other stakeholders. This will strengthen the feedback loops that need 
217 
 
to exist between local groups and the actors in the broader AIS (see Principle 4 below and 
Figure 7). 
Another way to support local industries is to minimise the transaction costs to local 
industries to achieve and maintain AWM. Industry-driven approaches will benefit from 
policies and procedures that are developed to minimise cost and effort to industry. Based 
on the interviewees’ feedback, opportunities for improvement include further 
strengthening stakeholder coordination, minimising staff changes (or the effect thereof) 
and fostering a client-oriented ethos in government departments. This work also argues for 
more innovative policy-making, in particular for more power at the local level to put in 
place enforceable systems to achieve and maintain collective action and sustainable income 
streams (see Principle 5). 
5.2.4 Principle 4. AWM programs need strong two-way connectivity with the 
broader QFly management innovation system 
Following on from principle 2, AWM can easily be seen as the mere implementation of a 
certain set of pest management measures by a critical mass of risk contributors within any 
geographical area. To a great extent, a focus on the mere implementation of QFly 
management activities by individual growers was the norm for QFly management in the 
past, when growers could rely on the application of the now restricted fenthion and 
dimethoate. Within this logic it can be easily assumed that the main form of support that 
local industries need is the production of effective pest management measures that need to 
be transferred to local industries for their adoption and implementation.  
Innovation studies show that successful innovation that results in positive on-ground 
change tends to result from a co-evolutionary process involving concurrent technological, 
social, organisational, and institutional change. Here growers are best conceptualised not as 
mere adopters, but as partners and entrepreneurs in the innovation system (Klerkx et al., 
2012b). Complementary to adaptive co-management thinking, successful innovation 
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involves changed narratives and discourses that come about between the interacting diverse 
stakeholders that are part of the innovation system (Leeuwis and Aarts, 2011). This 
includes the notion that a well-functioning innovation system will create conditions that 
make entrepreneurial activities flourish (Hekkert et al., 2007; Negro et al., 2007). In other 
words, a well-functioning fruit fly management AIS that promotes AWM will deliver the 
needed institutional, social, and technological change that will maximise the chances for 
industry-driven AWM to flourish. This is dependent on strong feedback loops between 
local AWM programs and the broader QFly management innovation system (Figure 7). 
Across both phases of the research there was evidence that local industries easily become 
disconnected from the broader QFly management innovation system. For example, in 
Phase 1 interviewees spoke about the difficulty of establishing the needed networks and 
finding information and guidance to instigate AWM.  
In Phase 2 interviewees spoke about the fact that research findings are often inaccessible to 
growers, both in terms of physical access as well as the way in which they are presented 
(e.g. many growers will not read scientific journal articles). On-going work, such as the 
‘Fruit fly body of knowledge’, is attempting to address this issue. The disconnect is 
intensified by the loss of public extension services, where extension officers were key 
intermediaries between the on-ground level and higher policy, research and market access 
groups. 
In addition, across both phases various interviewee feedback suggest that the grower voice 
is not well represented in national dialogues about QFly management. Higher level 
governance bodies may underestimate local complexities and overestimate the knowledge 
and abilities that local stakeholders have. While peak industry bodies make a considerable 
contribution to filling this gap, not all growers in a particular industry might see their peak 
industry body as representing their concerns. This was particularly evident in the Riverina 
citrus industry, where support for Citrus Australia is far less than in Central Burnett. Peak 
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industry bodies also have limited resources that prevent them from being intimately 
involved in all AWM programs (or attempts thereof) to develop an in-depth understanding 
of local issues.  
Policy implications 
A key way forward that is based on both literature and feedback from interviewees is the 
need to support knowledge brokering and intermediation to establish feedback loops 
between local and higher levels of the QFly management innovation system (Figure 7). In 
order to ensure local industries are well-integrated partners in the innovation system to co-
produce new, integrated knowledge with other innovation system stakeholders, there is a 
need to fulfil key boundary-spanning functions (Klerkx et al., 2012a; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 
2009), including the components listed below. These functions are easily overlooked as 
they are often invisible and hard to measure (Meyer, 2010; Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009). 
 On-ground demand articulation – including assisting local industries with finding a 
shared vision to identify and articulate their technology, knowledge, funding, and 
policy needs (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009) to achieve AWM.  
 Information translation – to connect ‘external’ information with the local context and 
growers’ existing knowledge (Klerkx and Proctor, 2013) in language that growers 
find useful (Klerkx et al., 2012a). This requires appreciation of the formal and 
informal knowledge that growers already have (Turnhout et al., 2013; Fazey et al., 
2013; Oreszczyn et al., 2010). Likewise, local issues and opportunities are 
‘translated’ to other players in the innovation system in order to contribute to the 
co-production of knowledge.  
 Network establishment – including local horizontal networks and vertical networks 
with higher levels of policy-making (Kilpatrick and Falk, 2001) and researchers 
(Klerkx et al., 2012a; Meyer, 2010) thereby strengthening supply and demand 
signals for knowledge, capabilities and resources (Turnhout et al., 2013). ‘Upward’ 
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information flow assists policy-makers and researchers to be responsive to local 
industries’ needs (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2008). Local horizontal networks include the 
need for capacity building to create new organisational forms (Kilelu et al., 2013). 
 Innovation process management – working towards better arrangements in the multi-
actor network, including facilitating cooperation and learning (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 
2009). 
In addition, instigating and supporting horizontally interconnected innovation platforms 
can strengthen connectivity between on-ground AWM activities and higher levels of 
decision-making. As in the case of adaptive co-management (Principle 2), this involves 
creating collaborations between heterogeneous stakeholders to undertake information-
sharing, learning from each other and in the process developing new integrated knowledge. 
Innovation platforms can be situated across different levels, such as at the local, state or 
national levels, for example, by connecting local AWM management groups with multi-
stakeholder groups at state and federal level. This will aid local industries to better meet 
their information and other needs. Upwards information flow can strengthen the grower 
voice to create a better understanding about the complexities of AWM at the local level and 
thereby contribute to improved decision-making at higher levels about how to best support 
local industries. The presence of QFly coordinators at regional, state and national levels can 
make an important contribution to forging these connections.  
5.2.5 Principle 5. Industry-driven AWM programs need institutional adjustment 
In the modern Australian biosecurity paradigm state and federal governments tend to 
favour market-driven approaches, including deregulation and a push for greater industry 
and community self-reliance. Yet, local industries remain embedded in various levels of 
institutions at local, state, national and international levels that set the conditions for what 
can be done and not done at the local level (Figure 7). 
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In particular, at federal and state levels biosecurity is seen as a shared responsibility 
between government, industry and the broader community. Here growers and community 
members can easily be seen as ‘active agents’ with a shared responsibility and who need to 
be mobilised to contribute to achieving certain outcomes (Curtis et al., 2014; Gill, 2011). 
Such mobilisation is then often enacted though awareness-raising and education (Curtis et 
al., 2014). 
Ostrom’s principles 7 and 8 for robust local institutions provides insight into how local 
industries can be best embedded in higher levels of institutions (see Article 1). Ostrom’s 
principle 7 ‘Minimal recognition of rights to organise’ refers to the importance of local 
industries developing their own rules that are recognised and supported by external 
authorities at local, state and higher levels. This contributes to the legitimacy and 
enforceability of these rules. Principle 8 ‘Nested enterprises’ is concerned with resources 
that are part of larger multi-level systems. It has been found that neither a reliance on the 
local level, nor broader level institutions alone are successful in addressing resource 
maintenance issues. Here institutions are best developed in a nested approach, where 
different layers complement each other. Local industries adjust rules to local circumstances, 
whereas larger-scale institutions regulate the interdependencies between smaller units and 
they may intercede if issues that threaten sustainable resource maintenance fall outside the 
control of local resource users (Ostrom, 2005). 
A major challenge for industry-driven AWM is dealing with QFly pressure from land 
beyond commercial orchards, as host plants in town backyards, and on peri-urban and 
public land, can present significant QFly breeding spots (Marte, 2007; Lloyd, 2007; 
Dominiak et al., 2006). Public support is a key requirement for the success of AWM 
programs (Hendrichs et al., 2007) and a lack thereof is a greater contributor to AWM 
program failure than poor technology (Dyck et al., 2005). 
A key theme across the case studies was the absence of any way for local communities to 
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go beyond reliance on voluntary approaches to address QFly pressure from towns and 
other private land. Currently legislative power rests predominantly with state governments, 
but they are reluctant to introduce enforceable measures that favour industry, as is evident 
from the policy documents such as Management of fruit flies in New South Wales – Policy (issued 
22 August 2014) (NSW Trade and Investment, 2014). This institutional challenge means 
that the only way many local industries can deal with the QFly pressure coming from towns 
and other private land is through awareness-raising and education.  
However, the case studies confirm the finding of Curtis et al. (2014) that a lack of 
awareness is not the only barrier to behaviour change. The case studies show other barriers 
to QFly management for several landholders. This includes that it might not make 
economic sense to manage QFly as recommened QFly management practices can be 
expensive and/or time intensive. Other challenges include absentee landholders, derelict 
orchards and community apathy. At least 89 per cent of growers surveyed in all case studies 
agreed that QFly breeding in towns increases on-farm QFly pressure. However, only a 
maximum of 42 per cent of case study respondents (in the case of Leeton-Carrathool in the 
Riverina) believed that regular education activities would ensure that town residents would 
adequately manage QFly on their properties. This suggests a limited potential that growers 
will voluntarily contribute to a reliance on awareness-raising activities to stem QFly 
pressure from towns. 
In addition, another major concern for industry-driven AWM is how these programs will 
be funded over the longer term. In many regions establishing an income stream from 
growers—as the main beneficiaries and/or local risk contributors—is dependent on 
instigating voluntary contributions. However, the Central Burnett case study demonstrates 
that relying on grower voluntary contributions to implement town treatments is thwarted 
by free-riding when some growers refuse to contribute while still benefiting from reduced 
QFly pressure from towns. This causes other contributing growers to also ‘opt out’. For 
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example, fifty-nine per cent of growers who responded to the Central Burnet survey said 
that they would contribute to town treatments only if others contributed too.  
Ostrom (2005) is the leading scholar who advocates self-organised resource governance 
institutions in order to ensure local institutions are tailored to local circumstances. 
However, she does not exclude complementary state intervention to back-up industry-
driven collective action in light of the needed nested approach between levels. She argues 
that it can give local people the needed trust that others will cooperate and that their 
individual efforts will not be jeopardised (Ostrom, 2005). 
Policy implications 
This work advocates ‘smart regulation’; that is, using complementary policy instruments 
and behavioural interventions to assist in overcoming the weaknesses of individual 
instruments, while still capitalising on their strengths. For example, by combining 
approaches that draw on people’s intrinsic motivation to ‘do the right thing’ with legal 
instruments that can be enforced. The introduction of various regulations and policy 
adjustments can ensure that ‘market rule’ and industry ownership are reinforced, while they 
address issues that fall outside the reach of market forces. ‘Smart regulation’ can be an 
important tool in modern biosecurity partnerships and shared responsibility contexts where 
government encourages industry self-reliance, but where industry has limited control over 
certain groups to contribute to managing biosecurity risks. This reflects Ostrom’s Principle 
8 ‘Nested enterprises’ for robust local institutions as is illustrated in Figure 7.  
Several policy instruments to deal with QFly pressure from non-commercial horticulture 
land were explored based on the case studies, the Landcare program and overseas AWM 
experience. They could potentially be used in combination with each other or with other 
policy instruments to ensure the overall approach is fit for the local context: 
 Community education and awareness-raising – if well implemented, this approach 
can be effective in reaching people who have an intrinsic motivation to manage the 
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pest, such as households that value their backyard produce. The cost and effort 
needed to sustain effective awareness campaigns are easily under-estimated. 
However, such campaigns will do little to overcome barriers to behaviour change 
that are not related to a lack of awareness (Curtis et al., 2014). 
 Broad-scale state regulation that enforces QFly management on all properties – the 
benefit of that approach is that it applies consistently to all risk contributors. 
However, it is very costly to monitor and enforce. There are also moral challenges, 
such as when landholders are physically or financially unable to manage QFly. 
Magistrates courts easily misunderstand the level of QFly control required and have 
rejected prosecuted cases.  
 Devolved power by endowing certain local groups with powers that currently rest 
with state government – including the ability to enter private property and/or 
prosecute landowners who fail to manage horticultural pests. This lessens the 
burden on state governments to carry out monitoring and enforcement. It is 
applied in some parts of the US, such as Oregon and Washington, under the 2011 
Washington Code (Title 15 Agriculture and Marketing, 15.09 Horticultural Pest and 
Disease Board). However, in the Australian context authorities may view this as 
favouring industry needs over those of other community groups and may be 
reluctant to implement such an approach. 
 Devolved power to the local level to enable industry, in partnership with local 
communities, to devise rules appropriate for the local context – including where 
appropriate allowing the use of enforcement as a ‘back-up’ mechanism. This would 
align most closely with the underlying principles contained in much of the 
community engagement literature that values community involvement in the 
decision-making processes of issues that affect them. However, there have been 
mixed results in other areas of NRM when more local self-determining powers 
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were allowed (Berkes, 2010). Potential adversarial effects if not implemented with 
care include conflict, ‘power grabs’ by some groups (ibid.) and dealing with 
uninformed people who try to influence the program (Dyck et al., 2005). Generally 
speaking, such approaches require considerable investment and skill to be 
successful. 
 Legislated cost recovery-structures – A legislated income-stream can facilitate 
industry and other appropriate local stakeholders to implement on-going and 
consistent pest treatments in QFly risk areas in combination with community 
awareness activities. Such an income stream can come from mandatory 
contribution from growers, the state and possibly town residents and is used in the 
SIR program for Codling Moth control in Canada’s British Columbia province 
(Anon., 2011). It could, however, encounter resistance from growers and others 
who are expected to contribute. 
5.3 Other implications for social theory  
This study has identified several implications for theory on different fronts and they are 
summarised here. This thesis contributes to scholarly literature about SESs, in particular 
the commons, adaptive co-management and community engagement for NRM; as well as 
about the social and institutional aspects of biosecurity in general. As this section deals with 
biosecurity and natural resource management in agriculture more broadly, the term farmers 
will be used rather than growers, except when specifically referring to the QFly context.  
Broadly speaking, this work contributes to a wider scope in rural sociology literature by 
focusing on the competitive, trade-related aspects of horticulture. Mainstream 
contemporary rural sociology tends to predominantly focus on the sustainability aspects of 
agriculture (Enticott, 2009). 
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5.3.1 Contributions to the SES literature 
The literature review revealed that there is a lack of scholarly work focusing on the 
influence of market requirements on SESs, including their influence on adaptive co-
management. This work contributes to filling this gap. For adaptive co-management 
theory, lessons from industry-driven AWM show that the influence of the market presents 
top-down elements that can cause tension with the need for locally adapted programs. It 
illustrates that a sensible approach is to first and foremost focus on how to best manage 
the resource (here maintaining low or no QFly prevalence) in the local context. While it is 
important to consider market access requirements early on when the AWM program is 
being designed, they are best seen as bolt-on components to a locally tailored program.  
Moreover, a large power differential exists between the state and farmers owing to the 
international and national biosecurity-related institutions that also contribute to top-down 
elements to pest management. This challenges the need for shared authority between 
stakeholders to achieve a certain goal. Shared authority is generally a key component of 
successful adaptive co-management (Plummer and Armitage, 2007). For example, local 
industries are greatly dependent on government negotiations with prospective importing 
partners to achieve market access. If anticipated market access fails, local support for at 
least some aspects of an AWM program is likely to decline.  
In the context of the commons, this work illustrates that the influence of market 
requirements can create diverse on-farm objectives related to different markets. Such 
heterogeneity is likely to increase the transaction costs of achieving a shared vision and 
therefore a widely-supported resource management plan. This is due to the need for more 
deliberation and negotiation amongst different farmer groups.  
Relevant to theory related to both the commons and community engagement, this work 
demonstrates that if not all risk contributors are resource users voluntary cooperation is 
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likely to be challenged. In the QFly context this refers to landholders with QFly hosts on 
their land but who have little intrinsic motivation to manage QFly. This work illustrates 
how reliance on single policy measures is challenging, such as either voluntary approaches 
or broad-based state legislation enforcing landholders to manage QFly. Instead, it outlines 
how ‘smart regulation’ might be a prudent way forward. This is due to its ability to give 
legitimacy to the AWM program, to overcome the flaws of individual policy instruments 
and its flexibility to tailor approaches to local conditions. In particular, in the context of 
partnerships and shared responsibility complementary policy instruments can assist local 
industries to be more self-reliant. Complementary policy instruments can be locally tailored 
and address the key challenges such as apathy and free-riding. This can give people 
prepared to implement the recommended practice the assurance that their own attempts 
are not undermined by a lack of cooperation elsewhere, thereby sustaining trust in the 
program (Ostrom, 1990).  
5.3.2 Contributions to the social sciences biosecurity literature 
Theoretical contributions to the social sciences biosecurity literature include lessons learned 
from applying Ostrom’s design principles for robust common-pool resource institutions to 
cooperative pest management. These lessons are significant in light of the push for 
industry-driven collective action to address pest issues as they bring to the fore several 
factors that farmers have little control over. This work illustrates that setting clearly defined 
geographical boundaries (Ostrom’s principle 1) is challenged by mobile pests as well as that 
pests like QFly can be brought in by travellers carrying infested produce. These factors 
render the geographical boundaries porous and there is little farmers can do about it 
without institutional and other forms of support.  
Achieving on-going congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions (Ostrom’s principle 2) is challenged in many regions by varying seasonal 
conditions that determine pest pressure. Some regions may experience years of no or low 
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pest pressure due to climatic conditions, such as cold winters or hot, dry summers for 
QFly. During these periods it may be hard to maintain the interest and investment of key 
local players such as local governments. When favourable conditions for the pest follow, 
such as a mild winter and/or warm, humid summer for QFly, engagement with these key 
players need to be re-established and might require significant transaction cost and precious 
time when quick action is crucial. Likewise, when crops are not affected by a pest after long 
periods of successful AWM, farmers may start to question whether the continued 
investment in managing the pest is warranted, as is the case with some in Central Burnett. 
Social memory by those who have witnessed crops being devastated by the pest then 
becomes vital to convince fellow farmers to keep up the investment.  
Regional community-based NRM governance literature stresses the need for nested 
enterprises where tasks are assigned across levels based on the ‘principle of subsidiarity’, 
that is, the lowest level where the issues can be effectively addressed. In the context of 
Australia’s biosecurity governance and shared responsibility approach, the findings show 
that certain responsibilities, such as dealing with pest pressure from beyond affected 
commercial operations, are assigned at a level too low to enable effective solutions. This 
includes winning the support from people who have little incentive to manage the pest on 
their properties and dealing with porous boundaries that can allow mobile pests to enter a 
region. Currently power to deal with these issues are located at state government level. 
Hence there is a need for either state government interference, such as ‘smart regulation’ 
that could involve devolved power to the local level to empower either local government or 
local farmer groups with certain powers. 
There has been limited application of AIS thinking in the crop protection literature (Schut 
et al., 2014). The research presented here contributes to filling this void for both in-field 
pest suppression and where pests are of phytosanitary concern to trade. This work also 
demonstrates the invaluable worth of systems thinking in supporting the governance of 
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complex biosecurity problems as solving one aspect of the overall problem may deliver 
limited progress. 
By applying the seven functions of innovation (Hekkert et al., 2007), this work 
demonstrates the importance of supporting all innovation functions to create an enabling 
environment for addressing pest-specific issues at the on-ground level, as opposed to 
focusing predominantly on producing new technologies.  
Reconceptualising farmers and local industries as entrepreneurs (function 1) in the 
biosecurity innovation system, rather than adopters, opens new pathways for achieving 
better outcomes. It broadens the focus from a key emphasis on communicating new 
findings and recommendations to farmers (as is typically done as part of linear thinking), to 
also seeing local industries as loci of lessons learned based on experimenting in different 
conditions. Where a lack of adoption in linear thinking is easily addressed by more or better 
communication to farmers, a lack of entrepreneurial activity signals that there is likely 
issues with the other functions that hold back uptake (Hekkert et al., 2007). It also includes 
offering other forms of support, such as ‘smart regulation’. 
Broadening knowledge development (function 2) to beyond scientific knowledge 
development, strengthens the demand for other types of knowledge required to identify 
workable solutions. This includes farmers’ hands-on learning, practical experience and 
knowledge of the local context. This means there is a need to strengthen investment in 
finding and working with such knowledge sources. 
Knowledge diffusion (function 3) stresses the importance of multi-directional information 
flow in the biosecurity arena. This work illustrates that knowledge transfer to some groups, 
such as risk contributors who have limited incentive to address a biosecurity issue, may 
have limited effect. To achieve sustained, long term change, more innovative ways to 
address these sources of pest risks are needed, such as ‘smart regulation’.  
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Where the international and domestic trade contexts shape the conditions for pest 
management at the local level, the various knowledge systems within and across levels need 
to integrate in order to co-produce new knowledge to identify workable solutions 
(functions 2 and 3). Innovation platforms offer a way to achieve this. Coordinated multi-
directional information flow and co-evolution ensure trade conditions can be developed 
that meet the needs of both farmers and markets. As many stakeholder groups are present 
throughout the biosecurity system, as is evident from the QFly management innovation 
system, investment in knowledge brokering is fundamental to overcome cognitive 
differences and to facilitate a shared language. 
There is much evidence in the Australian biosecurity arena of ‘guidance of the search’ 
(function 4), including a wide range of pest and jurisdiction specific biosecurity strategies or 
action plans. What this research shows is that in the case of mobile pests where collective 
action is needed, there is also a need for ‘guidance of the search’ at the local level in the 
form of a shared vision. Achieving such shared vision can be difficult and can involve high 
transaction cost, especially in regions where there is heterogeneous on-farm aims. 
Investment in terms of time, effort and resources is required to achieve this. 
Market formation (function 5) for agricultural produce affected by biosecurity is highly 
regulated. This work illustrates that for biosecurity this function might be met by 
conservatism. Markets prefer not to experiment with new phytosanitary measures that have 
not been trialled and tested elsewhere. It suggests that higher investment might be required 
to create legitimacy for new phytosanitary measures (function 7) than would be expected 
for innovations beyond biosecurity. 
Mobilisation of resources (function 6) is a key challenge for Australian biosecurity where 
the demands on the biosecurity budget is increasing and government budget cuts are not 
uncommon (Higgins et al., 2016). In the Australian context, there is scope to further 
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explore ways to extract financial contributions from people who undertake behaviours that 
are regarded as risky to biosecurity (Waage and Mumford, 2008). For example, where key 
risk groups are required to contribute to biosecurity efforts in the form of levies or land 
taxes, potentially as part of a ‘smart regulation’ package. 
Fruit fly AWM demonstrates that for the creation of legitimacy (function 7) of new 
biosecurity approaches, efforts are needed at both the local level and in the market space to 
overcome prejudices, concerns and apathy. Where local industries need to take on roles 
and responsibilities that traditionally rested with government, there is a need for 
governments to find ways to give local industries legitimacy to do so. In the AWM context 
this includes dealing with town people and other risk contributors in the region who have 
little incentive to manage pests. It is important that these groups witness that government 
(state/territory governments in the Australian context) is backing industry’s efforts. This 
can come in the form of devolved power, or other forms of ‘smart regulation’, which 
signals that the pest issue at hand is of prime concern and addressing it is a high priority.  
Furthermore, in relation to literature about modern biosecurity approaches, the multi-level 
system that hangs off the international phytosanitary system presents several challenges. 
This work illustrates that the local level can easily become disconnected from higher 
institutional and support levels, manifesting in a range of issues. For example, there can be 
limited understanding of trade rules relating to a specific pest at the local level. Policy-
makers can easily underestimate the challenges for farmers to achieve cooperative pest 
management. In addition, the multi-stakeholder nature of the pest problems can easily 
result in a lack of a shared language between stakeholder groups—such as entomologists, 
market access experts, biosecurity administrators and farmers—challenging knowledge co-
production.  
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In relation to Australia’s push for partnerships and shared responsibility, this work 
demonstrates that several stakeholder groups need to maintain a fine balancing act, in 
particular all three levels of government. At the local level, state governments need to make 
trade-offs in meeting the expectations of different agricultural and non-agricultural groups 
inhabiting the rural space. Following on from the trend towards farmers losing their 
hegemony in rural areas, state governments tend to be reluctant to force the will of 
agricultural groups over that of other groups, such as town residents or peri-urban 
landholders. Likewise, the state/territory governments and the Australian Government 
need to balance maintaining legitimacy with farmers in their jurisdictions and fulfilling their 
phytosanitary biosecurity obligations. This means that these government agencies are both 
the partner and the regulator of local agriculture industries.  
5.4 Recommendations for further research 
As this research was based on three case studies, there is room to expand the empirical 
scope to see if the findings hold in other cases where industry-driven AWM is implemented 
or attempted. This could assist in identifying other local social factors that influence the 
feasibility of AWM (beyond those identified in 5.2.1 Principle 1. The local social profile 
influences the prospects of successful AWM). There are cases in Australia where forms of 
‘smart regulation’ are applied in AWM programs and they can provide insights about the 
implementation of complementary measures. Currently in Victoria QFly management 
coordinators are appointed at regional and state level. Much can be learned from this 
approach by applying an AIS lens. 
The research reported here illustrates that market requirements can have a considerable 
influence on the incentives that local resource users have to manage a resource. Yet it is 
seldom highlighted in literature about the commons (with some exceptions such as 
Markelova et al., 2009; Agrawal, 2001) and adaptive co-management, which are 
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predominantly conservation and environmental management oriented. Further research 
about how to deal with the market access component of some natural resources is needed. 
This includes strengthening insights about how to achieve a balance between the need for 
harmonisation in global biosecurity systems for trade and allowing local programs to adjust 
to the local context. 
More work is needed to understand how to strengthen institutional support for industry-
driven AWM programs. This includes how they can be best resourced, including under 
different circumstances, such as based on the benefits obtained and QFly risk posed by 
different groups within the AWM region. In addition, a more detailed actor-network 
analysis will provide deeper insights into how the operation of the fruit fly support and 
institutional network as a whole can be best strengthened, including in terms of the flow of 
information and resources. This would be most valuable in informing the design and 
management of innovation platforms to prevent unnecessary introduction of new 
structures. A comparative functional-structural analysis between QFly and other successful 
AWM programs is likely to provide further insights about how QFly AWM programs can 
be best supported by the broader QFly management AIS. Successful AWM programs 
include Australia’s sugar (Hunt et al., 2012) and cotton (Ferguson and Miles, 2002) 
industries, or the Hawaii fruit fly AWM program (Vargas et al., 2008). 
In the context of partnerships and shared responsibility, there is a need to investigate 
different forms of devolved power and ‘smart regulation’ to make local AWM programs 
more feasible, sustainable and less costly to industry. More research is required about the 
appropriate and feasible role of local governments in AWM programs, including the 
capacities and resources they need to support such programs. Most rural towns have 
residents who are passionate about the QFly cause. Further work can identify volunteer 
roles, such as possibly assisting with awareness-raising and education, distributing traps and 
other QFly management materials, trap monitoring, lobbying government and engaging 
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other businesses and groups for support. Understanding how best to deal with pest 
pressure from towns will benefit from a more in-depth study about how other countries 
and their regions deal with this issue. This includes understanding the underpinning logic in 
terms of how the role of the broader community in biosecurity is conceptualised by 
building on existing work such as that done by Barker (2010). More broadly, a comparison 
between Australian practice and how other countries conceptualise the role of government, 
industry and the community in biosecurity, including the underpinning logic and 
assumptions, will provide valuable insights into how to best and realistically define roles 
and responsibility of each partner, including for QFly management. 
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Appendix 1. Questions for Phase 1 case study interviews 
Note that questions were adjusted depending on who the interviewee was and what his/her 
role involved. 
1. Introduction prompts 
 Assurance about confidentiality of information provided 
 Obtain permission to record interview 
2. Tell me more about yourself and how QFly and AWM relate to you. (Prompts to 
growers include impacts on production; to growers and supply chain members ask 
about how does QFly affect market access) 
3. How does the AWM program operate?  
 Can you briefly explain how the program works? (prompt with how is QFly 
managed, who does the treatments, what is expected of growers, supply chain 
members and the town community, etc.?) 
 What do you think about what has been achieved to date? 
 How are the ‘rules of the game’ established? 
 Are there any consequences for those who do not support the program? 
 What are areas of ‘hidden cost’ for the program, if any? 
 What are the main challenges to the success of the program? 
 What has been the main enablers of the program so far?  
4. Let’s talk about the players in the AWM program.  
 Who are currently the main players in the program? 
 What are growers like in this region?  
 What sort of support does the program receive from government agencies? 
 What sort of support does the program receive from industry bodies? 
 What sort of support does the program receive from supply chain members? 
 What sort of support does the program receive from town communities and other 
landholders? 
 Who else do you think should be more involved? Why? 
5. Now I would like us to explore communication within and about the program.  
 How does communication within the program work? 
 How is the program promoted? 
 Do growers know who is supportive and who isn’t?  
 To what extent do growers encourage others to support the program? 
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Appendix 2. List of knowledge, capabilities and resources required for local 
industries to achieve fruit fly AWM 
 
1. Effective program administration and management 
 Ability to achieve a local shared vision and purpose  
 The ability to effectively implement the program cycle: 
 Planning – including setting shared vision and goals, developing a strategy and ‘rules 
of the game’ to achieve them, identifying needs and ways to fulfil them, making 
trade-offs, etc. 
 Implementation – incl. dealing with practicalities and unforeseen circumstances not 
considered in the planning phase. 
 Monitoring – including QFly numbers, uptake of recommended practice, etc. 
 The ability to effectively administer the program, including organising regular meetings, 
developing action points, follow up, minute writing, record-keeping, etc.  
 The ability to carry out sound financial management of the program. 
 Process skills – Meeting facilitation, negotiation, conflict management, etc.  
 The ability to secure start-up and long-term funding, in-kind and other forms of 
support, including funding for contingencies – effective application writing, networking, 
relationship-building, etc. 
 Understanding broader institutional requirements that might apply, such as public 
liability and professional indemnity.  
 A form of policing to ensure compliance.  
2. Effective stakeholder interaction 
 Establish combined effort to get all stakeholders on the same page, including to achieve 
collective action.  
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 Access to networks to reach key people in the local community, government and other 
key stakeholder groups and gain their support. 
 Implementing effective engagement processes for different stakeholder groups, 
including the ability to reach large numbers of people without losing sight of the 
importance of one-on-one engagement. 
 The ability to monitor engagement processes to effectively respond to opportunities and 
issues. 
 Understanding the drivers for compliance and non-compliance and how these vary over 
time, for example, the effect of on-farm QFly pressure, market access requirements, 
fluctuating commodity prices, etc. 
 Increase uptake of recommended practice, including developing incentives for 
compliance. 
 The ability to develop effective engagement materials and tools. 
 The engagement of local leader(s) and champion(s) who are able to inspire and maintain 
motivation and a share vision to underpin local collective action. 
 Find workable solutions to deal with other sources of QFly infestation risk, such as 
derelict orchards and travellers carrying fresh produce into the region. 
 Support for growers along the way (‘hand-holding and reassurance’) while they build 
their confidence in the system. 
 Ability to develop and implement effective conflict management process(es). 
 
3. Understanding QFly behaviour and on-ground control in the target region 
Overall 
 Knowledge of QFly biology and behaviour, including host range, temperature 
thresholds, behaviour, lifecycle, number of generations per year, reproduction and 
dispersion capacity, the distance QFly travels, etc.  
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Understanding options 
 Understanding QFly behaviour within the target region all year round, its risk pathways 
and movement. This includes knowing the role of different hosts and alternative food 
sources for development and survival, timing of fruit ripening of all potential hosts, and 
maturity stage preference. In practice, typically this would require identifying the 
location of and describing: 
 the target region's boundaries and sub-regions (e.g. river, non-arable land, forest)  
 QFly host material (size, numbers, type of management), including commercial, 
backyard, council, abandoned and feral hosts 
 potential QFly overwintering refuges and other hot spots. 
 Understanding current on-ground control options and how to prevent QFly moving 
between locations, including pros and cons of each option and how they relate to the 
local context. This includes knowing the type, spread, location of existing or planned 
traps for monitoring, as well as the application of fruit testing, baiting, cover spraying 
programs, male annihilation technique and sterile insect technique. 
Ability to implement 
 Ability to consistently implement chosen QFly control methods across the district. 
 
4. Market access  
Overall 
 Understanding the market access application and approval process, including ways to 
maximise opportunities and enough understanding of the politics involved to have 
realistic expectations.  
 Understanding the IPPC requirements and guidelines in relation to QFly, the related 
control approaches and measures and the limitations of IPPC guidance. For example, 
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guidance about systems approaches involves broad statements whilst details remain 
under-developed; hence there is variation in how countries interpret them. 
 Understanding the expectations of current and potential trading partners. 
 Understanding the meaning and impact of various treatment modes of actions and 
standards (e.g. physical, chemical and irradiation), the concept of probit levels, and the 
concepts of dependant and independent measures.  
 Understanding the importance and limitations of verification activities including 
inspections, fruit cuts and other methods that might verify various aspects of a pest 
control program. 
Understanding options 
 Understanding the pre- and post-harvest phytosanitary measures available, their pros 
and cons, e.g. system approaches, trade windows, pest free areas, pest free places of 
production, areas of low pest prevalence, including relating to setting-up and 
implementing the measures and the on-going monitoring and verification likely to be 
expected from trading partners. 
 Understanding how to obtain rigorous data, where needed, to demonstrate the 
effectiveness and efficacy of phytosanitary measures to support a market access 
application. 
 Alternative chemicals, e.g. those registered for use in other commodities or regions, but 
not registered for QFly. 
 Understanding of the documentation requirements relating to different phytosanitary 
measures, both for the application process and on-going monitoring once accepted and 
implemented. 
 Understanding how to ‘package’ the above into a workable system, including 
verification steps. 
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Ability to achieve and maintain market access 
 Ability to develop an effective market access application. 
 Ability to gather information needed to provide scientific evidence of the effectiveness 
of proposed phytosanitary measures, including possibly engaging third parties to 
conduct trials to generate the needed data. 
 Ability to consistently implement and ensure monitoring of phytosanitary measures. 
 Ability to fulfil documentation requirements relating to chosen phytosanitary measures. 
 Ability to identify and implement suitable procedures and corrective actions for dealing 
with non-conformities and non-compliance. 
 The ability to consistently produce fruit (in export boxes) that are free from 
phytosanitary risk. 
5. Other 
 Knowledge of the region’s QFly management history, including historic data records 
and QFly behaviour under certain conditions. This might require access to government 
trap data. 
 Knowledge of the region's weather history and how it interacts with trends in QFly 
populations. 
 Understanding government and other stakeholders’ logic and policy paradigms that set 
the context for current decision-making. 
 Projected future trends of QFly in the region, e.g. under climate change. 
 Stay up to date with new developments in research and development. 
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Appendix 3. Grower survey questions  
(The Riverina survey is used as an example here) 
Riverina QFly Grower survey 2015  
Many thanks for your willingness to take part in the survey about how Queensland Fruit Fly (QFly) impacts you; what you think about different 
management methods; and how you view collaboration and support in this area. 
1)  What is you postcode? _____________  
2) Please rate the impact that QFly has had on your horticulture operation over the last 12 months. 
 
No 
impact 
Low 
impact 
Medium 
impact 
High 
impact 
Don't 
know 
Produce quality      
Production cost due to the need for on-farm QFly management      
Ability to access markets      
Production cost due to the need for post-harvest treatments       
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3) How important is the income you get from horticulture as part of your total household income? 
– Most or all of our income comes from horticulture 
m – Horticulture income is important, but other income sources can sustain us 
– Horticulture makes a small or no contribution to our total household income 
 
4) Which of the following statements best describe the future goals for your horticulture production? 
ow some or all aspects of the horticulture operation 
 
 
 
Let's have a look at QFly management practices. We would like to know which ones you apply or have applied in the past. 
As well, we would like to know what you think about different practices in terms of their effectiveness, practicality and cost. 
5) Which of the following QFly management activities have been applied in your horticulture operation (or part thereof), either currently or 
in the past? 
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6) Have you employed a crop consultant to assist you with QFly management during the last 12 months? 
 
 
7) Would you invest in contract spraying for QFly, if it was available? 
 
 
 
 
 
8) How do you prefer a contract spraying service to operate? 
 The contractor is a packhouse employee and the payments for the service comes out of my delivered produce 
 The contractor runs in conjunction with the packhouse and the payments for the service comes out of my delivered produce 
 The contractor is independent from the packhouse and I pay the contractor directly 
 I have no preference about how such scheme operates 
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9) What do you think about QFly trapping as part of monitoring QFly prevalence? Please rate the statements. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
Trap monitoring is an effective way that assists in managing QFly      
I can easily fit in trap monitoring as part of other on-farm activities      
Trap monitoring makes little difference to on-farm cost      
I know how to do monitoring based on best recommended practice      
10) What do you think about in-field inspections for QFly prevalence? Please rate the statements. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
In-field crop inspections are an effective way to prevent QFly damage      
I can easily fit in in-field crop inspections for QFly as part of other on-farm 
activities 
     
In-field crop inspections for QFly makes little difference to on-farm cost      
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11) What do you think about bait spraying for QFly? Please rate the statements. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
Bait spraying is an effective way of managing QFly      
I can easily fit in bait spraying as part of other on-farm activities      
Bait spraying makes little difference to on-farm cost      
Bait spraying causes no quality concerns to produce      
I know how to apply bait spray based on best recommended practice      
 
12) What do you think about Male Annihilation Technique (MAT) for QFly? Please rate the statements. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
MAT is an effective way of managing QFly      
I can easily fit in applying MAT as part of other on-farm activities      
MAT makes little difference to on-farm cost      
I know how to apply MAT based on best recommended practice      
MAT distorts QFly trapping for monitoring      
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13) What do you think about picking-up fallen fruit? Please rate the statements. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
Picking-up fallen fruit is an effective way to prevent QFly proliferation      
I can easily fit in picking-up fruit as part of other on-farm activities      
Picking-up fruit makes little difference to on-farm cost      
 
14) What do you think about mulching fallen fruit into the soil? Please rate the statements. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
Mulching fallen fruit into the soil is an effective way to prevent QFly proliferation      
I can easily fit in mulching fallen fruit into the soil as part of other on-farm activities      
Mulching fallen fruit into the soil makes little difference to on-farm cost      
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15) This question has four components. Please answer in the table provided below. 
 
a. List the horticulture crops grown for sale on your property during the last 12 months 
 
b. Indicate the level of QFly management for each to prevent QFly infestation 
(Note: The level of QFly management needed for each crop will depend on its susceptibility and growing season. Please base your answer in relation to the recommended best practice for the crop in your 
area. Here is a guide:  
 Highest – You are applying recommended best practice. This typically involves weekly bait sprays, MAT, regular crop monitoring and orchard/crop sanitation 
 Strong – You are doing a fair bit to manage QFly but not as much as for recommended best practice 
 Some –You are doing some things to control QFly 
 None – Nothing is done to prevent QFly 
 Mostly cover sprays – Depended mostly on cover sprays to manage QFly 
 NA - Crop not susceptible – Not applicable, the crop is grown in a season when QFly is not prevalent and/or QFly has little affinity for the crop 
 
c. Crop damage during the last 12 months 
 
d. Production area - Please estimate the area under production for each crop (you can use either hectares or acres) 
 
 
CROP 
(write in) 
LEVEL OF QFLY MANAGEMENT LEVEL OF QFLY DAMAGE 
PRODUCTION 
AREA  
(choose one unit) 
Acres Ha 
  
Highest Strong Some None 
Mostly cover 
sprays 
NA - Not 
susceptible 
None Low High 
Crop 
destroyed   
1.              
2.              
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CROP 
(write in) 
LEVEL OF QFLY MANAGEMENT LEVEL OF QFLY DAMAGE 
PRODUCTION 
AREA  
(choose one unit) 
Acres Ha 
  
Highest Strong Some None 
Mostly cover 
sprays 
NA - Not 
susceptible 
None Low High 
Crop 
destroyed   
3.              
4.              
5.              
6.              
7.              
8.              
 
16) Do you have other QFly host plants on your land including in your backyard or around sheds? This includes most fruit and vegetables, 
loquat trees, feijoas, etc. 
 
– What is the overall level of QFly management in the other host plants around your house and sheds? 
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17) Let’s look at a view more of your views. How much do you agree with the following statements? 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
QFly infestation on nearby land makes it more difficult to manage QFly on my land      
I am actively involved in grower groups where the issue of QFly is discussed from time to time      
My level of on-farm profitability has no impact on my level of QFly control      
Other on-farm pressures have no impact on my level of QFly control      
 
Now we want to know what you think about other people, groups and organisations and their support for QFly management. 
In particular, do you think they know how to, want to and is able to do what is needed from them?  
18) How much do you agree with these statements about full-time growers in your region? 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
All full-time horticulture growers know how to manage QFly       
All full-time horticulture growers are serious about managing QFly on their land      
All full-time horticulture growers are able to manage QFly on their properties, including having 
the needed money, time and equipment to get it done 
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19) How much do you agree with these statements about part-time growers (such as people on smaller acreage blocks) in your region? 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
All part-time horticulture growers know how to manage QFly      
All part-time horticulture growers are serious about managing QFly on their properties       
All part-time horticulture growers are able of controlling QFly on their properties, including 
having the needed money, time and equipment to get it done 
     
 
20) How much do you agree with these statements about QFly pressure from towns. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
QFly breeding in towns increases QFly pressure for horticulture farms in our region      
All town residents understand the QFly issues faced in our region      
Town residents will sufficiently manage QFly in their yards when there are regular education 
and awareness-raising activities 
     
QFly treatments on public land are an effective way of reducing QFly pressure in our region 
(such as baiting, trap monitoring and MAT blocks along town streets)  
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21) How much do you agree with these statements about the Riverina Biosecurity Inc (RBI)? 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
RBI knows how to minimise QFly pressure in the Riverina      
RBI is serious about helping us to minimise QFly pressure in the Riverina      
RBI is capable of minimising QFly pressure in the Riverina (including having the needed 
funding, influence, etc.) 
     
I have a good understanding of what RBI does      
 
22) How much do you agree with these statements about your local council (local government)? 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
The Council knows how to minimise QFly pressure in our region      
The Council is serious about helping us to minimise QFly pressure in our region with the 
resources they have 
     
The Council is capable of minimising QFly pressure in our region (including the needed 
funding, influence, etc.) 
     
The Council knows how to minimise QFly pressure in our region      
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23) How much do you agree with the statements below about the New South Wales Department of Primary Industries (NSWDPI)? 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
NSWDPI knows how to minimise QFly pressure in our region      
NSWDPI is serious about helping us to minimise QFly pressure with the resources they have      
NSWDPI is capable of supporting us to minimise QFly pressure (including having the needed 
staff, funding, etc.) 
     
NSWDPI is helping us to help ourselves to overcome our QFly problems      
24) How much do you agree with the statements below about the Local Land Services? 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
LLS knows how to minimise QFly pressure in our region      
LLS is serious about helping us to minimise QFly pressure with the resources they have      
LLS is capable of supporting us to minimise QFly pressure (including having the needed staff, 
funding, etc.) 
     
LLS is helping us to help ourselves to overcome our QFly problems      
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25) Who do you believe is the most appropriate group for overseeing on-ground QFly control in your region? 
  
 
 
 
growers impacted by QFly 
 
 
Let's talk about QFly and market access ... 
 
26) Are you, or are you interested in, supplying citrus to QFly-sensitive markets? 
 
– Please skip to question 32 on p16. 
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27) How much do you agree with the following statements? 
 
Note: Area-wide management refers to coordinated pest management across a region, including on farmland and in towns.  
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
I understand what is meant by using a systems approach for market access      
I understand what an ‘Area of Low Pest Prevalence’ means in the context of market access      
Area-wide management is the way of the future to manage QFly      
An ‘area of low pest prevalence’ is valuable in negotiating domestic market access as part of a 
systems approach 
     
An ‘area of low pest prevalence’ is valuable in negotiating international market access as part of 
a systems approach 
     
28) How much do you agree with these statements about the role of Riverina Biosecurity Inc (RBI) in strengthening market access? 
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
RBI understands the QFly-related issues that hinder our market access      
RBI is serious about helping growers overcome QFly-related barriers to market access      
RBI is capable of making a significant difference to reducing QFly-related barriers to market access 
(including working with the right government people) 
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29) How much do you agree with these statements about Citrus Australia?  
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
Citrus Australia understands our QFly-related issues that hinder market access      
Citrus Australia is serious about helping our local industry overcome the QFly-related issues 
that hinder market access 
     
Citrus Australia is capable of supporting our local industry to overcome the QFly-related issues 
that hinder market access? 
     
 
30) How much do you agree with these statements about NSWDPI?  
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
NSWDPI understands our QFly-related issues that hinder market access      
NSWDPI is serious about helping our local industry overcome the QFly-related issues that 
hinder market access 
     
NSWDPI is capable of supporting our local industry to overcome the QFly–related issues that 
hinder market access 
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31) How much do you agree with these statements about the Australian Government Department of Agriculture (DoA) in Canberra?  
  
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Don't 
know 
DoA understands our QFly-related issues that hinder our overseas market access      
DoA is serious about helping our local industry overcome the QFly-related issues that hinder 
overseas market access 
     
DoA is capable of supporting our local industry to overcome the QFly-related issues that 
hinder overseas market access 
     
 
 
About your information sources for QFly management... 
32) Where did you learn about QFly? Please mark your top two sources. 
 
 
growers 
 
 
 
    ....Please turn over.... 
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her – Write In: _________________________________________________ 
 
33) If you had QFly-related questions now, where would you look for information? Mark your top two sources. 
 
 
 
 
DPI Print material    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
– Write In: _________________________________________________ 
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A bit more about yourself... 
34) What is your highest level of formal education? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35) How old are you? 
-30 years 
-45 years 
-60 years 
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36) Do you have any other remarks you would like us to be aware off? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Thank you for taking our survey. Your response is very important to us.  
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Appendix 4. Phase 2 interview questions 
Introduction prompts: 
 Assurance about confidentiality of information provided 
 Obtain permission to record interview 
Background 
1) Please tell me about yourself and your role and how it relates to QFly management. 
Current role 
2) What is your understanding of your organisation’s role in the challenge of QFly? 
3) What is your understanding of your organisation’s role in advancing on-ground QFly control, for 
example, in assisting local industries to achieve a form of AWM? 
4) What is your understanding of your organisation’s role in advancing market access for local 
industries where QFly is a market access barrier? 
5) What are the main barriers to your organisation providing support to local industries in relation 
to AWM? 
6) From your perspective, what are the key knowledge and capabilities that local industries need to 
achieve AWM (ignoring for a moment the list that I sent through)? 
7) What do you think is the potential for AWM as part of a systems approach to underpin market 
access?  
8) What are the key knowledge, capabilities and resources that local industries need to achieve 
access to QFly-sensitive markets using a systems approach involving AWM (ignoring for a moment 
the list that I sent through)? 
Verification of knowledge, capabilities and resources list 
Here is a draft list of knowledge, capabilities and resources that I put together based on previous 
interviews, focus groups and literature. (Show list. If interviewee mentioned capabilities, knowledge or resources not 
on list, acknowledge them with a promise to add them).  
9) Are there any other knowledge, capabilities or resources you would like to add? 
10) Are there any knowledge, capabilities or resources listed that you disagree with? 
Potential role 
11) Based on this list, in which of these areas, besides what you already mentioned, do you believe 
your organisation can potentially support local industries? 
12) How can local industries secure that support? 
Conclusion 
13) Is there anything else you would like to add?  
